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TABLE OF CONTENT

HANS JONAS' CONCEPT OF LIFE AND RESPONSIBILITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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Abstract
The paper examines Hans Jonas' thought on life and responsibility which is embedded in his books: *The Phenomenon of Life* and *The Imperative of Responsibility*. In the Phenomenon of life, Jonas articulated the core of his philosophy which is thought to be an existential interpretation of biological fact. He argues that purposive existence is not a special attribute of human beings but is present throughout living nature. In the imperative of Responsibility, Jonas provides an ontological grounding of his ethical obligation to nature and to us as special product of its evolutionary labour. The paper goes further to analyse Jonas' discourse on life and the question of responsibility through analysing some of his key concepts and discourse on the concept of life and responsibility. It is discussed as follows: introduction, some methodological considerations, Jonas' thought on life, Jonas's thought on responsibility, evaluation and conclusion.

Introduction
This paper analyses Hans Jonas' conception of human life as discussed in his book titled: *The Phenomenon of Life*. And his concept of responsibility as embedded in his book titled: *The Imperative of Responsibility*. It examines the relations between the concepts of Life and Responsibility in the discourse of Hans Jonas with a view to understand the relations between them as discussed in these books and their extension in his discourse. Susanna Lindberg sees these books as the matured period of his Jonas' life (1). Accordingly, the bold and provocative philosophy of Hans Jonas' matured period is an attempt to answer a single burning question: how could *life* be an object of *responsibility*? Or, to put it in another way, given that our time is determined by the overwhelming presence of technology, how can we get aware of the requirements of life on the one hand and of responsibility on the other? Technology, as a domain of inanimate and extramural processes, generates a tendency to exclude the fundamental experiences of life and responsibility from the domain of thought and to assign them to the vague region of feeling and faith. Henceforth, the task of philosophy is to comprehend life and responsibility and, what is more, to show the fundamental interdependence of these two problems that might, at the outset, seem to exclude one another.

Some Methodological Considerations
According to Lindberg Jonas' work is often willingly outrageous (2). Despite his phenomenological origins, he thinks in terms of teleology instead of intentionality, or of freedom and necessity instead of possibility and impossibility, and he cherishes the notions of interiority and exteriority. This vocabulary probably makes him more understandable to the scientific modernity that he is primarily addressing. However, a present-day reader would appreciate the supplementary precision he might have achieved if he had confronted some of his predecessors more directly: the 19th century philosophers of nature and modern phenomenologist (Lindberg 3).

In general, Jonas braves the phenomenological interdiction to step beyond the phenomena: not that he would propose a hidden ground that would justify the existence of life on earth, but his description surpasses the given towards certain rational constructions. For him, life is not the problem of the 'living presence' in phenomenological observation. Life is an ontological problem (Lindberg 3). Now, we know how Heidegger reopened the ontological problem as the question of human existence, and of the totality of being as far as it becomes *Dasein'*s question. From Heidegger's

perspective, the living being as such appears to be incomprehensible and disquieting, and that is how, Jonas observes, nature ends by practically falling outside of Heidegger's thought (perhaps confined solely to technoscience) (Jonas *The Phenomenon of Life*, 280).

Lindberg opines that Jonas's principle of life is not alien to Heidegger's thought but on the contrary an extension of a Heideggerian way of thinking into a domain that the latter would finally have overlooked (3). To put it briefly, if Heidegger's thought opens out from the experience of death and Arendt's from the phenomenon of "natality", Jonas examines what happens between these absolute limits starting from the fundamental experience of *hunger*. Jonas's principle of life could be interpreted as a Heideggerian interpretation of Aristotle's *De Anima*. And in fact, his very first experience of live philosophising was Heidegger's seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima* in 1921. Furthermore, Jonas's approach resembles Heidegger's description of the animality on which Jonas does not comment, unfortunately for us. We will see how Jonas, like Heidegger, examines the animal's 'selfness' and justifies this through our possible 'privative access' to the animality, that he bases on our capacity to *follow* a living being's experience, if not *share* it (Jonas *The Phenomenon of Life*, 285).

Jonas turns precisely towards this nature, whose *being* has, from Kant to Heidegger, been defined as the limit of the philosophical interrogation, like an indescribable black hole that indistinctly gives being and retires its grounds(Jonas *The Phenomenon of Life*, 286). Heidegger might still agree with Jonas's way of taking nature's being as a groundless givenness. But Heidegger would not follow Jonas's effort to define the *essence* of this nature, and wonder not only *that* it is and *how* it is, but *what* it is. Through the question *what?* Jonas enters into the domain of speculations, rational constructions and even of mythological illustrations. What is life? Can we 'see' it; can we answer such a question without a speculation? Is Jonas right in claiming that representation – and consequently speculation – is peculiar to man to such an extent that, contrary to what Heidegger says, the faculty of images and the correlative conception of truth as *adaequatio* are more originally than truth as *aletheia*? The very possibility of Jonas's philosophical biology depends on this supposition that he practices consciously without treating it extensively (Jonas *The Phenomenon of Life*, 292). Jonas holds that life as nature's being might be for us strange and most mysterious. Now, Jonas does not ponder on the secrecy of the secret but claims, on the contrary, that we can understand (if not necessarily know) the essence of life. According to him, we can understand life because we are living ourselves (*The Phenomenon of Life*, 155). This leads to two movements. Firstly, we understand the living, thanks to a kind of a *sympathy* or an affinity which allows us to *recognise* another life experience, even if, on the other hand, its singular experience is precisely what we cannot *share*. Secondly, we understand lower life forms by *privation* (for instance, the animals have senses without images, the plants have metabolism without senses, etc.) In this way, Jonas establishes a *hierarchy of being* which starts from pure matter, develops through the simplest living organisms through the higher animals up to the human being.

David Levy commenting on the thought of Jonas from an epistemological point of view stated that these movements are intolerable: imagining another living being's experience through *analogy* with ourselves and establishing a hierarchy of beings whose *summit* we ourselves are is an anthropomorphic gesture that relies on imagination (30). To start with, Jonas understands life as an experience and an event, which are in any case outside of ordinary epistemological approaches. Either we admit the possibility of somehow understanding another being's experience, or we back ourselves into a sceptic's solipsism, which Jonas takes to be simply a logical illusion. In the last instance, however, Jonas justifies his presumed 'intellectual faults' with an ethical concern. For example, contrary to what Descartes claimed and although we cannot *prove* it, Jonas thinks that we *know* that animals can suffer, and that is why we *must* treat them as feeling creatures. And whatever logical errors this might entail, we are ethically obliged to bring this knowledge into the sphere of philosophy, instead of leaving it to the vague domain of feeling, religion and conviction.

On the other hand, putting the human being at the summit of the living world and attributing to him certain 'nobility' is certainly disturbing – but for Jonas, it primarily means that we have an ethical responsibility towards the rest of nature, whereas the inverse is not true. The human being's 'nobility' does not make him the master and commander of nature without engaging a most demanding responsibility that corresponds to the human power of devastation. Such an approach is anthropocentric and even biblical, but it is not nonsensical. It can be elucidated through a comparison to Levinas' position. Levinas also thinks that we cannot *share* the Other's experience, but we know *that* he has one, and this knowledge contributes to our responsibility for him (Levinas 43). Jonas simply extends such a responsibility to the entire living world and to its future, and tries to find out what we actually can know about another living being's life – knowing that we cannot live it.

According to David Levy giving an *ontological foundation* to an ethics, Jonas is conscious of making a disputable move (38). Heidegger, Jonas's mentor and closest reference, would not use his 'ontology' in order to develop an ethical imperative; and Arendt, Jonas's lifelong friend, would not found her political considerations on an ontological doctrine. Jonas knows and accepts this, and feels nevertheless an urge to brave what he takes to be a properly modern interdiction. I think that in the last instance, could justify his approach by stating that the living as such, being incapable of speech and even of the pure address that defines Levinas' *Other*, is definitely incapable of demanding justice in the sphere of politics.

According to Levy in order to cope with the unease this silence creates, we need another view of the foundations of the political sphere of thought. In this regard, the sciences cannot help us, because they have precisely caused this unease by transforming the natural being into a mere object. In this context, Jonas's definition of life as an experience also becomes an inquiry into *what*, in bare life, can appeal to us and engage our responsibility. Jonas does not conclude on a Schopenhauerian compassion or on an overwhelming obligation in regard to the living. But he endeavours to re-determine the minimal, formal requirements of an ethical situation. For instance, the object of responsibility must be capable of life – present, future or past life. And henceforth, the human being's responsibility, being such that he *must* do what he *can*, must finally encompass life itself as that which has become his most vulnerable other.

Jonas' Theory of life
Naturally, all of the aforementioned problems must finally be judged in relation to Jonas's theory of life. The question therefore is: What does Jonas understand by "life"? According to Jonas (*The Phenomenon of Life* 3), life is an ontological category. It is his interpretation of being that is particularly indebted to Aristotle's *On the Soul* and to Heidegger's teaching. In *The Phenomenon of Life*, Jonas reminds us of the two principal points of view on life in the history of western thought. The Ancients considered being in general as life (and confronted death as the major inexplicable mystery). On the contrary, since the Renaissance, the Moderns saw natural beings as lifeless bodies submitted to mechanical movements (henceforth, life is the inexplicable problem). Turning against the prevailing scientific world view much in the same way as Heidegger in his critique of the epoch of the technique, Jonas does not seek to re-establish the antique vision of nature as the sacred. Instead, he wishes to pierce the contemporary, scientific world view's blind spot by opening ontology of life that modern sciences would presuppose and yet ignore, or even repress.

Being as Life
Life is Jonas's interpretation of *being*. A living being does not subsist, like the dead body of Cartesian mechanics:- it's being is a *having-to-be*. It is purely its own *act* of being. It resembles Heidegger's *Dasein*, whose existence is a purely transitive having-to-be, except that a living being as such, for instance an amoeba, does not *question* its own being. The difference between Jonas's 'life' and Heidegger's 'existence' is precisely this *question* that reveals existence, and not life, to itself.

Jonas (*The Phenomenon of Life*, 50) holds that life remains an ontological category because the living being's having-to-be is its struggle with its nonbeing. Life is a being's auto-affirmation against the constant and overwhelming possibility of its nonbeing. In other words, life is essentially mortal, and according to Jonas, all living beings, and not only man, know the anguish before death. A living being is a tension between birth and death, coming from nothing and passing on to nothing and, stretched between these absolute limits, is a constant becoming.

Self and world

According to Jonas's fundamental thesis, any living being as such is a *self*. This is a controversial point. It has been said that Jonas's concept of self is a mere transposition of the human being's own self-understanding onto all living beings. It would be a pre-constituted entity that prevents us from seeing life as an auto-constitution and an individuation (Lindberg 14). In an excellent study, which is also rare because it specifically treats Jonas's concept of life, he states that Jonas's selfness presupposes a pre-constituted individuality, which prevents him from seeing 'the true being of life' and from developing an 'authentic phenomenology of life'. Accordingly, 'We have to understand life not as a property of an already constituted living being, but as the act by which it constitutes itself and individuates itself (Jonas, *Phenomenon of Life*, 54.) However, as Jonas says that self is not a stable state but a free movement of creating oneself from one instant to another, the issue is far from being evident (Jonas, *Phenomenon of Life*, 55.).For Lindberg, the difficulty is due less to the utilisation of the notion of 'self' than to the slight obscurity of Jonas's notion of 'form'.

What does Jonas mean by 'self"? Selfness is always a *relation to oneself*. When selfness characterises even the simplest living beings, like amoebas, it cannot be self consciousness. In this regard, the simple definition of life as a having-to-be opens up the dimension of primitive selfness. Here, the simple ontological auto-affirmation bends the living being back onto itself. For Jonas (*Phenomenon of Life* 152) the question of selfness is coextensive with the question of the world. Accordingly, living means being-in-a-world and having-a-world or, in other words, life is transcendence. The ontological character of having-a-world presents the world as the 'other' that does not just occur to the living being but conditions its very possibility of being.

This 'other' is the second factor that turns the living being back onto itself. When for Heidegger, the human being has a world and the living being is poor-of-world, Jonas considers that all living beings *have a world*, whereas the human being's distinctive feature would be his capacity of *having himself*, too, in his images, which would be impossible for the animals. However, when the relation to the world is defined as a *having*, whether it be 'rich' or 'poor', it means that the living being is not *one* with its world but separated from it.This separation is characterised by the living being's effort to *appropriate* (something of) its world. In other words, self is not coextensive with the world but oddly separated from it.

Jonas (*Phenomenon of Life*, 153; *Imperative of Responsibility*, 27) opines that mortality and world-relation determine the finitude of the living being. For him, the living being's birth and death open up a primary *temporal* sense of life's finitude. The otherness of the world opens up a primary *spatial* sense of the living being's finitude. As both dimensions of life's finitude have their roots in life as an act, they are actively synthesized by and as the living being's life and not given externally in passing, we can note that because the living being's essence is its exposure to something other, there are necessarily *many* beings. The idea of exposure and the idea of the plurality of being go hand in hand and one supposes the other.

Jonas studies the world relation of the living being on three levels. These correspond to the divisions of Aristotle's *PeriPsykhe*: metabolism, the animal's perception, movement and feeling, and the human being's capacity of imaging. On the most elementary level, any living being as such 'has a

world' in its *metabolism*. Metabolism is generally discarded from philosophical reflection as a simple process of absorption and excretion in view of remaining the same. On the contrary, Jonas gives it a highly philosophical status as the first ontological manifestation of freedom. Of course, a living being's freedom is conditional. The exterior world is a domain of necessity facing it. It is as impossible to choose another factual world as it is to choose one's birth or immortality. Nevertheless, it is a freedom. Metabolism shows that a living being is not just an inert object of external influences but relates actively to its environment. Even on the simplest level, metabolism is 'creative' because it implies choice and chance (Jonas *Phenomenon of Life*, 153; *Imperative of Responsibility*, 27 - 28).

Metabolism produces a division of interiority and exteriority (and not the other way round: interiority and exteriority are not pre-constituted, self-sufficient entities but are constituted in this intercourse). The interiority is constituted as an *affection* of something 'exterior' in such a way that the affected being becomes affected itself (*Imperative of Responsibility*, 28). Jonas says that the living being is *exposed*. In the core of its being, it is open to the world. In other words, a living being's self is an *ecstasy*, that is to say, something that has the ground of its being outside of itself. There is no separate interiority into which the living being might retire, for its interiority *is* its exposition to the exterior world. So the living being is simultaneously separated from the world and open to it (*Phenomenon of Life*, 155; *Imperative of Responsibility*, 29).

Jonas calls this relation of 'having a world' (which also implies the possibility of missing it and being mistaken about it) as an *experience*. It is a free experience of constituting oneself with what the world gives or denies; an experience where choice and hazard play fundamental roles. This experience is essentially temporal. The living being's self is never ready but it is constituted anew every instant. Yet, as far as there is a self-identity, Jonas thinks we must suppose an elementary temporal synthesis of such changing states. This implies that in an elementary sense, all living beings have a memory and a relation to the future or, rather, a trace and a desire of experience (*Phenomenon of Life*, 156; *Imperative of Responsibility*, 30). At the juncture of exposition and alterity, life is an original auto-production, auto-mimesis or auto-technique – it is the original movement of *fysis* such as Aristotle has presented it. Below, we will come to certain critical points which might delimit the scope of this affirmation.

The fundamental freedom of life is rooted in metabolism, but its adventurous character becomes manifest in *animal life*. When pure metabolism is based on *contact*, the proper character of animal life is *distance*. Thanks to the distance, the animal is not simply surrounded by an immediate exteriority, but synthesises a real space time, a genuine world. The distance has three principal dimensions: *perception* opens out a spatial and proto-theoretical gap; *mobility* opens out a temporal, proto-practical gap; and *feeling* relates the animal to itself as a desiring, a teleological active creature that is always separated from its aims. The animal is essentially a being of passion, where passion denotes a distance from the source of desire. Its freedom is manifested in its capacity to transcend itself by responding to its passion with an action. For Jonas, such an action has a teleological character. Being the root of any living being's action, teleology is not a conscious, willing procedure but a constant, instinctive invention, by which the animal reaches the source of its passion: its world and, correlatively, itself (*Phenomenon of Life*, 159; *Imperative of Responsibility*, 43).

Teleology is a way of following the detour through the world that brings the living being back to itself. In essence, if metabolism shows life as a border within the world, animal life shows the width of this border. This width is an absolute abyss that the animal crosses constantly without ever closing the gap (each crossing is a leap over an impossibility of rejoining the edges). Animality means crossing the distance towards the world and following the detour through the world. Its multiple activities could be condensed in the archaic polysemy of the world 'sense' that has often been pointed out. The animal *senses* its world, *feels* itself, acts in the *direction* of its being-in-the-world, and finally

the capacity of such a sensible directedness can be called the animal's *sense*, if not 'reason'.

Jonas locates the third kind of a world relation in the 'transanimality' of the human being. According to Lindberg, Jonas sees the *differentia specifica* of man as his capacity of imaging. The capacity of imaging extends the human world far beyond the simple animal opening towards *absent* places, times and persons (and not simply distant ones). It gives place to fiction and theory, and it equally founds the possibility of a genuine social world. In order to have a full idea of the transanimality of the human being, we still ought to consider *homo-pictor's* capacity of responsibility. The human being's responsibility is for Jonas a massive thesis, even if he does not include the ethical specificity of the human being in his deduction of the different forms of life. Jonas thinks that in the end, the human being's capacity of responsibility is finally the most human counterpart of the straightforward teleology of life.

Such would be the outlines of Jonas's theory of selfness that is developed through different ways of 'having a world'. Does Jonas's recourse to the notion of 'self' exclude him from a genuine phenomenology of life? No doubt this is so if the phenomenological rigour obliges us to constrain ourselves to what appears. However, when one examines another being's *experience*, one necessarily confronts something that does not present itself to us, and I think nothing prevents us from calling such an experience a selfness in an *ontological* consideration. But in that case, such a 'self' is more than a simple extrapolation of the human self-consciousness onto other living beings. It refers to the singular plurality of existence.

One problem remains, however. Jonas often assimilates his notions of 'self' and 'identity' to that of 'form'. In consequence, he often explains metabolism as if the self met the world simply like a form meets matter: filling itself with different materials but remaining fundamentally 'same.' Such a view on metabolism, especially if it is extended to perception, movement, feeling and image, is effectively out-dated. Moreover, this interpretation of self-identity contradicts Jonas' own ontological point of view, according to which metabolism is precisely the origin of the most fundamental freedom and creativity, thanks to which the living being precisely does not remain the same. In order to evaluate this incoherence – which remains indelible in Jonas's system – we have to examine Jonas's notion of form more closely, which is for him is a teleological issue.

Life as Teleology

Jonas explains life's becoming as an internal teleology – and he does it knowing that teleological explanations have long since been discarded from science and philosophy. At stake then is the understanding of the very essence of teleology. Jonas refers to Aristotle's presentation of the teleological movement of life but he modifies it by examining the teleological constitution of the form expressly *as* a movement of being. Jonas opts for teleology in order to avoid certain dead ends in the consideration of living beings (*The Imperative of Responsibility*, 53).

In Jonas (*Phenomenon of Life,* 158), the mechanist explanations simply misses the phenomenon of life, and there is certainly no point in returning to creationist ones, either. Darwinism does not take us much further, because the only resource it accords to the living being is *adaptation*, whereas Jonas stresses the importance of life's creative responses to the external situations. Teleology is, for him, the name of a situation where a freedom confronts a necessity. It mainly characterises a self's relation to its world. The living being is not some *thing* that could reach out towards an outer world. It *is* this gesture of reaching out. Its activity is moving towards the world and coming back to itself.

This endless transcending, this detour, is the fundamental sense of its teleological activity. Jonas's explication of 'having a world' shows how teleology *is* the law of *making* contact and *traversing* a distance, *crossing* a gap and *following* the detour. Teleology is, for Jonas, the *law of the experience*

that reveals the concrete space-time. But what is teleology, if it can thus give law to something that by definition does not tolerate any law, that is to say, to experience. In the first level, Jonas's teleology is simply the law of the living being's activity based on its desire. It is the being's own capacity of setting goals and pursuing them by different means. Even if we cannot really distinguish to what extent an aim is given by the world (an occasion) and to what extent it is set by the agent (a desire), we can consider it as being internal to the agent. The aim, however, remains somewhat external to the action itself and commands it as a value.

On a more fundamental level, underlying and motivating such partial teleological actions, the internal teleology of life itself does not follow relatively external values. Its activity has no other reason than itself. Teleology explains the movement of being itself: the *act of being*. If teleology commands the primary act of being, its aim is to *be* - and not to realise and maintain a predetermined *form*, whether that is understood as the platonic idea of, say, a perfect horse or as the genetic code of a horse. Naturally, in one way or another, such a form is realised in the being's life, but this realization does not *command* its *teleological* activity. Structurally, it is a part of the *necessity* that constitutes the being's *world*: it only provides a framework within which the actual activity remains free or, in other words, it determines the particular conditions for a singular activity. Teleology commands being in its *singularity*. Finally, the teleology of life aims at being alive, only this aim is no longer a value (an external aim), but rather an internal, unconditional *good*.

The original judgment at the root of the teleological movement of the living being is: it is *good* to live. In other words: life is not a value and it does not aim at survival as the highest *value*. The teleology of the living being is an internal teleology, and that is why it does not proceed from a form, if form is understood as a morphological figure, a stable idea or a superior in temporal being. Such a form, presented as the cause and the end of the process, is always an external principle, whereas life is a process of internal teleology.

However, an internal teleology can be said to proceed from another kind of a form: a form of *form-giving* itself. We could say that instead of reproducing a form as if it were a model, it *creates* one. The proper name of such a form is *freedom*, which is, according to Jonas, a 'fundamental ontological character of life as such'. On this fundamental ontological level, the exercise of freedom does not aim at a stable *product* of a free will. Its aim is freedom itself, and the form of freedom is precisely the emancipation from given, predetermined forms. That is why the internal teleology is not a stable process of reproducing the same, but, at the limits of the being's finitude, a surprising and even a creative event – and for Jonas, such a free event is precisely what can be described as a teleology rather than as a process. In fact, the form created by the internal teleology is entirely dynamic. It is a *capacity* of being.

On more specified levels of analysis, Jonas shows that the internal teleology is also the capacity to be *what* one is. Only, once again, this does not mean incorporating a definite figure, but exercising more and more freely, one's *capacities* of moving, of sensing, or of imaging. Nothing is said of the eventual products of such capacities, for it is a question of opening capacities, remaining capable, and becoming capable of facing new situations. Teleology does not follow ideas, it creates them; such ideas in their turn are no stable entities but rather traces of events.

The form produced by such an internal teleology is a *capacity of being*: firstly, the sheer capacity of being alive; and secondly, the supplementary capacities of metabolism, sense, movement, feeling, image, etc. On all levels, the teleological activity simultaneously requires and produces an openness of senses and a freedom of actions. For Jonas, the proper character of life is that its means become ends in themselves. Life is not a simple question of surviving but also a question of *what* survives: which capacities seek their plenitude. Now we see that the pure capacity of being alive is an

individual one: existence takes place in singular beings. On the other hand, the specific capacities, if not their particular use, are proper to entire species, and we could take them for forms in a more traditional sense. Jonas does not make specific analyses of such particular forms. Evidently he does not take them for eternal ideas, but he does not give a specific analysis of the temporality of the forms, either. He hardly mentions the problem of the origin of the species and finally says little about their possible extinction.

Jonas does not meditate on his origin or destination, but he asserts that we ought to preserve the 'image of man'. Now if the proper nature of life is freedom, and if human freedom includes the capacities of technical auto-transformation and even suicide, why should we suddenly restrain the use of this freedom within the limits of the human being such as he is presently? This is a very complicated question that cannot be treated without entering into the question of Hans Jonas's politics.

The political consequences of Jonas's theory of life are that his conception of life does not correspond to specific scientific questions or to purely philosophical contemplation. It takes responsibility for an ethics, an 'ethics of the technological civilisation' and opens onto a political consideration. Jonas addresses the problem of life because, according to him, only the living *can* be an object of a responsibility, even if this possibility does not entail an obligation. The responsibility does not encompass Being as a whole (*Sein*), because its being or nonbeing does not depend on us, whereas the living are by definition those whose *being* is precarious and vulnerable. On the other hand, in contrast to the traditional ethical theories, the responsibility should not encompass the human being alone. For Jonas, this is not so much because of *compassion* towards different living beings or because of the *admiration* of the beauty of nature, but because man's *existence* is entirely conditioned by the nature of which he is a part.

Jonas's categorical responsibility starts where *existence* is at stake. That is why it addresses life as such. The ethical responsibility towards nature has anthropocentric grounds, and that is why Jonas's famous imperative commands: 'act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible with permanency of an authentically human life on the earth.' In its apparent simplicity, the imperative has very complicated implications. Firstly, Jonas criticises traditional ethics for applying solely to man and expends so much effort in order to show the fundamental unity of man and nature, why does he end by restoring the primacy of man? One can answer by stating that Jonas's argument might be necessarily anthropomorphic but is not anthropocentric, since the centre of Jonas's thought is an ontology of being as metabolism, which is not a specifically human condition, even if we find it through the consideration of the human being. Nevertheless, the very formulation of Jonas's imperative only addresses human life, not life as such.

Jonas certainly accords a specific value to human life such as we know it. The 'transanimality of man', that is to say his capacity of image, is for Jonas a good in itself. But actually, without really stating it in this way, Jonas shows above all that the human being's *capacity* of responsibility, and the ensuing *obligation* to be responsible, sets him apart from all other living beings. Only the human being, and not the rest of nature, *must* be responsible. And the human being is also responsible for this possibility of responsibility that one finds nowhere else in nature. He is responsible for himself as the being capable of responsibility.

This brings us to another difficulty, namely to the question of what the 'authentically human life' might be. At times, Jonas says that we should conserve the 'image of man'. Is not such recourse to an *authenticity* and even to an *idea* most suspects? Should we not reject as metaphysico-theological even his maxim according to which the extinction of the human species is an evil *per se,* and that any action that might cause it is therefore prohibited? Why, indeed, should the human species exist and

why should its existence be somehow 'authentic'? To begin with, Jonas's 'image of man' is not a determination, a specific quality nor a stable form. On the contrary, he evokes it in order to thwart the desire to produce the 'perfect man' that characterised certain modern utopias. Jonas's imperative rather commands the preservation of the finitude and the openness of the human being's essence. Or, to speak like Heidegger, the human being's essence should remain a question.

Strictly speaking, Jonas's imperative only encloses the existence of man. We should not determine *how* the future man can live, but only *that* he can live. In this sense, the imperative only aims at avoiding the total extinction, and does this by preserving the possibility of a future *world*, not the reality of its inhabitants. More exactly, Jonas does not reduce life to a mere fact of existing, but he includes certain qualifications: the original freedom of any living being and the responsibility of the human being. The conservation of an authentically human life means the conservation of these capacities. It does not mean that we should predetermine *how* this freedom should be exercised. For instance, it is properly human to kill other living beings and humans. It is also properly human to form oneself according to various images which also, by nature, restrain one's freedom. But Jonas's imperative requires us to prevent these possibilities of murder and control from totally extinguishing human freedom and responsibility.

Jonas defends political liberties as being indispensable for human dignity (*Imperative of Responsibility*, 60). But if the ethics for a technological civilisation cannot be realised by a mass, it does not depend on the sole individual, either. In this sense, it is a genuinely political task with no definite solution in view. Jonas distinguishes his ethics of the future from the two commonest forms of the politics of the future, messianism and utopism. Messianism can only wait for the Messiah but not act in view of his arrival, whereas action is henceforth necessary. Utopism rather closes than opens the future, for by wanting to reform man, it generally ends by fettering his freedom. This implies, among others that Jonas's 'counsel of the wise' should not act on man himself, this being the task of each generation's own present politics. It should simply preserve the most general possibility of human life, and therefore also the possibility of his political life. Its task is a critical control of the technology, not of the political society, which must follow its own destinies but of what?.

Conclusion

Hans Jonas's ethics examines our responsibility towards those who are not yet born. It cannot address any singular existence or selfness. His unconditional imperative only encompasses the possibility of the *existence* of a future humanity. In other words, it only commands the preservation of a *world* as the condition *sine qua non* of any human existence as such. Such a task cannot open onto a specific political strategy. It rather requires the invention of a politics capable of preserving its own ultimate conditions.

Our discourse on Jonas' *Phenomenon of Life* and *Imperative of Responsibility* has opened diverse thought and discourse on his phenomenon of human life and its components along with the responsibility that goes with life in general and human life in particular. What does this hold for you?

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HUMAN GERMLINE BIOTECHNOLOGICAL TINKERING: A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO AUTONOMY OF FUTURE PROGENY?

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Abstract

The principle of autonomy is one of the liberties or bioethico-medical principles that are almost as old as medicine and the practice of medicine. This principle is founded on the fundamental right of peoples to self-determination and in modern times, it grants people the right to informed consent. However, the principle has been controversial and contentious when considered with specific reference to human germline enhancement (red biotechnology) and the right of future progenies to informed consent. Hence, the penetrating questions that constitute the problem of this discourse include, can the unborn be considered rational and deserving of informed consent? If it is granted that the unborn or children have right to autonomy, are their right to autonomy subsumed in their parents? Is it morally imperative for parents to receive informed consent on behalf of their progeny? Is it not immoral for parents to refrain from going for prenatal germline enhancement when they have the means and opportunity on the pretext of safeguarding the "right of autonomy" of the future generation? With the aid of the expository analytic method, this discourse reveals that the natural reproductive process is highly vulnerable to anomalies and frailties and generally the human nature is marred by infirmities that make biotechnological ontological tinkering of germline cells expedient. The study therefore concludes that since parents deserve the right to receive informed consent on behalf of their children for other medicals, they also more expediently are duty-bound to carryout germline enhancements that would forestall medical conditions that would negatively impact on the quality of life of their present and future progeny.

Keywords: Autonomy, Biotechnology, future progeny, Human germline tinkering, Informed Consent.

Preamble

This treatise is a qualitative research on the significance of biotechnological ontological tinkering for the autonomy of future generations in the discipline of philosophy. Its main thrust is red biotechnology (a subdivision of biotechnology) and specifically human genetic enhancement. It critically interrogates germline genetic enhancement with the bioethico-medical principle of autonomy- right of people (especially infants and the unborn) to self-determination and informed consent. Medical ethics has been immensely influenced by developments in human rights in recent times. In the contemporary day multicultural and pluralistic world with diverse moral traditions, the major international human rights agreements could provide a foundation for medical ethics that is acceptable beyond national boundaries (Williams 17-18). The reason for this is not far-fetched; the fact is that the modern era is an era when the talk on human rights and liberties has been most formidable; even at the detriment of moral values. In recent years, several fundamental ethical principles have been formulated and widely adopted as the basis for ethical discussions in medicine. These formulations in whatever form and variation are founded on the following four ethico-medical principles-autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, justice and veracity. The principal focus of this discourse is the principle of autonomy. It critically examines the autonomy of future progeny in relation to germline enhancement.

Genetic engineering is one of the modern medical research and practice that has been fiercely questioned with the principle of autonomy. It is germane to note that the aspiration for the moralisation of genetic interventions in humans has unfortunately always been greeted with significant incredulity. It suffices also to place on record that between the two forms of genetic interventions (somatic and germline), germline genetic enhancement is considered the most morally contentious. Amongst the plethora of issues that constitute sensitive concerns, the most pertinent questions often raise in this all-important debate include can the unborn be considered rational and deserving of informed consent? If it is granted that the unborn or children have right to autonomy, are their right to autonomy subsumed in their parents? Is it morally imperative for parents to receive informed consent on behalf of their progeny? Is it not immoral for parents to refrain from going for prenatal germline enhancement when they have the means and opportunity on the pretext of safeguarding the "right of autonomy" of the future generation? Does the principle of autonomy supersede other bioethico-medical principles? Are geneticists justified to carry out any form of research, diagnosis, clinical therapies and enhancement in human genome on the pretext of acting in accordance with their right to autonomy? These and other related searching questions would guide the appraisal of germline cells enhancement with the doctrine of autonomy in this bioethical (philosophical) treatise.

The aim of this discourse is to advance commonsense and nature-based arguments in defense of parents' right to germline enhancements for the sustainable promotion and conservation of qualitative life of their future progeny. The discourse attempts to demonstrate that germline tinkering does not ontologically constitute a violation of the right of autonomy of future generations, but rather a moral duty of parents towards their would-be offspring. Consequently, mindful of the frail conditions of the human nature that warrants genetic engineering, this paper considers it morally reprehensible for parents who have the means and opportunity but refused to do the needful.

Human Biotech and Germline Cells Enhancement

"Biotechnology has made human genetic engineering possible. It has made the possibility of effecting substantial changes in the human embryo a reality…" (Idachaba & Omale 2). Biotechnology is a very vast field which comprises of white biotechnology, green biotechnology and red biotechnology. Human and animal genetic engineering is collectively categorized as red biotechnology. Human enhancement technologies are new and emerging. Modern and contemporary biotechnologies deplored for genetic modifications either for the purpose of enhancement or for therapeutic reasons are made possible through gene mapping and sequencing. Gene mapping is achieved via Human Genome Project (HGP). HGP is the international research undertaking which aims to producing a map of the human genome. Human Genome is considered to be the complete set of information for the human body. It is believed that this information is the master key to unlocking the great secret of human life, health and disease.

Genetic engineering is the possibility and actual biotechnological breakthrough from In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) to genetic manipulation and recombination of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA). It has to do with the artificial manipulation in the body of human beings, plants and animals so as to give a desired result different from that which the nature of the specie provided (Enemuo 24). Azuafor sees genetic engineering as consisting of the direct tinkering of the genes of an organism or a living thing with the aid of biomedical tools. The technology employed is usually hyper-technology and the intervention could be for curative, eugenic or even for preventive purposes (48). Dickey and Bram defined genetic engineering as the manipulation of inheritable particulars of an organism in a predetermined manner, through the introduction of certain genetic templates extracted from another organism (237). Genetic engineering whether on the level of somatic cells or germline cells is done either to upgrade individuals' to average (therapeutic) or to upgrade to above average (enhancement).

Germline engineering is a higher dimension of gene therapy that alters the genes of parents in the sperm and egg before fertilization. This alteration whose basic objective is to reproduce offspring with enhanced genetic particulars has implications for future generations who are beneficiaries of this eugenics. As a result, this form of gene therapy has not escaped the moral questioning of philosophers, bioethicists, ethicists and religious zealots who expressed concerns about the consequences this may have on future generations (progeny) whose informed consent were never considered. One of the fundamental ethical principles frequently brought to the fore in this regard is the principle of parental and intergenerational relationship. It is on this established background that this treatise critically appraises human germline genetic modification with the principle and right to autonomy of future generations.

The Principle of Autonomy
Going by the delineation of the *Merriam Webster Dictionary,* the concept 'autonomy' means:
> i.   the state of existing or acting separately from others;
> ii.   ii. The power or right of a country, group, etc. to govern itself.

Further, the dictionary defined autonomy as the self-directing freedom and especially moral independence. Extending the meaning of this term, the same dictionary outlined the following words as its synonym: accord, free will, choice, self-determination, volition and will. Relating these definitions to medical ethics, autonomy presupposes the self-directing freedom and the moral independence that every individual human person enjoys with regard to making medical decisions. It also invariably enjoins physicians and all critical stakeholders in the business and industry of health to uphold the same.

The principle of autonomy demands respect for the autonomy of persons: respect for the right of self-determination of individuals and protecting those persons with diminished autonomy. It holds that every individual human person has an inalienable and irrevocable right to determine what he or she wants as far as healthcare is concerned. This is what Abraham implied when he maintained that:

> Autonomy is defined as a fundamental principle based on the worldview that every person has intrinsic value. One may not restrict nor negate the free wishes of an individual with respect to his own body. One must facilitate any desired action acceptable to a person's own judgment and in accordance with his own choice. The granting of autonomy requires that we recognise and accept the free choice of each person (cited in Uzomah 150).

This implies that this principle empowers patients to exercise their fundamental right to act as their own agents based on informed consent in terms of decision making in matters that concerns their healthcare decisions. As per what is implied by the term, 'informed consent' the *New Hampshire Legal* writes, "…the ability to understand and appreciate generally the nature and consequences of a health care decision, including the significant benefits and harms of and reasonable alternatives to any proposed health care" (cited in Uzomah 151). This, in a way shows the interplay of the principles of autonomy and veracity. The latter prescribes that physicians and other legal practitioners must in truth, reveal everything pertaining to the medical remedy (care) or drug to be administered to a patient. If the patient, because of certain medical condition is incapacitated to receive such information, the physician must relate the same honest information to whoever is in the position to take such decision. In the light of this, it is pertinent to assert that the principle of respect for autonomy obliges:
· Respect for the self-determination and choices of autonomous persons, and
· Protect for persons with diminished autonomy, for example, young children and persons with mental impairments.

Autonomy which is fundamental to every human person is seen as one of the inalienable index defining or constituting human dignity. Consequently, many scholars conceive the right or principle of autonomy as the most essential ethical principle which has preeminence over all other ethical principles. However, scores of scholars on the other hand consider the principle of autonomy as not superseding other ethical principles, but in the same level of importance with them. In this sense, these scholars consider any attempt to prioritise the right of autonomy over other principles as inappropriate. This implies that to the degree, physicians or medical practitioners in medical research, diagnosis, therapy and healthcare delivery in general are obliged to respect the autonomy of patients. In the same manner, they are duty-bound to respect other bioethical principles. Any attempt to derail from doing this, it is believed, has the propensity of instigating ethical anarchy in the society as far as the practice of medicine is concerned.

Another important fact to be noted about autonomy is the issue of whether physicians and medical practitioners are also entitled to the right of autonomy. Of course, universally, it is affirmed that physicians and medical practitioners as rational individual human persons also have the fundamental right of autonomy. Williams gave a nod to this fact when he observed that "the principle of autonomy or self-determination, is the core value of medicine that has changed the most over the years. Individual physicians have traditionally enjoyed a high degree of clinical autonomy in deciding how to treat their patients. Physicians collectively (the medical profession) have been free to determine the standards of medical education and medical practice" (17-18). This fact was corroborated by Steinberg, who argued that:

> A physician may refuse a patient's request for a therapy that has no scientific or rational basis, especially if it may be harmful to the patient. Also, a physician may refuse to implement a patient's decision for a certain treatment if it conflicts with the physician's conscience, for whatever reason. In such situations, the physician has the right not to treat the patient and to transfer such care to another physician (14).

The principle of non-maleficence reinforces the autonomy of the physician not to render any medical attention he or she considers harmful to the individual's health or integrity as a human person. Moreover, if such medical request infracts on basic moral precepts, the physician is bond and justified by conscience not to render such medical attention. Juxtaposing this with Kantian deontology, the physician is duty-bound not to consent to any wish of patients which he/she in conscience consider as ontologically morally inconsistent.

Consequently, contrary to the believe of many scholars on the preeminence of autonomy over other ethical principles, the universal affirmation of the right of autonomy of the physician as analysed here demonstrates that the principles of autonomy, especially with regard to that of the patient is not absolute. This is because the physician also is categorically obliged to ensure that claims made in the name of autonomy do not contravene other ethical principles. Based on this logical token, it may be argued that to ensure sound moral judgment, before a physician decides to carry out any medical research, clinical testing, therapies, etc., he or she must scrupulously integrate these ethical principles in order to ascertain the moral significance of them.

It is instructive to mention that the fact that the tenets of the principle of autonomy relates to Kant's categorical imperative cannot be overemphasised. Both ethical doctrines acclaim and promulgate the unconditional obligation that medical personnel, parents, caregivers and other critical stakeholders in the medical industry must accord to the individual patients because of their rational nature. The principle of autonomy as well as Kant's categorical imperative imposes an unconditional duty on parents and physicians to respect and treat individual human persons as humans with inherent ontological moral worth. This ontological moral worth confers on them the right to

informed consent before any medical decision and attention is carried out on them. It also gives individuals the right to seek for proper medical attention for the sake of sound health and wellbeing and self-determination.

The Germline Enhancement and the Right to Autonomy of Future Generations
The thrust of this segment is the consideration of some germane concerns raised against genetic interventions. This consideration consists of explicating the objections, reviewing their tenability and projecting counter arguments based on superior logic to discountenance those objections that are spurious. The aim is to defend certain germline enhancement with a reasoned appeal on the right to autonomy.

The first in the line of objections against germline genetic enhancement is the purported claim that it violates the right to autonomy of future generations who are beneficiaries of both the good and the bad of such engineering. This argument is based on the principle or right of autonomy. Apparently, theologians, philosophers, ethicists and bioethicists who champion this objection rely on Kant's doctrine of categorical imperative, with particular reference to its second formulation. By the dictates of this ethical doctrine, human individuals as moral agents ought to be treated as ends in themselves and not as a means to achieve another end. In other words, human individuals are to be treated as having intrinsic and not instrumental value. In this sense, they are to be treated in such a manner that they would rationally consent to.

In response to the above objection, I wish to observe that, the fundamental question that must be asked and answered before it can be established whether or not germline therapy or enhancement violates the right of autonomy of future generations is, can rational nature be justifiably accorded to progenies who are yet to be conceived? In other words, can rationality be accorded to human beings that may or may not be? As at the time when parents take the crucial decision to engage in this level of genetic modification, do the supposed future generations have the capacity to understand the expediency and consequences of such intervention so as to give informed consent, but they are denied? Of course not, because they lack actual existence. And lacking actual existence, I logically believe they also lack actual rationality. Lacking actual rationality, they lack the actual capacity to exercise the mandate of the right of autonomy in terms of deserving informed consent. If such intervention is expedient to a qualitative life and good health of future generations, don't parents have the overriding autonomy to do the needful? What if the one and only time to correct a given defect(s) that most likely cause(s) some medical conditions or manifestation of certain vices that are transmitted from one generation to another, is through germline editing of embryos? It would not be unreasonable to believe that no sane rational entity with sound mind would disapprove genetic tinkering done on them in the past to improve (unleash) potentials and optimise their health by their parents. Moreover, it may be universally valid to allude that the supposed right of autonomy which embodies the right to informed consent of future generations is subsumed in their parents' right of autonomy and sacred parental duty towards the proper raising and nurturing of offspring. Predicated on this, I strongly maintain that parents have the sacred duty and obligation to make important and expedient medical decisions for their children, especially in such matters that have significant implication to their health and general wellbeing. And somatic and germline tinkering that are of utmost value to the qualitative life and wellbeing of their future progeny are included in the list of those medical obligations they have towards their progeny.

To the first question above, I further argue that although future generations may possess potential rational nature, but in the main, they lack the rational nature required to make informed decision. Parents by their natural and social placing are endeavoured with that right of autonomy which obliges them to make informed decision on behalf of their future progeny. Based on this logic, it could be strongly argued that the right of autonomy of future generations is subsumed in their

parents' right to make informed decisions on matters that borders on their supreme goods, since, at the moment they lack rational nature. This position was given a firm affirmation even with Kantian moral philosophy by Allhoff thus:

> Technically, of course, unborn generations lack rational nature and therefore do not participate in humanity. Therefore, I think, Kant would not object to genetic intervention on the grounds that it fails to respect their (nonexistent) autonomy. So, to honor the Kantian principle, genetic intervention would be morally permissible only if every future generation would rationally consent to the genetic alterations made in the germ-line. Can this criterion be satisfied absolutely? More interestingly, however, the answer suggests which sorts of germ-line enhancements are morally permissible and which are not (53-56).

Consequently, because future generations do not have the rational capacity to either give their informed consent or withhold the same at the auspicious moment when the particular germline genetic editing ought to take place, it is absurd to purport that germline genetic engineering infracts on their right to autonomy. Parents who have the means and privilege to prosecute this ontological medical intervention are, by Kant's categorical imperative, obliged to. I anchor this position on the understanding that even if it is granted that the future progenies of a man are rational beings, tinkering the germline of future generations is by no means treating the same as means to another end. Rather, the intrinsic moral nature of these future humans is respected, for the aim and purpose of such tinkering is only for their good life and not for someone else's.

However, I must unequivocally state that, germline modifications that have eugenic and transhumanist aspirations are not to be justifiably included in the category of germline enhancements to be considered as morally permissible; only those whose aim is to advance the supreme goods of man both as a rational and social animal, are to be considered justifiable. Life, in fact qualitative life, is the fulcrum of every other supreme (elementary) goods of man. Therefore, any technologically assisted measure taken by man in line with the dictates of practical reason as to decipher what is proper towards promoting the cause of life in a given situation is morally permissible. This assumption is what was implied by Allhoff, when he argued that:

> I think a strong argument can be made to support the moral permissibility of certain types of genetic enhancement in general and germ-line genetic enhancement in particular. Specifically, such interventions are morally permissible if and only if they serve to augment Rawlsian primary goods, either directly or by facilitating their acquisition (53-56).

But what are these primary goods and how can they justify certain germline modifications that have their advancement as their teleology? For Rawls, "Primary goods are those factors that every rational person should value, regardless of his conception of the good, rights, liberties, opportunities, income and wealth, health, intelligence, imagination, and the likes" (54-55). In another vein, John Finis postulated what he referred to as seven basic goods that motivate and justify human actions to include, Life, Knowledge (for its own sake), Friendship and Sociability. Play, Aesthetic Experience, Practical Reasonableness (the ability to reason correctly about what is best for oneself and to act on those decisions) and Religion. These basic goods proceed from man's rational nature and as such they are the practical leverage for moral judgment. They provide a meeting point where all rational beings may agree pertaining to the moral significance of an action or state of affairs.

Note that both the primary goods of Rawls and the seven basic goods of Finis are fundamental and they are essential to achieving the supreme good of man which is happiness. Been fundamental and

essential to the supreme good of man, they are individually and collectively not goods that no rational agent may not likely consent to. They make life qualitative and meaningful. Affirming this truism in the spirit of the integration of Kantian deontology and Rawlsian template of justice, Allhoff writes:

> Expediently, everyone should want; it would be absurd to turn them down when offered. Nobody could be better off with less health or with fewer talents, e.g., regardless of her life goals. …I propose that germ-line genetic enhancements are morally permissible if and only if they augment primary goods or create abilities that would lead to their augmentation (53-56).

It should be pointed out that what is common to both Rawls' primary goods and Finis' seven basic goods is the good of life. Life is ultimate good on which every other human goods necessarily depend. Therefore, it is incumbent on humans to do anything possible according to practical reason to advance and enhance human life. Sequel to the above argument, in what could be described as Kantian-Rawlsian synthesis, Allhoff made a strong case affirming that all rational human beings ought to consent to certain genetic enhancements. According to him:

> Perhaps more interestingly, one even could argue that these enhancements would be required by Kant. Kant speaks of a duty to develop one's own talents; so, if genetic enhancement would consist in the development of talents, Kant might consider its pursuit to be a duty. Of course, in this case, it would not be self-development of talents, which is the case Kant considered, but rather someone else developing the talents of the (potential moral) agent. Nevertheless, I think that failure to develop the talents of one's progeny plausibly could yield a contradiction in will, and, if so, genetic enhancements would be required by Kant. But the prospect of a moral obligation to enhance is made even stronger by Rawls, who writes: "In the original position . . . the parties want to insure for their descendants the best genetic endowment. . . . The pursuit of reasonable policies in this regard is something that earlier generations owe to later ones" (53-56).

It is plausible to agree no less that failure of parents to carry out crucial germline genetic therapies and enhancement when they have the means is certainly in itself failing to act in such a way that all rational men would consent to. In this vein, Walters and Palmeris, was right to have maintained that, "Certainly any intervention that would make progeny healthier is morally permissible" (cited in Uzomah 201). Genetically engineering greater resistance to disease obviously would be morally permissible, even if the subject of the intervention already has a level of disease resistance commensurate with that of a "normal" human. Highlighting the categorical nature of the obligation of everyone to the preservation of life through proper medical care Cherry, argued:

> We do have moral obligations to safeguard our bodies and preserve our lives. Our significant duties to ourselves as well as to others, such as to spouse and children, generally require that we seek proper medical treatment. Healthcare is a necessary for living a good life for these reasons (cited in Uzomah, 201).

Wellness or health is something that can never be overemphasised; and staying healthy is not solely one person's responsibility but incumbent social responsibility. It is a categorical duty that is both personal and collective. It is an unconditional obligation that parents and guardians do not only owe their extant offspring and worlds, but also to future progenies. By the nature of this obligation, it is both personal/private and collective/social. This obligation proceeds from the precepts of natural law. Even great scholars in legal naturalism like Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Aquinas, John Finis and the likes, eloquently attested to this inclination. By the ordinance of the precepts of the natural law,

man is obliged to do all expedient to preserve life and propagate his kind. Irrefutably, biomedical pundits see gene technology as not just an ontological approach towards merely preserving human life militated by despicable infirmities but also as a way of transmitting qualitative and optimised life. If scientists can through stem cell research and therapy make death optional by 2045 as being predicted by some Chinese biomedical scholars, what could be more noble and humanitarian than that? Who is comfortable with disease, sickness and death? Medical personnel and indeed all rational parents have it as their unconditional duty to not just merely preserve life by propagating their species, rather, they must essentially transmit and preserve healthier humans. For the greatest wealth any human being may boast of is health. Health is wealth, and as such, it is the greatest gift parents can gift their progenies.

Life is the ultimate value of human existence, and this makes health a core value. Every other good man pursues in the society are only attainable when there is life. Indeed, "life is the ultimate goal and end in itself that makes the existence of other ends and values possible" (Ijezie 81). In this regard, it is only thoughtful and philosophically plausible to hold that towards sustaining and maintaining a meaningful existence human life considered as the ultimate good and end of human existence is a primary good that every rational human being- (in African cosmology and cosmogony) living, living dead and those pre-existing in the world of the unborn would rationally consent.

Moreover, since the quality of one's life has a crucial impact, genetic tinkering targeted towards improving upwards human capacities and potentials that do not portend any harm to the human person may also be justified owing to the fact that it is connected or it is at the service of (life) the ultimate goal and end of human existence. Concerning what one may aptly consider as germane physical enhancements that augment individuals' capacities that may be ethically permissible, one may plausibly advocate for the enhancement of stamina, speed, eyesight, brilliance and a lot others that would improve the quality of one's existence and experience in the society. For Clark and Grunstein, "There are a host of mental templates that contribute both to our talents and to our overall intelligence. If there ever were a way to enhance mental acuity, mathematical and spatial reasoning, language faculties, creativity, musical abilities, and other sublime powers of man, I would propose that we should do so" (cited in Uzomah, 201). The possible engineering of these capacities has the positive merit of unleashing human potentials and optimisation of life. There are a lot of students I have met on campus who I have taken heartfelt pity on. These students were very studious, attend classes regularly and punctually and take their assignments seriously. But these students for no fault of theirs perform abysmally poor in examinations just as a result of their below average intelligence. Poor students! See, man is the only resource that can solve the problem of the world. So, the more enhanced his intellect is, the more empowered he will be to effectively and efficiently engage his human capitals and resources towards this end.

On the authority of the above, it is my strongly belief that should one have the knowledge and means to procure best genetic endowments for their progeny and refuses to do same on the pretext of respecting the autonomy of future generations, such act is morally despicable. Put differently, I maintain that while germline therapies and enhancements that are unnecessary and harmful are morally reproachable, refusing to carry out those that are expedient when one has the means and opportunity is most morally contemptible. It is tantamount to neglecting what one rationally has a duty to do. And every rational human being must resent to this fanatical negligence.

Commonsense Justification of Parents' Autonomy
Apart from justifying certain germline modification on the authority of Kantian-Rawlsian synthesis, I also see a great possibility of justifying certain germline engineering in common sense polemics. For instance, there are many rational responses one can make in this regard. First, one may asked,

when nature does its natural selection, who does it consult, the parents or the child? None! When nature imposed some physiological and anatomical and genetic impediments on children, did it consult either parents nor the coming children and future generations who inevitably would be beneficiaries of both the good and bad of such random selection? No! Then, even if it is granted that germline genetic engineering is guilty as accused, on what basis may our disapprobation of germline genetic engineering be justified since natural selection itself infringes on the purported right of autonomy of future generation? Does nature consult parents and unborn children before it randomly (and sometimes indiscriminately) selects their genetic materials? If the ways of nature that religious conservatives and 'perfectionist moralists' impulsively assert is without impediments and abnormalities, then, there would not have been the idea or need for technological intervention. Therefore, it is my considered opinion that responsible gene technology comes to makeup for the lack in human biological nature. The contemptible lack in human nature that makes gene technology imperatively expedient, in itself, makes human integrity non-absolute.

Consequently, genetic engineering whether on the level of somatic cells or germline cells is done either to upgrade individuals' to average (therapeutic) or to upgrade to above average (enhancement). This is a rational, conscious and ontological attempt beyond the limitations or anomalies of natural selection. On the level of consent, like in other medical procedures that require consent of patients, the right to consent of children is subsumed or is exercised by parents on behalf of their progeny. If this has been the practice and considered legitimate universally regarding other medical cares, then I argue that it would amount to the fallacy of double standard if the issues of informed consent is adjudged differently with regard to germline engineering. In as much as the intention of parents is noble and for the good of their future progeny, then it is justified. Would it have been rather noble if parents continue to transmit genetic traits that course serious ailments or health conditions that are deleterious from one generation to the next, just because they never wanted to violate the demand for consent from their future generations? Diseases like diabetics, stroke, cardiovascular disease, etc. and not to mention congenital conditions are transmitted from parent to their children. Is it rather rational to allow generations after generations to suffer the despicable pain and suffering these ill-health conditions cause, than to end the same via germline genetic engineering? I see it as actually ridiculous, absurd and callous for parents to subject future progenies to untold suffering just because they hold to a conservative (fundamentalist) notion of human dignity and integrity.

Moreover, it is strongly believed with formidable cultural and scientific evidences that some vices are transmitted within a family tree from one generation to another in an endless stream of perpetuity via heredity. In this regard, if there is a way of eliminating these vices like stealing, kleptomania, promiscuity, bad temper, etc. that attract reproach and disapprobation via germline therapy and enhancement, would that not add up to the good of the that family and future progeny who bore the shame and contempt and the society that suffers the brunt effect of these vices? I suppose every rational being would give their answers in the affirmative, but for those with inordinate prejudice. Surely it would!

Reflecting on the pervasive and extensive nature of genetic infirmities across the globe, Wertz et al. pointed out that "Genetic conditions occur with similar frequencies in different nations and irrespective of the socio-economic status of individuals. In fact, at all levels of society, children born with genetic disadvantages have higher risks of getting sick and dying of environmental causes such as infections and malnutrition" (3-34). This is an empirical and indubitable fact that the society has been subjected to. Extant medicines at best are only relevant in helping to reduce their impact and have not been able to offer cure. It is believed with strong evidence by geneticists that the only curative and even preventive and regenerative lasting remedy to genetic conditions is germline tinkering.

As for me, I would consider it as an unpardonable crime when I learn that my parents had the knowledge, capacity and the means to procure germline enhancement and did not, on the pretext of respecting the utopic right to consent of future generation. It was Galilee Galileo who exclaimed when in the medieval era when the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church were persecuting him for his intense scientific analysis and pronouncements that, "I do not think that the God who gave me reason would forbid me from using the same". Like Galilee, for me, I profoundly believe in the principle of pragmatism that the value of an idea, concept or knowledge is its practical application in solving existential human needs. On this basis, it is my considered submission that the function of the human reason is to enable him to advance meaningful knowledge to master himself and the entire created orders. Reason is for man's self-determination and preservation. Rigid interpretation of the essence of the ontological moral nature of man inhibits man and it is inimical to the ultimate good of man. Before disease and sickness, everyone is helpless and humbled beyond compare. Disease and sickness and even the most odious reality death does not respect the supposed ontological moral worth of man or right to autonomy of anyone. They reduce human fate and existence to the same status with other animals, low and high alike. The only meaning our rationality may make in this regard is to provide remedies (curative) in medicine to resuscitate or rescue humanity from the demean state of sickness. Moreover, man is to exhibit the enviable height of his dignity and integrity accusing from his rationality when he pays heed to the universal and immutable philosophy that obliges him to prevent than to cure. It is rather irrational for one to prefer to live and manage infirmities when he or she has the means of ontologically eliminating them via techno-scientific intervention?

It is a great service to the course of protection of human dignity and integrity to invest more in regenerative and preventive medicine than in curative medicine. Preventive medicine uproots disease from their taproot, while curative only does surface weeding. The hallmark of regenerative medicine is essentially preventive rather than curative. It is rationally reasonable for human beings to invest more in preventive medicine than in curative. To cure implies to attempt to correct what has gone bad. Everything that goes bad in human body causes man some level or magnitude of pain and suffering. Curative medicine can only alleviate or temporarily eradicate these pains afterwards, it can never remove the fact that the patient suffered such pain and suffering. But genetic engineering whether somatic or germline engineering would prevent such pain and suffering. Cellular therapies have proven to be profitable. Take the issues of genotype and sickle cell anemia for instance, it took genetic engineering to establish that incompatible genotypes are responsible for the birth of children with sickle cell condition. Philosophy and philosophers unanimously affirm that the right approach to problem-solving is through ontological approach- interrogating the ultimate cause(s). Why then should same philosophy and philosophers express aversion and disdain for geneticists' ontological approach to interrogating this ancient and ubiquitous evils-disease and infirmities?

Conclusion

Consequently, my point is, genetic engineering, whether of somatic cells or of germline cells carried out for the supreme good of future progenies does not in any way violate their utopic right to autonomy. Rather, in doing this, parents discharge the sacred duty imposed on them by the principle of intergenerational responsibility. It is the responsibility of every parents of every generation to ensure that by all standards, the life of future generations is far better than past and extant generations. In principle, no rational animal would object to this conclusion.

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KANT'S CONCEPTION OF SPACE AND TIME IN THE *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON* AND ITS INFLUENCE ON SPACE-TIME THEORY

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Abstract

This study presents Kant's treatment of space and time in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and its influence on space-time theory in relativity physics. While attempting this comparative evaluation, Newton's conception of space and time came up very prominently. Obviously, there were distinctions between space and time conceptions in Newtonian physics and Kant's critical philosophy and relativistic space-time. Kant's space and time entered into mainstream subjective idealism. Einstein rather situated space-time within a critical realism. Even linguistically, there is "space-time" in relativity, while "space and time" remain Newtonian, Kantian. However, there is something more than linguistics here. For Newton, space and time are absolutes; for Kant, space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition; while for Einstein, there is no space and time, but space-time, and so remains a property of matter. Kant's analysis was meant to answer the question of how space and time structure our perception of things and reality, while Einstein's analysis was meant to answer the question of how space-time structures our conception of matter. In both Kant's and Einstein's analyses of space and time, epistemology and ontology are wholly involved. This study focuses on a part of the philosophical problem of space and time. There is a special focus on Kant and how he was influenced by Newton. Both Newton and Kant later influenced the emergence of space-time theory in relativity physics. Our study was library-based, adopting the conceptual, analytic and comparative approaches to achieve our objective.

Key words: Space and time, Space-time, Transcendental Idealism, Critical Philosophy, Relativity Theory

Introduction

Space and time and the problems they pose are not only the concern of the physicist or the mathematician, but, fundamentally, of the philosopher. Unlike the physicist who grapples with space and time within the purview of mechanics, the philosopher considers space and time more in the light of the theory of knowledge and ontology. How do space and time structure our conception of the world? Are space and time properties of the object of our cognition, or are they mere receptivity or arena where things or events take place? Is the universe limited in time and finite in space, or is it an infinite and static universe? These questions, as philosophical as they are, only come as consequences of the works of physicists, mathematicians, astronomers and astrophysicists. One may, then, have to look at the theme of space and time within an interdisciplinary matrix. But let us assume, here that exhausting such a task is beyond the scope of this present work. The present study focuses on Immanuel Kant's treatment of the theme of space and time in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, KRV) and its influence on space-time theory in relativity physics.

Before we analyze how Kant and Einstein grappled with these concepts, we shall first cast a cursory overview on these concepts in philosophy, mathematics and Newtonian physics as they relate to our present project.

A History of the Problem of Space and Time

The history of philosophy brings out the philosophies on space, time, and motion, since motion is possible with space and time. Since motion involves the occupation of different places at different

times, Zeno's paradoxes strike at the heart of our concepts of space and time. Zeno, who wanted to defend his master, Parmenides, argued that motion, change and plurality were mere illusions. He came directly against the Heraclitean credo in motion, change and plurality, through his famous paradoxes.

Paradox 1: Achilles and the Tortoise
Zeno imagines that Achilles, the fleetest of Greek warriors, is to run a footrace against a tortoise. It is only fair to give the tortoise a head start. Under these circumstances, Zeno argues, Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise, no matter how fast he runs. In order to overtake the tortoise Achilles must run from his starting point A to the tortoise's original starting point T_0 (see figure 1). While he is doing that, the tortoise will have moved ahead to T_1. Now Achilles must reach point T_1. While Achilles is covering this new distance, the tortoise moves still farther to T_2. Again, Achilles must reach this new position of the tortoise. And so it continues, whenever Achilles arrives at a point where the tortoise was, the tortoise has already moved a bit ahead. Achilles can narrow the gap, but he can never actually catch up with him.

Paradox 2: The Flying Arrow
Zeno argues that an arrow in flight is always at rest. At any given instant, he claims, the arrow is where it is, occupying a portion of space equal to itself. During the instant it cannot move, for that would require the instant to have parts, and an instant is, by definition, a minimal and indivisible element of time. If the arrow did move during the instant it would have to be in one place at one part of the instant, and in a different place at another part of the instant. Moreover, for the arrow to move during the instant would require that during the instant, it must occupy a space larger than itself, for otherwise it has no room to move.

Achilles and the Tortoise are designed to refute the doctrine that space and time are continuous, while the arrow is intended to refute the view that space and time have an atomic structure (Salmon 35).

Democritus represented what would have been Leucippus' ideas. Democritus believed that the universe consisted of atoms and was void. The atoms were the smallest possible parcels of matter, entirely indivisible (Greek "atomos" means "uncuttable). Democritus inferred the existence of atoms, probably, by the simple argument that, if one keeps cutting a piece of matter in half, then after an infinite number of cuts one would end up with nothing. Because an infinite number of nothings is still nothing, there must be the smallest, indivisible particle, or else there would be no matter (Emiliani 5-6). This one smallest, indivisible particle, is the atom, according Democritus. Democritus believed that the atoms had different shapes: the atoms of air and water were very smooth and slippery; those of iron were hard and jagged (Emiliani 557). These atoms moved in space. Space, for Democritus, was the arena where motion of indivisible particles took place.

The concepts of space and time are interwoven with motion in Aristotle's physics. Time, according to Aristotle, is "numerus motus secundum prius et posterius", meaning that "time is the measure of motion according to before and after" (Aristotle, *Physics* Book 4 ch. 11,218b, 1-2). Having thought of what time as such could be, Aristotle's mind went straight to motion. In that things move, that events come, stay on and pass on, and that the physical universe in which we speak of time is characterized by this continuity of movements, these realities are immediately linked with time. Though not identical, time and motion are tied to each other. In Aristotle's words, we perceive movement and time together…for the occurrence of movement is linked by the human mind with the lapse of time. Time belongs to movement (Aristotle, *Physics*, 4,11,219a,5-10,p.291). Where there is motion, there is time. Motion points to time, while time reveals motion (Iroegbu 28). In Aristotelian conception, space is the receptacle of things, which are in movement. Space goes with being and underlies its existence. Space holds being. Space, time and movement are existentially and inseparably linked.

They are linked both in 'se' (in themselves) and 'quo ad nos' (in reference to us). Whatever moves, moves in space and time. Time is linked with motion in so far as measurement of time (speed, velocity) and position is involved in motion.

Does this mean that time stops as motion stops? Time as measurement or counting stops as motion stops. Time stops to measure the motion of that body which was in motion. In terms of motion, Aristotle argued that the natural state of a body was to be at rest, and that it moved only if driven by a force or impulse. This argument implied that a heavy body should fall faster than a light one, because it would have a greater pull towards the earth (Hawking15). The Aristotelian tradition had to be deflated by Galileo, who had to experiment on whether bodies of different weights did fall at different speeds. Aristotle believed in absolute time and that an event could be given an absolute position in space (Hawking 18).

St. Augustine addressed God with the problem of time: "You made all times and before all times you are; nor was there ever a time when there was no time (St. Augustine Book X1,ch13,p.267). What is time? St Augustine writes: "I know what it (time) is if no one asks me what it is. But if I want to explain it to someone who has asked me, I find that I do not know (Book XI ch 13,p 267). St Augustine argues that if nothing passed, there would be no past time, and if nothing were coming, there would be no future time, and if nothing were now, there would be no present time. St Augustine thus argues for the necessary relationship of time to events and things. For time past means events past, present time means present events, and future time means events that would occur in the future (Iroegbu 23). However, he goes on to argue, that past things are no longer there and future events are not yet there, for both cannot in the strict existential sense be said to be there. They were. They will be. But they are not. Time, related to these non-existent, is also non-existent. For Augustine, we cannot truly say that time exists except in the sense that it is tending toward non-existence. Perhaps only the present exists, for to deny this would be self-contradictory and ourselves negating. Augustine uses three expressions to bring past, present and future to reality as existing: a presence of things past is couched in "memory"; a presence of things present in "sight"; and a present of things future in "expectation". Thus, Augustine looks at time from a psychological perspective, since time is conceived and contemplated in the mind.

Every philosopher or philosophy student, who may have studied skepticism, or the body-mind problematic or elementary history of modern philosophy, must have come across the name of Rene Descartes. The same holds for mathematicians and physicists who may have learned something in (analytical) geometry, particularly, the Cartesian coordinates system. The Cartesian system of coordinates consists of three plane surfaces perpendicular to each other and rigidly attached to a rigid body. Referred to as a system of coordinates, the scene of any event will be determined (for the main part) by the specification of the lengths of the three perpendiculars or coordinates (x,y,z) which can be dropped from the scene of the event to those three plane surfaces. The lengths of these three perpendiculars can be determined by a series of manipulations with rigid measuring-rods performed according to the rules and methods laid down by Euclidean geometry (Einstein *Relativity*, 7). In so far as space and time concepts are concerned, they are intricately interwoven with a system of coordinates. Descartes was fascinated by the mathematics of geometry.

Rene Descartes ushered in the modern period of philosophy by wholesale doubt of the reliability of sense experience. He argued that we could never be absolutely sure of the verdict of the senses because we could never know for certain that we are not dreaming. Fascinated by the apparent clarity and certainty of geometry, he proposed to erect the edifice of philosophy on a sure ground. Thus, he was looking for an absolute and unshakable foundation (absolutum et fundamentum inconcussum) to establish his philosophy. This was the origin of 'I'- viewpiont of modern times and its subjectivism (Heidegger 297). After having admitted of the existence of the res cogitans, after his methodic doubt,

he added the existence of res extensa. He argued that geometrical properties (extension) represent the essence of matter (Salmon 3). For Descartes, then, space is an essence of matter. Descartes did not admit the existence of vacuum or void (Gribanov 180). He admitted of the existence of mind and body and space and time, for whatever is extended is so extended in space and time. In this case, space is not empty.

Isaac Newton held tenaciously to absolute concepts of space and time. Newton distinguished absolute concepts from subjective ones.

> Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine by its position to bodies; which is commonly taken for immovable space (Newton, *Mathematical Principles*, 6).

Space was not a property of matter, but existed as some independent substance. Space, in Newtonian scheme, was a kind of receptacle filled with material bodies.

Newton drew the same conclusion with regard to time. He distinguished absolute and relative time. Absolute time he represented as uniform, pure duration, existing independently of the material world and not connected with events taking place in nature (Gribanov 178). It was one-dimensional continuous and homogenous throughout the universe.

> Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year (Newton 6).

In addition, time and space were considered independent not only of mechanical processes (independent in relation to moving matter) but also relatively to one another.

Unlike Newton, Leibniz approached the problem of time and space from the angle of a broader notion of time. First of all, Leibniz argued that Newton based himself, in his conclusions about time and space, on a limited metaphysical notion of matter, and saw that as the main reason preventing disclosure of the deeper space-time properties of nature. Leibniz stressed that the ancients' idea of the existence only of atoms and void had impoverished our notions of the world, and reduced material reality simply to the existence of the simplest elements of matter. The material world, he argued, was not limited just to the existence of substance-matter.

> It cannot be said that, the present quality of matter is the fittest for the present constitution of things. And supposing it was, it would follow that this present constitution of things would not be the fittest absolutely, if it hinders god from more matter. It was therefore better to choose another constitution of things, capable of something more (Alexander 40).

Leibniz also extended the concept of matter to light and magnetic phenomena. Like Aristotle, and later Descartes, he did not admit the existence of vacuum or void, and considered that matter was present everywhere.

> The author objects against me (he wrote) the vacuum…which is made by pumping the air out of a receiver; and he pretends that there is a truly perfect vacuum, or a space without matter (at least in part) in that receiver. The Aristotelians and Cartesians, who do not admit a true vacuum, have said… that there is no vacuum at all in the tube or in the receiver; since glass has small pores, which the beams of light, the effluvia of

the load-stone and other very thin fluids may go through.   I am of their opinion (quoted in Gribanov 180).

Leibniz recognized the qualitative diversity of the forms of matter, and reduced substance only to a partial case. This enabled him to reject the Newtonian idea of an absolute vacuum and consequently of absolute space as a separate self-contained principle existing alongside matter and independent of it. It was the position of Leibniz that space and time could not be considered outside things and processes, but were properties of matter. Matter played a decisive role in space-time structure.

Unlike Leibniz, matter for Toland was objective reality and not a spiritual substance (Toland 165-167). However, Toland came to the same conclusion, with Leibniz, about the limited nature of the Newtonian doctrine of time and space. Like Leibniz, Toland came to study of space and time from matter.

Toland was uncomfortable with the Newtonian ideas of vacuum, and also absolute time and space. Time and space, in Toland's view did not exist outside matter and outside its processes as an independent substance. Space and time were properties of the material world.

> Yet because the mathematicians had occasion to suppose space without matter, as they did, duration without things, points without quantity, and the like. The philosophers, who could not otherwise account for the generation of motion in matter which they held to be inactive, imagined a real space distinct from matter, which they held to be extended, in corporeal, immovable, homogeneal, indivisible and infinite (Toland 181).

The conceptual problem of space and time remained, and mathematicians as well as physicists had to lend their reflective minds to also philosophize on same concepts. Geometry relates with philosophy as both share a similar foundation, in terms of time, place and fatherhood. Thales of Miletus was the first to systematize both philosophy and geometry (Salmon 1). Pythagoras was another mathematician and philosopher, who developed geometry, and Plato held that mathematics holds the key to philosophical truth, the key to understanding and prepared the way for Euclid. Plato believes that geometry signifies reality (Salmon 2-3). Descartes, Leibniz, Frege, Russell were also symbols of the synergy between philosophy and mathematics. The doctrine that geometry provides useful knowledge of the physical world via pure reason was given its clearest formulation by Kant. He said that the propositions of geometry are synthetic a priori truths (Salmon 3-4). Euclid, in *The Elements*, reduced the whole of geometrical science to an axiomatic form in which all of the propositions (theorems) are deduced from a very small number of starting assumptions (axioms and postulates). He held the view that the postulates of geometry are self-evident truths.

> Below are five postulates of Euclid's geometry:
> P-1 A straight line can be drawn between any two points.
> P-2 A finite straight line can be extended continuously in a straight line.
> P-3 A circle can be drawn with any center and any radius
> P-4 All right angles are equal to another.
> P-5 Given a straight line and a point not on that line, there is one and only one line through that point parallel to the given line.

Euclid's geometry is a theory of the spatial forms of matter. The first four postulates of Euclid's geometry constitute what is today known as Euclidean geometry. The fifth postulate, after it had been criticized, gave birth to what is known as non-Euclidean geometry. The structure of space in Euclidean geometry is flat. This is attested to by Einstein when he described the flat space-time of the special relativity theory as Euclidean (Einstein, *Relativity* 92).

The geometries of Saccheri, Lobachesky, Bolyai and Riemann regarded the fifth postulate of Euclid as less self evident. They doubted the absolute character of this postulate and thus made a turning point in the history of thought. Non-Euclidean geometry was born. In 1733, Girolamo Saccheri attempted to prove the parallel postulate by assuming it to be false, and then deducing an absurdity. In the first place, one can deny the parallel postulate by maintaining that parallel lines do not exist at all. On the basis of this assumption Saccheri did succeed in deriving a contradiction, for the first four postulates do imply that there is at least one line through the given point parallel to the given line. In the second place, one can deny the parallel postulate by asserting that there is more than one line through the given point parallel to the given line (Salmon 5). Saccheri died with the conviction that he had "cleaned Euclid of every blemish (Euclid, quoted in Salmon 6).

Carl Friedrich Gauss, Johann Bolyai, and Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky, working on the problem of the parallels, came to the conclusion that it is possible to assume that the parallel postulate of Euclid is false without getting into any absurdity or contradiction. They also realized that it is possible to adopt Euclid's first four postulates while denying the fifth one (by asserting the existence of more than one parallel), and to develop a perfect consistent non-Eulidean geometry on that basis. Bolyai and Lobachevsky denied Euclid's fifth postulate by saying that, instead of one parallel, there are many parallel lines (Salmon 6). Lobachevsky's success was due to his deep philosophical approach to contemplation of the essence, unity, and diversity of nature, and to hisunderstanding that our knowledge of nature was far from full, rough reflection. He was convinced that nature dictated knowledge to us, and that it was necessary to start in cognition from an analysis of reality (Gribanov 181). Lobachevsky's position was that several lines parallel to a given straight line can be drawn through a point. For him, space was inconceivable without physical bodies. (Gribanov 182). Bernhard Riemann discovered that it is possible, if one tinkers a bit with the first four postulates, to develop another type of non-Euclidean geometry on the basis of a postulate that denies the existence of parallels altogether. He thus worked out a "no parallels" non-Euclidean geometry (Salmon 6), while Bolyai and Lobachevesky worked out a "many parallels" non- Euclidean geometry (Salmon 6).

However, Riemann confirmed Lobachevsky's idea of the possibility of there being properties of space different from Euclidean ones. He created a spherical geometry that defined the geometrical properties of a spherical surface. Like Lobachevsky, Riemann pointed to the connection of spatial characteristics with the physical properties of natural objects. He assumed that the space between bodies was filled with a substance that could be represented as 'a physical space the points of which move in geometrical space' (quoted in Gribanov182). The structure of space in non- Euclidean geometry is curved. This is why the space-time continuum of the general theory of relativity is not a Euclidean continuum (Einstein, *Relativity* 93).

The connection of geometry to philosophy here centers on the concept of space, the thematic cause of our analysis here, with its kindred concept of time. The problems surrounding time are whether time is absolute or relative; whether time will end; what the origin of time is; whether two events can happen at same time or not, that is, the problems of simultaneity and succession; whether time can keep existing after motion would have ended; whether time is separate and separable from space; whether time is objective or relative, etc. Concerning space, some of the issues for reflective determination are: whether space is finite or infinite, flat or curved; whether space has content or is empty; whether space exists independently of matter or not, etc. The problem of space and time remain philosophically and scientifically thematic.

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*
In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant attempts, among other things, to establish the validity of knowledge, and, in the most part, the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, synthetic *apriori*

knowledge. Human knowledge, according to Kant, arises through the joint functioning of sensibility and intellect, or understanding. Sensibility is a passive receptivity, the power of receiving representations of the objects by which it is affected. Understanding is an active spontaneity, the power of exercising thought over the objects given us in sensible intuition (Kemp 16). Intuition is the product of sensibility and concept is the product of understanding. And space and time are a priori forms of intuition.

Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition (A26/B42). Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition (A26/B42). Though not empirical concepts, space and time are empirically real, which means that "everything that can come before us externally as an object" is in both space and time, and that our internal intuitions of ourselves are in time (A28/B44, A34–35/B51–51).

Kant's first major point about space is that it is not an empirical concept derived from our experience of things outside us. We discover empirically, by sensory observation, that a certain object is to the left of, or above, or further from us than, another object; but that objects in general are in spatial relations of some kind to one another is not an empirical generalization from specific spatial statements. For the very discovery that X is to the left of Y already presupposes that we have some 'idea" of space in general. If someone asks us "What are the spatial relationships between X and Y?" we can, in principle at least, provide an answer from the results of observation. But if someone asks us "Is X in any spatial relationship to Y?" it would be absurd to try to answer this question by making this observations; for if the answer was NO, this would be conclusive proof that observations made through our senses could not possibly be relevant, and that X and Y (or one of them at least) were not located in space at all (Kemp 17). Similarly, we cannot, Kant says, imagine or represent to ourselves the absence or non-existence of space, although we can think of space as being empty of object. And since we cannot form an idea of a spaceless world, our knowledge that the world is spatial cannot have come to us through sense-experience; we can only observe like for S not to be P. Our apprehension of space then is not empirical (Kemp 17). But space is not a general concept either. For when we have a general concept there are, or many be, particular objects falling under the concept (as particular houses fall under the general concept of house). No particular spaces fall under the general concept of space. There can only be one, all embracing and space.

Space, then, is nothing but a form of all appearance of outer sense. Space is a necessary condition of all outer objects as they appear to us, but does not necessarily underlie things as they are in themselves.

Kant argues that we cannot have formed the concept of time from our observation or experience of events happening successively or simultaneously, for the notions of succession and simultaneity themselves presuppose time (Kemp 18). Succession and simultaneity are temporal concepts and we must therefore already have the concept of time before we can talk about, or grasp the existence of, successive or simultaneous events.

Time, again, is not a general concept, for even though we can talk about different times, they are not different instances of one concept (as here words on a page are three different instances of the concept "word") but different parts of one and the same time. Time, then, is, like space, an *a priori* form of intuition. Unlike space, it is a form of our intuition or perception of ourselves and our inner state, not of our intuition of objects outside us.

A further distinction follows: time is a necessary formal conditions of all appearances whatsoever. All objects outside us appear to us as extended in space, but all representations, whatsoever, whether

or inner states or of outer objects, appear to us as succeeding or simultaneous with, one another in time (Kemp 18). We cannot say that things as they are in themselves exist in time, anymore than we can say that they are spatially extended. But all things as they appear to us in our human condition are in time-relation (Kemp 18).

Our capacity for receiving sensations, then, is so constructed that whatever it's material, it is inevitably arranged in a temporal order and, as far as objects outside us are concerned, in a spatial order as well (Kemp 18).

Space-Time Theory

Albert Einstein, like Leibniz and Toland, reacted against the absolutist conception of space and time as described in Newton's classical mechanics, where time is independent of the position and the condition of motion of the system of coordinates. Einstein reaffirms that space is a three-dimensional continuum. By this, Einstein means that it is possible to describe the position of a point (at rest) by means of three numbers (coordinates) x, y, z, and that there is an indefinite number of points in the neigbourhood of this one, the position of which can be described by coordinates such as x, y, z, which may be as near as we choose to the respective values of the coordinates x, y, z of the first point (Einstein 55). According to the theory of relativity, time is robbed of its independence. As time loses its independence as a continuum and forms a unity with space, we have the space-time continuum. Relativity theory thus becomes the space-time theory.

In relativistic physics, space-time is not arena where events take place, without their being affected or affecting the events. Space-time is properties of matter such that nothing could be conceived outside of space-time continuum. Reality and knowledge of physical reality has meaning only within the context of this continuum. In the light of relativity, Hawking considers an event "as something that happens at a particular point in space and at a particular time" (Hawking 24). This is why space is inseparable from time, such that instead of the traditional, classical idea of "space and time" we have "space-time" in relativity.

Metaphysically considered, space and time in Einstein's theory of relativity are not entities themselves, but properties of matter substantially conceived. If we approximate Aristotle's analysis of substance and accidents in terms of relativity, space-time would be only but accidents, inhering in some substantial matter in so far as such matter is measurable in terms of x, y, z, t coordinates. Space in relativity is finite and has boundary. Time also have an end.

Special theory of relativity:

One of the commonplace misunderstandings of relativity is that "everything is relative". This is, as pointed out, a misunderstanding. On this Bertrand Russell remarked in his *ABC of Relativity*.

> A certain type of superior person is fond of asserting that everything is relative. This is, of course, nonsense, because, if everything were relative, there would be nothing for it to be relative to. However without falling into metaphysical absurdities, it is possible to maintain that everything in the physical world is relative to an observer (Russell 17).

Each person has his own personal measure of time depending on where he is and how he is moving (Hawking 36).

In 1905, Albert Einstein revolutionized classical physics and turned physics into its modern course. This revolution lay in the principle of relativity, which guarantees that all the laws of physics are the same in all inertial reference frames.

Before he exalted this principle in the realm of modern physics, Einstein took into consideration the features of Newtonian mechanics, the Galileian transformation, Maxwell's electromagnetic theory of light, the Michelson-Morely experiment, and the Lorentz transformation.

Newtonian mechanics and gravitation relied on the Galileian transformation. The Galileian transformation assumes that time and length are absolute. The Galileian transformation and their assumptions of absoluteness of time and length formed the foundation of Newtonian physics.

James Clerk Maxwell unified the laws of electricity and magnetism in a single law now referred to as "the Maxwell' equations", which is his theory of electromagnetism (see Marion and Hornyak 607-8). A changing magnetic field induces an electric field while changing electric field in turn induces a magnetic field. Maxwell was unifying faraday's law, Gauss's law (electric and magnetic) with Ampere's law (Marion and Hornyak 608). However, the Galileian transformation is untenable for phenomena like electricity, magnetism or phenomena the velocities of which approximate the speed of light ($C = 3 \times 10^8$ m/s).

The Michelson-Morley experiment, conducted in 1987, was designed to demonstrate the existence of the special frame of references called the "ether' frame, and to determine the motion of the earth with respect to that frame. The result was that the velocity of light is the same when measured along two perpendicular axes in a reference frame which is moving relative to either frame in different times of the year (Alozie 78). Einstein was to annul the ether frame and saw it as irrelevant and inapplicable to modern physical theorizing.

The Lorentz transformations perceive space and time in a symmetrical manner. What is a pure space interval or pure time interval in one reference frame becomes a mixture of both space and time intervals in another reference frame.
One consequence of the Michelson-Morley experiment was the special theory of relativity. The theory which applies to systems in uniform motion was based on two postulates.
First, the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames (Einstein). An inertial reference frame is a coordinate system in which the law of inertia applies. The earth can be regarded as an inertial frame if its motion is neglected. The laboratory in which we perform our experiments and which is fixed on earth is also an inertial frame, and so is a vehicle moving with uniform velocity relative to the laboratory (Evwanraye 212). The second postulate of the special relativity theory is that the speed of light in a vacuum is always measured to be the same no matter how fast the light source or observer may be moving (Einstein Relativity). The special theory deals with problems involving frames of reference in uniform relative motion.

With a view to ascertain the connection and interdependence of space co-ordinates (X, Y, and Z) and time, we shall see how the general theory of relativity treats problems involving frames of reference accelerated with respect to one another.

The General Theory of Relativity:
Space and time must be seen as a unity rather than space and time taken alone (Alexandrov). We here speak of space-time. The unity of space-time was realized by Minkowski, who expressed it in the opening words of his famous lecture on "space and time" as follows:

> The views of space and time which/wish to lay before you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics, and therein lies their real strength. They are radical. Henceforth, space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent reality (see Minkowski 75).

The general theory of relativity arose through the extension of the principles of relativity on the gravitational field (Gribanov 217). The application of the law of gravity to relativity, or say to the principle of relativity gave rise to the general theory of relativity. Gravitation holds that objects or bodies attract each other with a force that depends on the masses of their bodies and on the distance between the bodies (Hawking 16, 17). Whatever the success of the theory of relativity, gravitation resisted incorporation in the theory, although Henri Polncare already in his work, where he developed the theory of relativity independently of Einstein, undertook such an attempt that was to be separated by Minkowski.

For Minkowski, there are four coordinates, to wit, x, y, z and t. Minkowski gave a four-dimensional world in space-time given by phenomena. By developing and generalizing the special theory of relativity Einstein arrived at the general theory of relativity. The general theory of relativity is a new theory of gravitation (Zukav 183). The theory is based on the assumption that the four-dimensional space-time continuum in which the forces of gravity operate is subject to the correlations of non-Euclidean geometry (cf. Frolov 357).

The general theory of relativity is a theory of space-time explaining gravitation through the dependence of its structure on the distribution and motion of masses of matter. Distribution and motion of masses of matter determine the difference between the structures of curvature-tensor space-time of the general theory of relativity. In its turn, this structure determines the motion of masses under the impact of gravitational forces. Thus, the masses of matter determine the structure of space-time, and determine their movement. The difference of the structures of space-time from the flat metric, the field of the curvature is the gravitational field.

Einstein's relativity, by demonstrating the impossibility, in principle, of detecting our motion relative to the luminiferous ether (Salmon 72), made the assumption that the whole idea of a unique ether's frame of reference is dispensable, as is the concept of the ether itself. Einstein, instead, postulated the speed of light as having inertial frame of reference.

The most fundamental effect of special relativity on time was the concept of simultaneity. Simultaneity refers to events happening at the same time.

> If the professor sneezes just as the class bell rings, we can observe that these two events happen simultaneously. This is a case of local simultaneity. But when the events in question happen at widely separated places… the problem of whether they occur at the same time is much more difficult (Salmon 73).

In classical physics it was believed that relations of simultaneity were absolute and unambiguous. Two events that happened at different places were either simultaneous or not one's state of motion had no relevance with the question (Salmon 81). It was Einstein who showed that simultaneity is relative to the particular reference frame, inertial moving.

Placing space-time relativity in a nutshell, we have the following to say. In the special theory of relativity, Einstein discovered the laws relativity space and time measurement between two uniformly moving observers. A uniform motion is one that proceeds at constant speed and fixed direction. A non-uniform motion is one in which the speed (such as when a ear or train goes around a curve). In order to treat non-uniform motion, Einstein had to go beyond the tenets of special relativity (Pagels 25). Then came the general theory of relativity. General relativity extended the concepts of space and time of the gravitational field. We must conclude that although both special relativity and general relativity deal with space and time, space and time in special relativity in within the context of uniform motion in general relativity. While space-time is flat in special relativity, space-time has a curved, warped structure in general relativity theory.

Special relativity assumes that:
a. Physical laws are obeyed in all frames of reference and that;
b. The velocity of light in free space is constant in all inertial frames of reference.

General relativity predicts the following:
   a. That light bends in a gravitational field.
   b. That the perihelion of mercury precession (perihelion is the nearest point of mercury to the sun).
   c. That physical process such as the vibrations within an atom is slowed down in a high gravitational field, and therefore the light coming from the stars is reddened slightly (Gibbs 469).

Immanuel Kant was able to systematize the concepts of space and time as a priori forms of intuition. Do we think Einstein had anything to do with Kant and his teaching? There may be no similarities in their approach to the concepts of space and time. Even their points of divergence justify our research.

Possible Influences of Kant's Critical Philosophy on Einstein's Space-Time Theory
Here, one may not expect an analysis of how Einstein reproduced the propositions of Kant's philosophy in the light of the methodological tasks that was facing physics at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Einstein has been represented as a follower of Berkeley and Hume. Some others represent him as a Kantian, a Machist, a positivist, a rationalist, or an empiricist. In his quest for philosophical ideas adequate to the nascent non-classical physics, Einstein turned to analyses of the ideas of other philosophical schools.   In his articles he examined works of various trends: Aristotle, Plato, Lucretius, Democritus, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Mach, Leibniz, et cetera.
Einstein was particularly interested in the ideas of their works which pointed out the contradictory, dialectical character of the cognitive process (Gribanov). Among modern philosophers, Kant was the pioneer thinker who systematized contradictory philosophical ideas and thus established the foundation for modern dialectics. The "Transcendental Aesthetic" section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* contains what Kant referred to as the antinomies of reason. One of these antinomies, particularly, the first antinomy, concerns infinity and finiteness of the universe in time and space. Thus:
Thesis: The world has a beginning in time and is limited as regards space.
Antithesis: The world is infinite in both time and space.

The philosophical views of Kant and Einstein, though unidentical, are not absolutely unrelated. Einstein affirmed that the positive thing that he borrowed from Kant was that reality is in us. He formulated it as follows:

> I did not grow up in the Kantian traditions but came to understand the truly valuable which is to be found in his doctrine, alongside of errors which today are quite obvious, only quite late. It is contained in the sentence: 'The real is not given to us, but put to us (aufgehoben) (by way of riddle). This obviously means: There is such a thing as a conceptual construction for the grasping of the inter-personal, the authority of which lies purely in its validation (Einstein 680).

Einstein saw that Kant had not only made an advance toward solution of the Humean dilemma (break in the chain of knowledge, no causality), but had also pointed out that the sense data in themselves still did not give the necessary notion of the essence of the objects of the external world. They only provided material, which it was necessary to analyse logically, select the essential properties from it, and reject everything that did not express the thing's qualitative determinacy, and so to form a scientific concept. According to Einstein, scientific concepts are the result of the mental work of the

brain and not of sense of organs. The reality of concepts depends on their validation in experience. In Kant, concepts are the products of understanding, and these concepts begin with sensation. Hence: *Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without contents are empty, intuition without concepts are blind* (Kant, A50–51/B74–76). The two forms of intuition which belong to the faculty of sensibility are space and time. Einstein had to part with Kant's transcendentalism. Kant, for example, pictured the world as divided into the noumenon, existing objectively, and phenomenon that allegedly arouse as a result of the ordering of empirical material by means of the subjective forms of time and space. It was by means of time and space that sense data were converted into concepts. Kant considered that time and space, the laws of nature, and casualty did not reflect objective natural processes but were subjective categories, which were a priori, 'innate' in man, eternal, and immutable in time. They preceded experience and played a decisive role in determining the picture of the world. It was impossible to go beyond subjective experience, Kant stressed, because we immediately fell into antinomies and irresolvable contradictions (Gribanov 100).

Einstein did not accept Kant's division of the world into one of noumenon and phenomenon. He understood that, although phenomena were not in themselves identical to the essence of an object, they all the same reflected it. He believed in the *power* of human reason, knowledge of the substance of the object studied. Unlike Kant, Einstein came to the conclusion that the source of our knowledge of the external world lies in that reality itself.

Conclusion

Einstein was not entirely 'unKantian' in analysing space and time. Although he disagreed with the Kantian bifurcation of reality into phenomenon and noumenon, he, nevertheless, thought of space-time in terms of epistemology. While Kant considered space and time as *a priori* forms of intuition, Einstein considered space-time as properties of matter.

Einstein came across the origin of some scientific concepts in his philosophical studies. He, however, assumed that there were contradictory statements about the origin of such concepts. Some of these philosophical positions were that concepts reflected reality, but were not logically deduced from it. Einstein proposed a unity of empirical, practical, and abstracted, rational reality. He criticized the Kantian and Hegelian viewpoints on the problem of concepts and the idea of immutability of concepts (Gribanov 209). Just like Hegel began his philosophy by casting a polemic on Kant, so did Einstein begin to philosophize when he critically assessed the conceptual apparatus of classical mechanics. In his critical analysis of scientific concepts, such as space and time, matter, substance, atoms, particles, motion, etc, he parted company with the naked empiricism of the positivists. Einstein reaffirmed that knowledge cannot arise from sense data alone, without resort to mental activity, just as theorizing divorced from reality could not lead to true knowledge (Einstein *Physics* 757-758 quoted in Gribanov 204). Here one may doubt if this Einstein position is far from the Kantian mediation which is found in the assertion that without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without contents are empty; intuition without concepts are blind… the understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through union can knowledge arise (A50–51/B74–76).

Einstein held the view, just like Kant, that knowledge is the result of the interaction of the subject with the object. And, at least, at this point and for the reason of the unity of sensibility and understanding, Einstein and Kant are synthesized.

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AN ANALYSIS OF KAROL WOJTYLA'S CONCEPT OF THE HUMAN PERSON: RELEVANCE FOR FOSTERING TOLERANCE IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

The centre of the various transformations and advancements in modern society is man. It is man by whom and for whom these transformations and advancements are made. But one negative factor accompanying these transformations is the violence or the degradation of the human person and his dignity. More alarming is the violence committed by man against his fellow man. Today, there is so much violence in the world, every day we hear about killings, kidnappings, rapes, abortion, terrorist attacks, hunger, wars and many other acts of violence. It is ironic that, while the human person is the very victim of this violence, it is also the human person who is the perpetrator of such violence. Hence man is simultaneously the victim and the culprit. Man indeed is a paradox, for while he is bestowed with dignity and good nature, he is also capable of doing evil and inflicting harm against others. This violent tendency happens because man fails to acknowledge the very dignity of his nature which is rooted in his fundamental relationship with God and extended to his fellow human being. While the   human person and human dignity have become the favourite concepts and bywords in contemporary discussions, like in philosophy, anthropology, politics, religion and even in discussions about social and political issues, the aim of this work is to bring out the relevance of human person in upholding the dignity of every man. Using expository method, this work pointed out that if tolerance is embedded in the dignity of the human person, it will surely lead to a peaceful Nigeria.

Keywords: Human Dignity, Human Person, Social Transformation, Tolerance, Violence,

Introduction

The growing rate of intolerance experienced in Nigeria daily under the facades of religious crisis, ethnicism, boundary clashes, land tussles, herdsmen and farmers' clashes etc., is very alarming. This gloomy situation of Nigeria was observed by Haldun C. Anci & Opeyemi A Odukoya when they said that Nigeria "is laced with some of the most obstinate conflicts, most of them constructed from differences in religious and ethnic identities. Religious and ethnic nationalism has led to conflict about control of state power, unequal allocation of resources, citizenship issues, state collapse, economic decline and ethno-religious clashes. Nigeria has been pushed hither and thither by recurrent crises of regional or state illegitimacy, often impairing efforts at economic transformation, democratisation, national cohesion and stability" (Anci & Odukoya no. p.).

These cannot but give credit to Wojtyla assertion that "man not only deforms the image of God in his own person, but is tempted to offences against it in others as well, replacing relationships of communion by attitudes of distrust, indifference, hostility and even murderous hatred". And further said that "when God is not acknowledged as God, the profound meaning of man is betrayed and communion between people is compromised"(John Paul II EV.36). Hence the paramount need to analyse his concept of the human person. His understanding of the human person as that who cannot be subjected to domination by others but one with dignity justifies the topic in view.

Therefore, a systematic structure of introduction, the conception of human person, the conception of tolerance, threats to the existence of human person in Nigeria, cases of intolerance in Nigeria, the relevance of Wojtyla concept of the human person in fostering tolerance in Nigeria and conclusion is adopted to project the value of human life and diversity in Nigeria once again as a way of better enhancing tolerance.

The Concept of Human Person

Over the ages, there has been the problem of understanding and defining in clear terms, who the human person is in terms of his true nature, existential features and integration, and his essence. Efforts that have been made over time have proved futile because through the philosophical and scientific investigations and analysis of the who human person is, more questions and theories have elicited the intellectual realm. From the Ancient era till now, there has been the need by scholars and thinkers to understand who man really is.

With the ground-breaking discoveries, inventions, crimes and actions undertaken by man, many have come to view the human person in different ways. The human person becomes a perpetrator and victim of his very own actions such that there is a pivotal need to understand who the human person is and his reasons for his actions. The human person is by nature good, but he is also capable of doing evil things.(Aguas 40). The human person indeed is a paradox, for while he is bestowed with dignity and good nature, he is also capable of doing evil and inflicting harm against others.(Aguas 40)

Etymologically, the term "person" comes from the Latin "*persona*" whose Greek version is "*prospon*". The term has two main meanings in both Latin and Greek. The first meaning is that of "a mask" used to be worn by actors in Greek and Roman drama. The second meaning is that of "face, visage, role, character or part presented by an actor in drama. (Okenwa 62) From this etymological meaning of the person, we can see that the person from the Latin and Greek standpoint is an actor – one who is acting. This acting does not mean that a person is taking part in a drama but that the act of acting (of doing something) is a special characteristic of the person.

Karol Wojtyla (also known as Pope John Paul II) was born in the market town of Wadowice, 50 Kilometers Southwest of Krakow on May 18, 1920. Karol Joseph Wojtyla is correctly pronounced as " Karol Joseph Voy-tee-wah". He is the son of the loving couple named Karol Wojtyla, Sr. and Emilia Kaczowska. Karol's father was a military officer who had fought in the First World War He was the only a young boy when his mother died in 1929. His elder brother Edmund was a doctor who died in 1932 at the age of 26 from the contamination of the scarlet fever, while his older sister died in infancy. He was a prolific writer and playwright and most importantly, a protector and promoter of human worth and dignity.

Wojtyla's Concept of Human Person

His understanding of the Human person is expressed profoundly in his encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* (the Gospel of Life). The human person is seen as that intelligent being that is "mysteriously different" from other earthly creatures who has transcendent character of "existence as man". He is a being whose life is seen as sacred or splendid gift of God entrusted to his responsibility, loving care and "veneration". The life is not "his exclusive property, completely subject to his control and manipulation" (Wojtyla 22). Wojtyla saw life as good. Because to him, human person is the only being with "the ability to attain truth and freedom" and is "capable of knowing and loving his creator" (Wojtyla 22). He sees human's life as "the seed of an existence which transcends the very limits of time" (Wojtyla 22). For him, the human person is called to a fullness of life which far exceeds the dimensions of his earthly existence, because it consists in sharing the very life of God. The loftiness of this supernatural vocation reveals the greatness and the inestimable value of human life even in its temporal phase. Life in time, in fact, is the fundamental condition, the initial stage and an integral part of the entire unified process of human existence. It is a process which, unexpectedly

and undeservedly, is enlightened by the promise and renewed by the gift of divine life, which will reach its full realization in eternity. (EV 34) This means that a Human person is an embodiment of physical and spiritual component that enjoys spatiotemporal existence and has capacity of existing beyond it.

As a person, we are more complex and more dynamic than simply what our consciousness can constitute us. For there are parts of our human conditions which are not mediated by our consciousness but are considered important towards our personal becoming. For instance, we possess human dynamism that we only experience *passively*. Wojtyła calls it as *activations* or "something- happens-in-man" which corresponds to our experience as a *passive* subject because it functions even with the absence of our active and conscious participation in it. (EV 34)

In Psychoanalytical level, according to Sigmund Freud, the human person comprises of three levels in his structure of personality. These levels are the "id", "ego", and the "superego". At the "id", it consists everything that is inherited, that is present at birth is laid down in the constitution – above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate from the somatic organisation, and which find a first psychical expression here (in the id) in forms unknown to us (Palado 8). It is seen as the biological part of one's personality and operates on a pleasure principle. The "ego" on the other hand is the first conscious area and the executive arm of one's personality. It enables the human person to distinguish between wish and reality and operates on the "reality principle". The "superego" is the culmination of one's personality. The human person is complete at this stage because he is able to discern good from evil and able to decide properly what he wants to do in such a way that he is conscious of how it would affect others. The superego acts as the conscience, maintaining our sense of morality and proscription from taboos. Anthropology sees the human person as being higher than all other creatures of the world because of our unique characteristics like the brain and other certain levels of socialization that we exhibit, and the level of morality that we condone in our society.

A Canadian Philosopher Charles Taylor is well known for the promotion of the concept of "the self" in his philosophical works. He affirms the concept of the 'Self' in relation to the human person in these words:

> The human person is a being with certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. But underlying the moral status as its condition are certain capacities. A person is a being who has a notion of the future and the past, who can hold values, make choices. ..At least, a person must be the kind of being who is in principle capable of all these, however damaged these capacities may be in practice (Taylor 97).

From the foregoing, one can say that the human person is a respondent being: a being who can be addressed and who can reply. Thus, Charles Taylor opines that any philosophical theory of the person must address the question of what it is to be a respondent. This is what differentiates the human person from animals (97).

For Karol Wojtyla, the human person is not simply defined as a psychosomatic being. But he defines man as "person" (146). He also adopted the philosophy of Boethius on the concept of person as "as an individual substance of a rational nature" (Stump 17). The two key terms are individual and rational. When commenting upon this definition, Saint Thomas Aquinas indicated that this definition applies to human beings because they are separate from one another, thus they are individuals, and because they are rational, that is, they "have control over their own actions and are not only acted upon as are all other beings, but act of their own initiative." (Aquinas Online). A person is an individual because he is unique and separate from other beings even of his own specie or kind. He is a substance because he exist in himself and not in another in other words the person is not an accident. And he is a rational because he is endowed with rational appetencies : the intellect and the will. The intellect is the persons power to know being, his own being and being with others. Likewise through the intellect man is able to contemplate.

The Concept of Tolerance

Tolerance is a moral virtue best placed within the moral domain – but unfortunately it is often confounded with prejudice. Tolerance is a fair and objective attitude towards others whose beliefs and lifestyles are different than yours. Subjects that may require tolerance include religion, politics, and education. And the levels of tolerance include personal, community, state, and national. But, unlike prejudice, tolerance can be grounded in the moral domain which offers a positive approach to examining relationships between groups of people who are different from each other. This would mean that tolerance implies recognition and respect of human person's rights irrespective of the differences therein.

The word tolerance was introduced in the early 15th century from the Latin word "tolerantia". This word was originally meant to endure hardship or provide support. It was also used as a French word around the same time and had a similar meaning. In 1765, it became associated with its more modern meaning as a tendency to be free from the judgment of others. Other people have attempted defining tolerance from both the positive and negative approaches. Defining tolerance from the positive, Gordon Shepherd and Gray Shepherd defined it as "the recognition and respect for the equal civil rights and liberties of people whose social status and cultural preferences are different from one's own" (Shepherd 87), and from the negative, Susanne Karstedt argues that "it is not an expression of benevolence, but embodies a sense of disapproval. Tolerance is the deliberate choice not to interfere with conducts and beliefs, lifestyles and behaviours, of which one disapproves. Tolerance is defined by passivity, not activity, and it is non-reaction and non-interference that characterizes tolerant attitudes and behaviours" (Shepherds 86). In both senses of the definition, it is worth noting that tolerance of diversity entails guidance of the law where groups of people are afforded liberty and security in pursuit of their life goals. And this is one of the fundamental requirements of modern democracy for minimizing social strife and promoting a civil society. Today, words like allowance, acceptance, etc., are used in place of tolerance. Therefore:

> Based on its Latin origin, tolerance, or toleration as philosophers often refer to it, is most commonly viewed negatively as "putting up with" something we dislike or even hate. If a person is prepared to "put up with" something – along the lines of, I do not like the colour of your skin but I will still serve you not to lose your custom – that person is someone who does not discriminate but remains intolerant in thoughts and beliefs. (Wittenberg no. p.)

Threats to the Existence of Human Person in Nigeria

Quoting the Church Fathers in his encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* Pope Saint John Paul II recounted that:

> Whatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia, or willful self-destruction, whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on body or mind, attempts to coerce the will itself; whatever insults human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and children; as well as disgraceful working conditions, where people are treated as mere instruments of gain rather than as free and responsible persons; all these things and others like them are infamies indeed. They poison human society, and they do more harm to those who practice them than to those who suffer from the injury. Moreover, they are a supreme dishonour to the Creator (EV. 3).

So some of the threats faced in Nigeria are as follows:

1. Poverty: Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon. The World Development Report 2000/2001 (see World Bank, 2001) summarizes the various dimensions as lack of opportunity, lack of empowerment and a lack of security. This makes them practically inactive in the society. Their lack of empowerment limits their choices in almost everything and their lack of security makes them vulnerable to diseases, violence and so on. Similarly, a United Nations statement says: Poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, a violation of human dignity. It means lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in society. It means not having enough to feed and clothe a family, not having a school or clinic to go to; not having the land on which to grow one's food or a job to earn one's living, not having access to credit. It means insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion of individuals, households and communities. It means susceptibility to violence, and it often implies living on marginal or fragile environments, without access to clean water or sanitation. (United Nations)

There are several effects and deficiencies associated with poverty in Nigeria. One of the main effects of poverty is poor health, as is reflected in Nigeria's high infant mortality and low life expectancy. Poor people in Nigeria face several health issues as they lack basic health amenities and competent medical practitioners.
Poverty is multi-dimensional and even though it is difficult to separate the various dimensions of poverty from the various causes of poverty, in the case of Nigeria, we have shown that unemployment, corruption, the non-diversification of Nigeria's economy, inequality, laziness, and poor educational system are some of the key determinants of poverty.

2 Corruption: A high level of corruption and the looting of state resources is another serious and 'pandemic' problem that makes all forms of conflict and trouble worse in Nigeria. The country is 'richly endowed with natural resources and high quality human capital' but corruption is one of the main reasons that affect the development of the country in a negative way. The preface to an article, "Corruption in Nigeria: patterns and trends Second survey on corruption as experienced by the population" presented by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, in 2019, revealed that:

> The survey on bribery and other forms of corruption, which was conducted in May and June 2019, covered more than 33,000 households across the country, providing data for each of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. The survey's primary focus is to assess the actual experiences of Nigerians whenever they come into contact with up to 20 different types of public official. The survey also evaluates the likelihood of citizens being approached for the payment of bribes as well as the frequency of such requests and payments. It also provides insights into citizens' attitudes towards corruption, their readiness to refuse requests for bribes and to report corruption incidents. For the first time, the survey provides data on bribery and nepotism in public sector recruitment as well as the phenomenon of vote-buying. It does this by breaking down this information by sex, age, educational background and economic status (Kale & Stolpe no. p.).

3. Ethno-religious Conflicts: *Both Islam and Christianity have had significant impacts on the making of African societies, from the time of Africa's first encounters with these two religions. Even more significant is the role these religions have played in a multi-religious environment such as Nigeria. Given that both religions have played a vital role in the shaping of society, politics, and ethnic identity in Nigeria.*

Nigeria's multi-ethnic and multi-religious diversities coincide with the North and South divide, with Muslims and Christians dominating each part respectively. For several decades now, Nigeria has been witnessing an upsurge in ethno-religious conflicts. Nigeria is a country of diverse and rich

cultural heritage. With a population of over 200 million people, Nigeria remains the most populous nation in Africa endowed with rich natural resources. Despite this, Nigeria is faced with many problems and challenges among which ethno-religious conflicts seems to top the list. Ethno-religious conflicts have created instability and remained a constant threat to human life, properties and peaceful co-existence in the Nigeria society. This made Dukor to assert that "religion is not a concept which is intrinsically bad. It is rather an integrating force. Religion as a disintegrating force is attributable to the organizers, the organization, the preachers, the preaching, the propagators and the propagation of religions."(Dukor 61). Adding more credence to the origin of the ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria, Professor Olufemi Vaughan in his book "Religion and the Making of Nigeria" has this to say:

> Following Nigeria's independence from Britain in 1960, Christian-Muslim tensions became manifest in regional and religious conflicts over the expansion of sharia, in fierce competition among political elites for state power, and in the rise of Boko Haram. These tensions are not simply conflicts over religious beliefs, ethnicity, and regionalism; they represent structural imbalances founded on the religious divisions forged under colonial rule. (Vaughan)

The long-term consequence of the challenge that came from such imbalance among the two religions is an exacerbation of the intolerance between the Moslem north and the rest of Nigeria.

4. Kidnapping and Senseless Killings: The obvious result is the escalating wave of criminal activities as exemplified in the recent upsurge in the rate of kidnapping and senseless killings in different parts of the country. To say that kidnapping is a menace in contemporary Nigeria is surely an understatement. Kidnapping in Nigeria first attracted national attention on 25th February2006, when restive youths in the Niger Delta abducted some foreign oil workers in the bid to press home their demand for restitution and increased infrastructural development. Since then, this deadly crime has not only become ubiquitous, it has been shamelessly commercialized in different parts of the country.

Accordingly Samaha has also noted that kidnapping is an ancient crime that originally involved holding the king's relatives for ransom. According to him, kidnapping was considered a serious offense because it interfered with the personal liberty of members of royal families. He specifically noted that aggravated kidnappings were mostly undertaken to achieve any or a combination of the following objectives:

i. Sexual invasion
ii. Obtaining hostage
iii. Obtaining ransom
iv. Robbing the victim
v. Murdering the victim
vi. Blackmailing
vii. Terrorizing the victim and
viii. Achieving political aims (356).

Today almost every Nigerian lives in perpetual fear of being abducted by kidnappers and ransom asked. In some instances, the ransom is paid yet the victim is killed. This act has led to the death of many ranging from ordinary citizens to the privilege placed ones. In recent time, an example is the kidnap and killing of the Abuja – Kaduna bound train passengers, the kidnap and killing of Rev. Frs. Joseph Bako Aketeh and Vitus Viashima Borogo of Kaduna Archdiocese on 25th June, 2022 and Christopher Odia of Uromi diocese in Edo State on 26th June, 2022. The June 5th killing of over 40 parishioners of St. Francis Xavier Catholic Church, Owo - Oluwa, Ondo diocese in Ondo State, the

abduction and killing of Fr. JohnMark Cheitnum of Kafanchan diocese on July 15th 2022. Fr. Isaac Achi of Minna Diocese was shot dead by terrorist in January 15th 2023 and so many other unreported incidents of kidnapping and killings that are still going on around the country.

5. Farmers and Herder's clashes: Violence between Nigerian herders and farmers has escalated, killing more than 3000 people since January 2018 till date. The conflict has evolved from spontaneous reactions to provocations and now to deadlier planned attacks, particularly in Benue, Plateau, Kaduna, Adamawa, Nasarawa, Taraba states and in some southern states of the federation. The Online Punch Newspaper of 22nd October 2022 reported that the death toll from the reprisal by the suspected herders on Gbeji in the Ukum Local Government Area of Benue State has hit 36. Several people were said to still be missing. The herders in the early hours of that Wednesday 19th October invaded Gbleji community and shot indiscriminately, killing 18 people including a policeman. According to the report of the International Crisis Group of 26th July 2018, affirmed that:

> Three factors have aggravated this decades-long conflict arising from environmental degradation in the far north and encroachment upon grazing grounds in the Middle Belt: militia attacks; the poor government response to distress calls and failure to punish past perpetrators. The farmer-herder conflict has become Nigeria's gravest security challenge, now claiming far more lives than the Boko Haram insurgency. It has displaced hundreds of thousands and sharpened ethnic, regional and religious polarisation. It threatens to become even deadlier and could affect forthcoming elections and undermine national stability. As the killings persist, Nigerians are weaving destructive conspiracy theories to explain the conflict. Charges and counter-charges fly of ethnic cleansing and even genocide – by both farmers and herders. In Benue, Plateau and Kaduna states, herders' attacks have deepened anger, particularly but not only among farmers, at the Fulani who are spread across the north.(ICG).

6. Loss of the Sense of God's Existence: Blaise Pascal's choice of 'wretchedness' (*la misère*) as a sub-title for one group of 'thoughts' reflected his personal experiences. "The greatness of human beings consists in their ability to know their wretchedness" (Fragment 105: II, 574). Pascal's rejection of any naturalistic explanation of the human mind or soul, his emphasis on dread of an unknown future (because, according to his theology, we do not know whether we are saved or damned), the apparent insignificance of human existence, and the experience of being dominated by political and natural forces that far exceed our limited powers (Paschal 574).

Today some have lost hope in God to the point of doubting his existence because of the challenges faced daily. And Wojtyla referring to when the sense of God is lost would say that "by living as if God did not exist, man not only loses sight of the mystery of God, but also of the mystery of the world and the mystery of his own being" (22).

Cases of Intolerance in Nigeria
According to Michael B Aleyomi in his article, *Ethno-Religious Crisis as a Threat to the Stability of Nigeria's Federalism*, a glimpse of some of the ethno-religious conflicts include; the Maitatsine sectarian crisis in 1981, the Kaduna and Bulunkutu (Maiduguri) in 1982, the Ilorin Muslim-Christian riot during Christian Easter procession of March 1986, Zaria and Funtua religious riots of March 1987. In October 1990, there was a clash between Christians and Muslims in Kano. The Christians invited a German Christian preacher Reinhard Bonnke to Kano but the Muslims felt cheated for the fact that Ahmed Deedat, a Muslim preacher was previously denied to preach in South Africa. As a means of retaliation, it resulted into crises left behind a casualty of over 500 lives and million-worth property (Aleyomi 130). He further stated Kano civil disturbance of December 1991 and Jos crisis of April 1994. Other instances that can be seen as forms of intolerance in Nigeria are:

1.The July 1999 conflict among the Oro cultists in Sagamu in Ogun state who claimed that the Hausas were outside with their gnome. The results were arguments that finally turned into a full-scale crisis. Many Yoruba and Hausa people were killed before dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on the Sagamu town. Even as the infamy was being put under check in Sagamu, reprisal attacks continued in Kano, in Hausa city, leading to deaths and destruction of property worth billions of Naira (https://www.accord.org.za).

2. Another ethno-religious conflict that had far reaching impacts on the people of Nigeria was the October 2000 Lagos-Kano (Idi-Araba/Oko-Oba) conflict which was caused by a misperception between the Hausa inhabitants and the Yoruba living in Lagos over the use of a convenience by a man from Hausa. The mayhem resulted in the death of man Yoruba. As a consequence, the O'dua People Congress (a Yoruba militia) was formed and worsened the situation as the violence later spread southwards to Kano.

3. Worse still, in September 2001, ethnic friction between the Tivs and the Jukuns in Taraba state reached fever pitch following what came to be referred to as 'mistaken identity'. 'What this means is that some Tivs took some nineteen soldiers to be Jukuns in fake army uniform. The Tiv youths captured them and slaughtered them one by one'. And then the Nigerian army embarked on devastating reprisal attacks in Zaki-Biam. According to some controversial numbers at least a hundred people died in the attacks (Human Rights Watch 2001). Violence spread to Jos plateau especially after a Christian was appointed as a Local Council Chairman. By the time the menace was brought to a standstill, over 160 lives had been lost.

4. The killing of Deborah Samuel in Sokoto is another mishap. She was a student of Shehu Shagari College of Education, Sokoto who on Thursday the 12th of May 2022, was stoned, flogged and burnt to death in Sokoto by school mates after posting a message on the class group. She was a Christian killed by Muslims over the allegation of blasphemy against their Holy Prophet Mohammad. In like manner, A member of a vigilante group Ahmad Usman, was killed in the Lugbe area of Abuja over an alleged blasphemy against Prophet Muhammad. Daily Trust on Sunday 5th June, 2022 gathered that the mob killing occurred at the timber market section of Fruit Market in Federal Housing Estate, Lugbe. The Premium Times reported that one Munkaila Ahmadu (37 years old), a member of the Tijjaniyya Islamic sect, killed his parents in Gagarawa Local Government Area of Jigawa State, on the account that they uttered blasphemous comments against the Prophet Mohammad. According to Ahmadu, "I killed them because they refused to accept the truth concerning the Prophet Muhaamad (SAW). I killed them because they abused the prophet and their punishment is death, there is no repentance for any person who abused the Prophet" (30).

The Relevance of Wojtyla's Concept of the Human Person in Fostering Tolerance in Nigeria
When Karol Wojtyla said "that the human person, unlike animals and things, cannot be subjected to domination by others" (19), he was referring to tolerance or man's ability to tolerate. This is an affirmation in a way of an assertion that, "complex, pluralistic societies that are not united by a limited range of shared social and cultural characteristics must find ways to transcend their internal differences in order to function effectively in meeting people's needs and sustaining their political rights. This need is central to modern democracies in which social and cultural diversity are the norm. Recognizing and protecting minority as well as majority rights is a major challenge for all democratic states in the contemporary world" (Shepherd 86). With the consciousness that the human person is an end in itself and not means to an end, people irrespective of their religion, tribe, nationality or political affiliation will live in harmony with their differences. Their differences would not be seen as threat but as gift to foster their flourishing and survival in the society.

To him every man has dignity. Their dignity consists in their having same origin or Creator. And this is the unifying factor of all men. Just as the Catholic Church teaches that the equality of men

concerns their dignity as persons and the rights that flow from it (CCC 1945) and respect for the human person considers the other "another self". It presupposes respect for the fundamental rights that flow from the dignity intrinsic of the person (CCC 1944). So when realized that the human person has dignity, he would be treated with utmost respect that accords his being. Therefore, would not be subjected to subhuman living conditions like poverty. And the order of things would be seen to be subordinate to the order of persons where truth, justice and love flourish.

He believes that every man is his brother's keeper. As such everyone has the responsibility of living in solidarity with others. But it is disheartening that today almost everyone wishes to assert himself independently of others and to make their interest prevail. A major factor he discovered to be a reason for this is "a notion of freedom which exalts the isolated individual in an absolute way, and gives no place to solidarity, to openness to others and service of them" (Wojtyla 19) He then observed that this "freedom negates and destroys itself, and becomes a factor leading to the destruction of others, when it no longer recognizes and respects its essential link with the truth. When freedom, out of a desire to emancipate itself from all forms of tradition and authority, shuts out even the most obvious evidence of an objective and universal truth, which is the foundation of personal and social life, then the person ends up by no longer taking as the sole and indisputable point of reference for his own choices the truth about good and evil, but only his subjective and changeable opinion or, indeed, his selfish interest and whim" (Wojtyla 19). This really buttresses the fact that the human person is a social being that exist in a community and not isolation. And if live in a community then one needs to care, love and cherish another such that the problem of one could become the problem of all. This is true because when someone suffers in a society, others also suffer indirectly. For example, if someone is kidnapped. It is true that the first victims would be one's immediate family and friends but it doesn't exclude others as well. For if not for anything then others would live in fear of being kidnapped as well.

So his holistic view of the human person as someone who exists in the world and has the capacity of knowing and loving his Creator, living with others and being responsible for them, has the rationality that distinguishes him from other creatures as a free being; and can only grasp the mystery of God, the world and himself by not losing sight of God is all the more relevant. And this is the consciousness that can help Nigerians live within the motto of the nation: in justice, peace and unity. This is a stage where citizens either from the North, South, East or West will not identify themselves as Northerners, Southerners, Easterners or Westerners but Nigerians, and likewise Christians, Muslims and Traditionalists. That is, a stage where tolerance is at home and Nigerians see themselves as human persons with common origin or Creator irrespective of their tribe, region or religion.

Conclusion
Paradoxically, a situation where a society that shows unlimited tolerance towards people with intolerant ideas eventually loses its capacity to be tolerant as the intolerant group destroys their rights. This was elaborated by Austrian philosopher Karl Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies. Popper argued that for a liberal society to sustain itself, it must be intolerant towards intolerance. However, Popper did not propose that intolerant ideas need to be suppressed. It is only intolerant actions like violence that he thought needed to be stopped in a liberal society.

It is undoubtedly established that Nigeria is high on the list as one of the most unstable states in Africa. Since its independence, Nigeria has been driven hither and thither by recurrent crises of regional or state illegitimacy, often impairing efforts at democratisation, stability, economic transformation and national cohesion. A peak of the crisis appears to have occurred during the civil war of the 1960s which began shortly after independence. Since 1999 when Nigeria transited into

civilian rule, the country has witnessed a rapid increase in the number of conflicts. In all these "what is at stake is the dignity of the human person, whose defence and promotion have been entrusted to us by the Creator, and to whom the men and women at every moment of history are strictly and responsibly in debt" (CCC 1929). Therefore, Karol Wojtyla concept of the human person is indeed relevant in fostering tolerance in whatever form in Nigeria and any part of the world. He views the human person as a free being that has dignity, has the responsibility of being his brother's keeper and is different from other animals. His view is indeed a profound remedy to the problem of intolerance experienced in Nigeria if genuine appreciation would be made by implementation.

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SYMBOLISM AND PERSONIFICATION OF NATURE: EXPLORING THE ECOCRITICISM IN DEREK WALCOTT'S *ANOTHER LIFE*

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Abstract

This paper is an ecocritical study of Derek Walcott's poem *Another Life*. The method adopted by the paper is analytic. The paper argues that one of the dilemmas of our society today is the human existential degradation resulting from various exploitation of the ecosystem. It is a dilemma that arises from man's craving for his insatiable wants, sometimes to the detriment of his fellow human beings. The paper draws man's attention to nature through the medium of literature; it underscores the need for man to live in harmony with his environment. Using ecocriticism as a framework, the paper shows how Walcott in his poem *Another Life* delineates man and the ecosystem, using the ecosystem to define the identity of the Caribbean person. Thus, this work is an ecocritical study of Walcott's conception of the ecosystem in relation to the Caribbean identity.
Keywords: Ecocriticism, Environmental Ethics, Derek Walcott, Ecosystem, Literature.

Preamble:

Man's growing concern to establish a healthy relationship with his environment has become a topical issue in the contemporary era. Basically, man's socio-economic activities have always posed significant threat to the ecosystem and man himself. Significantly, the notion of environment in this work is not limited to physical landscape, but encompasses the entire ecosphere. This is because eco-literature focuses on the relationship between humanity and the environment and given that humanity cannot exist independent of environment, the environment deserves as much as humanity deserves. Thus, ecocriticism is a literary genre that focuses on human-nature interface. Nature no doubts, has profound effects on the way we see and interact with one another as humanity (Bate 2). And with the importance of literature, the individual is able to investigate what literature has to tell us about our relationship with the environment, and with the publication of two seminal works in the mid-1900s, marked the formal beginning of this movement-ecocriticism- with its motivation to revive nature writing, promote ecological knowledge, and ultimately philosophy of literature and develop new approaches in contributing to contemporary environmental movement.

Conceptualizing Ecocriticism

Ecocriticism is as ancient as humanity itself. But the conception of ecocriticism as a distinct object of study started to gather momentum in the 1990s, first in the US and the UK, as more and more literary scholars began to ask what their field has to contribute to our understanding of the unfolding environmental challenges. At first it was focused on the "reappraisal of Romanticism and its cultural progeny, but has since extended its emphasis to address the question of the relation between humans and natural world in literature. It deals with how environmental issues, cultural issues concerning the environment and attitudes towards nature are presented and analyzed.

Some Scholars have rejected the label "ecocriticism" due to the fact that it can easily be identified with one version of environmentalism (Deep Ecology), there is need therefore to suggest an

alternative designation, such as environmental ecological literary studies or green cultural studies (Hochman 30), this is because Deep Ecology is strongly committed to political activism. Nevertheless, the term ecocriticism has grown as the name for what it is today "a study of literature and environment from an interdisciplinary point of view where all sciences come together to analyze the environment and brainstorm possible solutions to the challenges confronting the ecosystem" (www.literariness.org). The theory was officially heralded by the publication of two influential works, both published in the mid-90s: *The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks* edited by Cheryll Glotfelty & Harold Fromm and the *Environmental Imagination…* by Lawrence Buell. According to Buell:

> The common ground on which all strands of ecocriticism stand is the assumption that the ideas and structures of desire which govern the interactions between humans and their natural environment (including perhaps most crucially, the very distinction between the human and the non - human) are of central importance if we are to get a handle on our ecological predicaments. While its mainstay is still, the study of culture in a more narrow sense (literature visual arts, and also music), ecocriticism is by its nature an interdisciplinary enterprise, which seeks to engage with environmental history, philosophy, sociology and science studies, and not least with ecology and life sciences (Buell 117).

The word ecocriticism can also be traced to William Rueckert's essay "Literature and Ecology: An Experiment in Ecocriticism" (1978), that deal with the web of relationship between cultural products and nature. But in 1989, Cheryll Glofelty during the meeting of the Western Literature Association in Corneld revived the term and argued for its adoption to refer to "the diffuse critical field that before now had been known as the study of nature writing" (38). Glotfelty's idea is that "literary studies in an age of environmental crisis conceivably may do some good and in some ways ameliorate the environmental crisis" (39). Carolyn Merchant in her works *Radical Ecology* and *Reinventing Eden*: *The Fate of Nature in Western Culture* maintains that, "prior to the seventeenth century, nature was conceived as an organic model, a benevolent female and a nurturing mother, but after the scientific revolution, nature was conceived as a mechanistic model, a mere machine, inert and dead" (91; 42). While Glen Love did not deny the reality of environmental degradation, he nevertheless emphasizes that such degradation is largely a product of socio-economic inequalities. In his essay titled "Revaluing Nature: Towards an Ecological Criticism" he believes that "the issue of environmental pollution should not be seen as a political rhetoric; rather, as an avenue to address the environmental crisis in the contemporary society" (229).

Simone Estok in his essay "*Ecocriticism*" opined that looking at the relationship that exists between literature and ecology, "ecocriticism is not just a means of analyzing nature in literature, but rather, something that entails a biocentric world view, an extension of ethics, a broadening of human conception of global community to include all non-human life forms and the physical environment" (Simone19). The implication of Simone's statement is that ecocritical writers, apart from reflecting nature in their works should be able to show how literature relates to the physical as well as the natural environment. Similarly, Michael Branch in consideration of ecocriticism in his article *What We Talk About When We Talk About Ecocriticism* maintains that "human act occurs within a network of relationships, processes, and systems that are as ecological as they are cultural" (16). Branch here identifies the intricate relationship between nature and human beings. This in other words, this means that environmental degradation can give rise to both moral and cultural degradation in the society. Human beings do not exist as independent entities outside the environment but rather beings that live and have their sustenance from the environment. Thus, the destruction of his or her environment, may lead to man's eventual extinction. Thus, ecocriticism becomes "a form of literary criticism that is based on an ecological perspective that investigates the relationship between humans and the

natural world in literature, the study of how individuals in the society behave and reacts in relation to nature and the ecosystem" (Ebeh and Aleke3).

Therefore, one of the major concerns of ecocriticism is to make "the public to be more sensitive to and informed about the environment in which they live" (4). It draws man's attention whether consciously or unconsciously towards his environment. Consciously in the sense that man's actions in some instances towards the environment are deliberate, and unconsciously because man in some instances becomes destructive to his environment without his knowledge. Ecocriticism tries to direct our attention to our environment and make us good managers of our ecosystem, since the environment plays a vital role in ensuring a healthy and successful living. According to Bill Freedman in his work *Ecosystem and Humans,* the ecocritical principle lies in the fact that "it draws one closer to one's environment, making one know the need to develop the resources that abound in one's environment" (17). Ecocriticism views literature as part of the complex global systems, tool for global change through awareness about the people's environment and the need to preserve the natural artifacts endowed in them by nature. Ecocriticism also directs man attention to matters which he ought to know about his environmental crisis by using literature to transmit values with profound ecological implication.

Derek Walcott's *Another Life:* Symbolism and Personification of Nature

Today, it seems that the most important function of literature is to direct human consciousness to a full consideration of its place in a threatened natural world. Walcott in his poem *Another Life* successfully engaged the Caribbean landscape in the task of redefining the identity of the inhabitants of the West Indies. From the very beginning of the first part of the poem, Walcott brought to the fore the consciousness of the physical environment's presence and potential roles in the form of metaphor:

Verandah where the pages of the sea
Are a book left open by an absent master?
In the middle of another life,
I begin until this ocean's a shut book
And like a bulb the white moon's filaments wane.
Begin with twilight … (3).

The sea mentioned here is symbolic of the general history of the Caribbean Island since it was through this natural entity that Columbus arrived at Hispaniola Island by misadventure and subsequently arranged the arrival of European tradesmen and opportunists who came to decimate the Island of the original natives – the Arawaks and the Caribs. It was also through this sea that slaves were transported through the middle passage and subsequent arrivals (indentured labourers) meant to depopulate and decimate West Indies. So, "the passages of the Sea" which open at the "verandas" represents the symbolic histories of all the races through the Caribbean world. The moon and twilight images represent relative darkness which in turn translates to the era of colonialism, subservience, hopelessness, alienation and double consciousness. These images keep reoccurring in this work as the Derek Walcott employs them as a medium of illustrating the transformation of the old world to the new. This in a way typifies his passion for chronological exploration of historical events through accurate documentation and thereby recreating history through the symbolic nature of the "Sea":

But drunkenly, or secretly we swore
That we would never leave the Island
Until we had put down, in paint, in words …
For no one had yet written of this landscape (52-53)

They had painfully observed that "the whole generations died uncherished even as forests of holy thicken with amnesia" (53) so it became their obligation to paint the landscape while discerning their

identities within this framework. The *persona's* double consciousness thus came to the fore while interacting with nature as the *persona* declared:

> *It searched the sea-wrack for a sea-coin:*
> *My white grandfather's face ...*
> *My black grandfather's voice*
> *Imprisoned in his choice (66).*

But concludes that "I tried of your whining, grandfather/ I tried of your groans, grandfather" (66).Because his task is also to recreate his history in a symbolic fashion. Unknown that nature acts differently as such, even his desire to recreate his depends on how nature intends it. The *persona* asserts:

> *The forest keeps no wounds*
> *This nature heals*
> *The newest scar*
> *Each cloud wraps like a bondage (70).*

Thus, even his resolve to recreate history and initiate a rebirth will not come to fruition if nature approves of it. Confirming this, the poet complains:

> *Where did I fail? I could draw*
> *I was disciplined, humble*
> *I renewed the visible world that*
> *I saw exactly, yet it hindered me ... (58)*

So nature arises to "frown at images" over the shoulder of the poet. It also arises to recreate the history, to facilitate the rebirth of the Caribbean man. To perform this function, it must assume another image, that of fire. Hence, the persona declares:

> *Nature is a fire;*
> *Through the door of his landscape*
> *I have entered a furnace (58)*

Nature's fire or the sun thus serves as agent of change, of rebirth, the transmitter of a new beginning- the New World:

> *It mesmerized like fire without wind*
> *And as its amber climbed ...*
> *The sky grew drunk with light*
> *There was your heaven!*
> *The clear Gaze of another life,*
> *A landscape locked in amber,*
> *The rare Glean ... (3)*

A new life then begins after the rebirth as the *persona* realizes itself in its new identities:

> *The sun came through or skins*
> *And we behold, at last, the exact,*
> *Sudden definition of our shadow (76).*

Although they became "orphans of the nineteenth century, they became the light of the world since they lived by another light" (77). Indifference becomes established, the image of twilight and moon indicative of darkness, slavery, colonialism ignorance and helplessness and that of nature's fire indicatives of purgatory, enlightenment, freedom and productivity. In fact, all that the New World yearned for is created: "slowly she rose, the New Jerusalem" (103).

Eco-critical Evaluation of Derek Walcott's "*Another Life*"

Walcott's *Another Life* is an attempt to use literature to transmit values with profound creative and ecological implications. He tries to engage the Caribbean landscape (environment) in the task of redefining the identity of the Caribbean man and his identity and invariably that of man generally. According to Mervyn in an article titled *Derek Walcott and the Caribbean Poetry,* Walcott as a poet has always been concerned with defining his identity with a specific region or a particular historical condition. Mervyn submit that Walcott "has always in theory and in practice, been willing to draw on the total heritage available to him as an alert and enquiring about human being and the environment" (144). It is a work on how "the environment (Caribbean Island) is perceived by the Caribbean" (145). The *Divided Child* for instance, introduces us to the young artist and his Island environment.

The racial relationship between black people and whites, colonizers and the colonized, is the concern of Walcott as he asserts:

> *Like Christopher he bears in speech*
> *Mnemonic as missionary's the word*
> *To savage ... style and voice*
> *We make his language ours*
> *Converted cannibals (Derek 149:).*

Walcott has written both in dialect and in Standard English. Sometimes a fusion of the two serves to suggest "that dramatic ambivalence" (Mervyn154), as found in these lines from *Another Life:*

> *But I tired of your whining*
> *Grandfather in the whispers of march grass*
> *I tired of your groans,*
> *In the deep ground bass of the combers (12).*

Mervyn explains that the English past participle "I tired" is also a dialect present indicative I am tired: as the persona is addressing a white grandfather (whose ancestral language is English) and a black grandfather (whose descendants speak dialect, mostly) the tension is particularly appropriate. Walcott in *Another Life* focuses primarily on using the environment to trace identity and define the historical landscape of the Caribbean man. So while change – conscious natives of the West Indies, it remains acutely passive to undiscerning of the neocolonialist inclined.

The Mexican Nobel Laureate, Octavio Paz, in an essay about modern poetry once argued quite simple: "the immense, stupid and suicidal waste of natural resources must come to an immediate end if human species wishes to survive on this earth" (156). Paz's point is instructive because it demonstrates that we have come to identify the end of time as synonymous with the destruction of our natural environment and dehumanizing the inhabitants. He concludes that "it was this environmental dilemma which Walcott attempt to depict in *Another Life*" (157),and this has attracted commentaries from critics. George Hadley in an article " Derek *Walcott's Poetics of Environment* states that Walcott "rejects technology and market values as the means by which he can be protected and instead argues for an elemental acceptance of poetic yet Adamic task of meaning things" (6). Walcott's Adamic identity and nature, however, does not involve the subordination of nature that is implied in the genesis plot, but history is never removed from Walcott's nature.

Mervyn submits that *Another Life* is "an autobiographical efficient in carrying a burden of narrative and factual information, yet able to soar into lyrical celebration or passionate, contumely" (140). He states further that like what the twilight says, "it is steadily alternately self-critical and combative" (140), he accused Walcott of "turning to the European culture and experience in order to interpret the West Indies and so betraying his own civilization" (89). Walcott was also criticized of "situating the labour of poetry between the Christian notion of paradise and the tourist version of the Caribbean

Eden" (Thomas 7). The labour of the poet here is model after Isiah, Dante and John Clare.

On the issue of language in Walcott's poem, Handley holds that "Walcott's own poetic deliberations about his mother are inherently treacherous, because language only seems to make more evident the immateriality of that which it refers" (19). He also noted that Walcott's use of language is "exploitatively creative, and surprisingly large number of his life has the ring of Shakespearean aphorism" (83). Essentially, one has to compare Walcott's early poetry with other Caribbean verse of the period to realize how unusual was, Walcott's formidable intelligence and technical control. Patrick Cahmoiseau in an interview with Solibo Magnifile reveals that "Walcott however is a formidably self-aware poet and he has consciously developed out of the imprisoning shell of his intelligence. Not intellectual concepts, but the physical environment of the Caribbean, has become more and more the bedrock of his imagination".

From the above ecocritical review, it is evident that Walcott's poem *Another Life* is a demonstration of ecosphere balkanization of the Caribbean Island by the western colonialists. Hence, this work has attempted to bring to the fore, the environmental dilemma of the Caribbean person and how Walcott captures this environment crisis in *Another Life*. Therefore, *"Another life"* describes, celebrates, and reevaluates the life, art, love, spirituality and history of the Caribbean in relation to their environment. Walcott examination of the Caribbean ecosphere exploitation in relation to western colonization shows that colonization left the Caribbean history distorted with numerous gaps to be filled. His attempt to recreate the natural environment history of Caribbean was what gave birth to the poem *Another Life.*

Conclusion

Human existence is coeternal with the ecosystem. Our environment forms parts and parcel of features that informed our being. Therefore, our environment should be given adequate attention and protection so as to always secure the identity and well-being of the inhabitants. Given the fact that literature emanates from the society, literary scholars should project environmental related issues in their works with a view to protecting it from decay. It is believed that this work will stimulate more works in the area of ecocriticism to step up the campaign, through literature, to make humanity live in harmony with the ecosystems.

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TRANSHUMANISM, COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF PEDAGOGY

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Abstract

Current advances in science and technology, and the influence it bears on the shaping of life globally, suggests that we are in an age that is increasingly becoming technological. We see an expression of this technological spirit in transhumanism's quest for radical cognitive enhancement (CE) through pharmaceuticals, tissue engineering, gene therapy, and cyborgization. The motivation is to create super-intelligent humanoids whose intelligence and cognitive capacities far outpace those of the ordinary person. This has some good prospects but due to the mind boggling issues surrounding this transhumanist project, it has always sparked wild reactions, ranging from acceptance, skepticism, and repugnance. While CE can be used for personal advantage, its implications come into sharp focus when we consider how it can raise issues about personal identity and fairness in educational settings. Hence, using the analytic and evaluative methodologies, this paper analyzes the challenge of determining the extent to which CE can be reasonably used within pedagogical settings. In the final evaluation, the paper argues that in those cases where the outcome of a project remains largely unknown, harmful, and irreversible, progress should be more precautionary than proactionary.

Keywords: Transhumanism, Cognitive Enhancement, Digital Pedagogy, Education, Technology, Precautionary Principle.

Introduction

The aspiration for humans to enhance themselves is coeval with humanity. It is a necessary expression of humanity's instinct for survival, adaptation, evolution, and development. There was a period in humanity's history where the factors sponsoring human enhancements were majorly controlled by the natural forces of evolution. Apart from the natural forces at play in man's evolution; good nutrition, exercise, and education are known to be within the threshold of generally accepted means of cognitive enhancement. So, the issues that warrant heated debates on the subject of cognitive enhancement do not arise because cognitive enhancement in itself is bad. Contentions arise in relation to the means employed in achieving cognitive enhancement.

In recent times, there has been advocacy that the natural factors of evolution have run their course and humans have to be more intentional and deliberate about the next phase of human evolution. Transhumanism represents a school of thought that believes that this next phase of human evolution can only be achieved through the use of technology to overcome age long biological limitations, and ultimately overcome death through virtual immortality. Part of their radical life enhancement ideas feature cognitive enhancement. With these technologies, human cognition can be radically enhanced beyond present limitations in terms of memory, speed, functions, creativity, innovation, and comprehension.

On the other hand, several issues regarding the use of CE for personal advantage in pedagogical settings have been raised. Putting several factors into consideration, it is apt to ask, "Will students who use enhancements have an unfair advantage over their non-enhancing peers? Will workers who

use enhancements indirectly pressure their non-enhancing co-workers to do the same? Will expensive and powerful enhancements increase the gap between the haves and have-nots? Will nations that support cognitive enhancement research have a competitive advantage over those that do not?" (Fost and Rizzuto 575). These and similar considerations and their impact on pedagogy informs the motivation and discussion of this paper.

The paper begins by introducing the meaning and agenda of transhumanism, and how it serves as a strong influence towards present day radical ideas of cognitive enhancement. It then discusses the various models of cognitive enhancement. The implications of cognitive enhancement in pedagogical settings are then considered. The paper concludes by advocating for caution and policy measures to control the development of cognitive enhancement technologies owing to their potential risks and several ethical uncertainties.

What is Transhumanism?

"Transhumanism" (popularly dubbed as Humanity+ or H+) as a word, made its debut in *The Transhumanism, New Bottles for New Wines* when the renowned biologist Julian Huxley noted that:

> The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself- not just sporadically, an individual here in one way- but in its entirety, as humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature (17).

Transhumanism is often considered as an offshoot of humanism in that both ideologies emphasize the place of the human person and the affairs concerning humans, such as our values, interests, needs, abilities, freedom, dignity etc. rather than some superstition, theistic belief or transcendent being. Contrary to the worldview of supernaturalism which places emphasis on a transcendent principle; transhumanism "employs reason, science, and technology as a means of understanding and improving the human condition" (Fayemi 62). From its background in humanism, Bauer Keith considers transhumanism to be the "social, technological, political and philosophical movement that advocates the transformation of human nature by means of pharmacology, genetic manipulation, cybernetic modification, nanotechnology, and a host of other technologies" (2). Drawing a dichotomy between transhumanism and humanism, Max More notes that:

> Transhumanism differs from humanism in recognizing and anticipating the radical alterations in nature and the possibilities of our lives resulting from various sciences and technologies such as neuroscience and neuropharmacology, life extension, nanotechnology, artificial ultra-intelligence, and space habitation, combined with a rational philosophy and value system.

In order to emphasize that transhumanism is a principled and value laden ideology, More defined transhumanism as "a class of philosophies of life that seek the continuation and acceleration of the evolution of intelligent life beyond its currently human form and human limitations by means of science and technology, guided by life- promoting principles and values." Furthermore, considering More's claim that the efficiency of computers doubles by every 18 months, it is no surprise that transhumanism has become common place since the 1970s and keep taking deeper roots in those places that are highly technologized. According to More, the aim of transhumanism is to propagate a "philosophy of life that rejects deities, faith, and worship, instead basing a view of values and meaningfulness on the nature and potentials of humans within a rational and scientific framework." As a result of this worldview which is built on the potentials of human rationality and science, transhumanists believe in the necessity of taking a quantum leap into the next phase of human evolution, by making essential changes to the human body through the radical application of science and technology.

Despite the suspicions and criticisms by many that this idea of transforming human nature through technology is merely a lofty fancy or an unrealizable fiction, they have garnered support and advocates through various technological experiments and advancements that have been able to turn the fictions of yesterday into the realities of today. This is meant to usher in an age of technological dependence wherewith humans are able solve their fundamental problems. According to Pilsch:

> Transhumanism, instead, articulates a new kind of futurity, one in which humans are rendered into a kind of posthumanity through technologies that fundamentally alter basic elements of the human condition: lifespan, morphology, cognition. Rather than evolving our future's *mise-en-scène*, transhumanism represents a new vision of the future in which we are ourselves being evolved by the futuristic setting we have already created for ourselves (2).

Understanding the present nature of humans to be an early phase in its collective development, Bostrom defines transhumanism as:

> (1) The intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities. (2) The study of the ramifications, promises, and potential dangers of technologies that will enable us to overcome fundamental human limitations, and the related study of the ethical matters involved in developing and using such technologies (3).

Having sketched an understanding of transhumanism, it is worthy of note that transhumanism manifests itself in many forms viz. democratic humanism, extropianism, immortalism, libertarian transhumanism, postgenderism, postpoliticism, singularitarianism, technogaianism etc. While transhumanism has been critiqued from several philosophical, ethical or religious fronts, it is "often dismissed in academic circles as a retrogressive assertion of Cartesian humanism, a techno- secular reimagining of Christian fundamentalist salvation history, and a celebration of the most brutal forms of capitalist excess" (Pilsch 2-3). Though it is acknowledged that there are many transhumanist projects that can be tolerated, endorsed or even encouraged, some scholars opine that there are some grey areas that need to be checked. This is what Agar in *Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement* explains as the distinction between "beneficial" and "radical" enhancements. According to Agar, "radical enhancement involves improving significant human attributes and abilities to levels that greatly exceed what is currently possible for human beings" (1). Pilsch explains that:

> For Agar, the difference between beneficial human enhancement and radical human enhancement lies in this ability to recognize and function within current limits. In Agar's bioethical framework, all of us running as fast as Usain Bolt thanks to robotic legs would be on the border of acceptable enhancement, while running as fast as the Flash would not because we would no longer be able to veridically engage as human (9).

Transhumanism and Cognitive Enhancement

Considering the nature and goals of transhumanism, it is observable that one of the strong motivations for edgier means of cognitive enhancements has its roots in transhumanism. Our cognitive power as humans is one of the faculties that separate us from other non-human animals. As such, it is expedient as humans to endeavor to enhance our cognitive capabilities to their maximal utility, so as to consequently maximize the resources and potentials of our human existence. So, the fuss about cognitive enhancement is not so much about whether there is such a thing as cognitive enhancement or whether any sense of it is right or wrong; it is more about the means employed in enhancing human intelligence, i.e. whether the means used are reasonable and socially acceptable. There is a sense in which we could say that we are generally involved in the process of cognitive

enhancement on a regular basis via good nutrition, education, interaction with culture, and conversation (Gazzaniga 56). In the broad sense, common means of cognitive enhancement could be the use of caffeine as a pharmacological maneuver around mental alertness (Fost and Rizzuto 573). Edgier examples would involve the use of kava, nicotine, ephedra, or Ritalin to control alertness, focus, and brain stimulation (Maher 674).

According to Bostrom, tranhumans and potential posthumans refer to probable future beings "whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by our current standards." These super-intelligent beings could be humans who have uploaded their brains into cyberspace and have them radically enhanced, or the product of incremental but profound enhancements over time. At this point, the enhanced intelligence expresses such speed and dexterity that the unenhanced would even be considered to be intellectually disabled. Bostrom adds that "creating superintelligence may be the last invention that humans will ever need to make, since superintelligences could themselves take care of further scientific and technological development." As it has been claimed, this superintelligence will possess radically superior capacities that outperform even the most intelligent minds in every sphere of life, "including scientific creativity, general wisdom, and social skills" (Bostrom).

Having defined cognition "as the processes an organism uses to organize information, which includes acquiring information (perception), selecting (attention), representing (understanding) and retaining (memory) information, and using it to guide behavior (reasoning and coordination of motor outputs)," Bostrom and Sandberg then defined cognitive enhancement "as the amplification or extension of core capacities of the mind through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing systems" (311-312). Interventions that are targeted at treating a particular pathology are considered to be therapeutic. Whereas an intervention is considered to be an enhancement when it improves, advances, or boosts a subsystem in other ways besides mending something that was damaged or fixing a dysfunction. Practically, it is quite difficult to draw a dichotomy between enhancement and therapy. However, a distinguishing characteristic of cognitive enhancements is that "they improve core cognitive capacities rather than merely particular narrowly defined skills or domain-specific knowledge" (Bostrom and Sandberg 312). Several models of cognitive enhancements have emerged overtime. This paper will consider Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement (PCE), neuro-stimulation, Brain-computer Interface (BCI)/Implanted Neural Interface (INI), Virtual Reality (VR)/Augmented Reality (AR), Memory Modification Technology (MMT), and genetic engineering.

Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement (PCE) is considered to be one of the primary means of cognitive enhancement (Schelle et al. 1). Generally, PCE refers to the use of medicines over the counter to boost mental prowess in healthy individuals. It is usually administered in the form of injections, pills or inhalants (SIENNA 89). Schermer et al. define PCE as "pharmacological interventions that are intended to improve certain mental functions and that go beyond currently accepted medical indications" (77). Common examples of pharmacological enhancers include dextroamphetamineamphetamine (e.g. Adderall), methylphenidate (commonly called Ritalin), Arizept (Donepezil), modafinil (such as Provigil) and beta-blockers (e.g., propranolol) (Elfferich 126). Originally, while these medications were developed to treat cases like Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Alzheimer and Narcolepsy, they are now being used to boost cognition in healthy individuals (Gordon and Dunn 418). Generally, these drugs have been observed to be able to manipulate wakefulness, mental alertness, attention, focus, learning, memory, and speed of information processing (Dubljevic and Ryan 25). This means that with these drugs, healthy individuals could not only achieve higher cognitive performance, but also gain "advantage" over natural limitations like sleep deprivation and fatigue (Dubljevic 70).

Brain-computer Interfaces (BCI) refer to devices that give room to a computer to directly communicate and relate with a human brain. This could allow people to directly control robots and relate with computers without the mediation of external devices (He 131). The umbrella name for such technologies is "neuroprosthetics" and refers to technologies that interface with the nervous system, such as retinal or cochlear implants. While neuroprosthetics generally interface by receiving data from external devices and communicating them to the brain, BCIs particularly allow for non-muscular output interactions that lie within the control of the individual. BCIs could operate through implanted devices (such as Implanted Neural Interface -INI) or non-intrusive technologies (such as devices that can pick up brain activity via sensors positioned on the scalp). These devices therefore allow for faster communication, extension of communication beyond bodily limitations, and seamless integration of information systems with human brain (Devlin 52).

Neuro-stimulation refers to technological devices such as Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) that create electrical or magnetic fields that are used to stimulate the human brain for certain effects (Mcintyre 1239). Most neuro-stimulators are implanted and they release electrical or magnetic impulses that stimulate neural cells. They mostly function by interfering, blocking, or diverting specific electrical impulses that are released by the nervous system, causing certain symptoms. They are mostly applied in treating severe pain, epilepsy, spasticity, movement disorders, incontinence, neuropsychiatric disorders, depression, addiction, anxiety disorders, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (SIENNA 94). The use of TMS to either increase or decrease the excitability of the brain and thus modulate its plasticity serves as a means of boosting the outcomes of procedural learning tasks, motor tasks, visual-motor coordination tasks, memory, finger sequence motion, classification, and memory consolidation while asleep (Bostrom and Sandberg 318).

Virtual Reality (VR) refers to computer devices that can simulate digital environments for a user to experience, through the use of a dataglove or datasuit, recorded and managed on a computer. The basic features of VR systems include, a virtual world (the environment and objects that users relate with), immersion (the experience of being in a virtual world), sensory response (sensory data regarding virtual space centered on user input), and interactivity (sensitivity of the digital space to user's activities). Drawing a distinction between a virtual reality and a virtual world, Brey Philip renders a virtual world to be "an interactive computer generated environment" while a virtual reality "is a special type of virtual world that involves location and movement-relative sensory feedback" (363). On the other hand, Augmented Reality (AR) "allows users the ability to experience computer-generated virtual objects that coexist within the same space as the real world the user is inhabiting through the use of a headset, handheld device or spatial display" (SIENNA 98). The modes of sensory input for humans in AR are through touch, sound, and sight. This reality offers individuals a wide range of possibilities to manipulate, observe, and work on objects in varied and new ways.
Memory Modification Technology refers to computerized devices or drugs aimed at helping to improve memory. This could range from helping students who lack strong retention or recalling capacities to soldiers who have suffered from a traumatic experience and seeking to erase such memories. Ultimately, the goal of such technologies offers the possibilities of enhancing and editing memory (Erler 235).

Genetic engineering is also another attractive option of cognitive enhancement. This usually involves procedures like replacing, augmenting, or editing certain neural networks in order to achieve a specific result. Research shows that this model has prospects of enhancing memory acquisition, retention, the unlearning of fear response, and desensitizing/sensitizing certain kinds of pain (Bostrom and Sandberg 319). For instance, the introduction of protein adenylyl cyclase was shown to enhance brain growth and signal transduction (Wang et al. 636).

Cognitive Enhancement and the Future of Pedagogy

In the first place, cognitive enhancement does have positive prospects for pedagogy. With the vast amount of educational data now available, it could be a tasking and exhausting venture for the unenhanced mind to plough through them. Cognitive enhancements could help individuals cope with memorizing, processing, and applying the vast amount of educational data. It will also aid in increasing the speed of knowledge acquisition, while decreasing the time spent in acquiring knowledge about a particular subject matter; thus increasing the possibility of achieving more educational goals and finishing more courses within lesser time frame. The use of integrated cognitive enhancement technologies could also allow for humans to connect their minds directly to the online grid of a MOOC for example, allowing for seamless study and report on the go.

However, several concerns and challenges regarding the feasibility, desirability and appropriateness of cognitive enhancements have also been raised. A strong point of concern relates to the personal identity of those who are given to cognitive enhancements. This also touches on the concept of personhood, which has to do with the state of being, or those qualities that classify an entity as a bearer of certain rights and moral considerations. A common assumption behind the motivation for cognitive enhancement is the desire to improve and maximize one's use of brain capacity. However, a pertinent question to ask is that, after subjection to any or several radical enhancement techniques that have been proposed by transhumanism:

> Will this radically enhanced creature still be me? If not, then, on the reasonable assumption that one key factor in a decision to enhance oneself is one's own personal development, even the most progressive bioethicist will likely regard the enhancement in question as undesirable. For when you choose to enhance in these radical ways, the enhancement does not really enhance you (Schneider 1-2).

Perhaps, Schneider is right since the creature that may emerge after a period of enhancement may turn out to be radically different, and with a unique personality quite unlike the original person. If this is true, "why would embarking on the path to radical enhancement be something you value? For wouldn't it instead be a path which leads to your own demise, leading you away from your true self, ultimately causing you to cease to exist?" (Schneider 4).

Now, if we consider the fact that overtime we all undergo one form of change ranging from size, shape, weight, colour, intelligence, and age; what then would count as a really significant change that could cause a person to lose their identity or possibly cease to exist? Philosophers distinguish between accidental and essential qualities. While accidental qualities can undergo change without affecting the identity of a thing, a change in essential qualities can radically alter the identity of a thing. So, the question then is, to what extent does cognitive enhancement affect the essential qualities of humans? Unfortunately, there is no easy way to answer this question. Even a key transhumanist figure like Kurzweil expressed the difficulty is definitely assuring that we do not run risk of losing personal identity:

> So who am I? Since I am constantly changing, am I just a pattern? What if someone copies that pattern? Am I the original and/or the copy? Perhaps I am this stuff here – that is, the both ordered and chaotic collection of molecules that make up my body and brain (383).

Speaking about extended minds and extra-cranial sources of enhancing cognition, Zawidzki Tadeusz notes that overtime, it could become difficult to distinguish between cognitive functions originating intra-cranially from extra-cranial ones:

> Such coupling should result in the experience of a kind of seamless access to extra-cranial information, of the same kind that one has to intra-cranial information. In the course of mastering such technologies, consciousness of interface-related routines

should drop out of one's phenomenology, leading to the illusion of transparent access to content, exactly analogous to the phenomenology of access to intra-cranial sources of content (218).

Though this should not be a problem since this seamless coupling is even the goal in most cases, Charles Stross in his fiction novel *Accelerando,* however observes that sooner or later, this phenomenological collapse/merging is bound to initiate an identity crisis:

> The victim sits on the cobblestones clutching his aching temples. What happened? He wonders. The universe is a brightly colored blur of fast moving shapes augmented by deafening noises. His ear-mounted cameras are rebooting repeatedly: They panic every eight hundred milliseconds, whenever they realize that they are alone on his personal area network without the comforting support of a hub to tell them where to send his incoming sensory feed. Two of his mobile phones are bickering moronically, disputing ownership of his grid bandwidth, and his memory… is missing… Who am I? He wonders. "I'm Manfred", he says with a sense of stunned wonder… I'm Manfred-Manfred. My memory. "What's happened to my memory?"… He burns with a sense of horrified urgency. I was going somewhere, he recalls. What was I doing? It was amazingly important, he thinks, but he can't remember what exactly it was (74-75).

In order to put this into context, let us consider the mainstream model of personal identity adopted by transhumanists. According to Bostrom, "a widely accepted position is that you survive so long as certain information patterns are conserved, such as your memories, values, attitudes, and emotional dispositions, and so long as there is causal continuity so that earlier stages of yourself help determine later stages of yourself." This model of personhood raises serious challenges in the context of cognitive enhancements. Suppose a chip is merged with the brain of a student to aid better performance in medical school, is it possible that such radical change could break the current pattern? Is it also possible that the addition of extra senses such as echolocation could break the pattern? It even gets more complicated given the possibilities of brain hacking or memory editing that is available in the case of cyborgs or implanted neural devices. This then raises serious challenges for pedagogies as it opens the possibilities of starting an educational program but eventually ending up with a different self. Educators may have to deal with changing identities of learners and may find it difficult to cope with the pace of change. Other learners may also find it difficult adapting to the changing personalities of their colleagues and teachers. The enhanced students (mostly the rich who can afford these technologies) will also gain unfair advantage over the unenhanced; thus, inadvertently coaxing them to also adopt enhancements, so they can compete favourably. This could also create a dependence on digital realities that would gradually depersonalize education.

According to Dewey, for education to be complete, it must also inculcate moral values:

> For unless the learning which accrues in the regular course of study affects character, it is futile to conceive the moral end as the unifying and culminating end of education. When there is no intimate organic connection between the methods and materials of knowledge and moral growth, particular lessons and modes of discipline have to be resorted to: knowledge is not integrated into the usual springs of action and the out- look on life, while morals become moralistic-a scheme of separate virtues (361).

Is it not therefore ironic for the educational system, which should be a potent moral hub for discouraging certain social vices such as cheating, to embrace a system could potentially blur the lines of fairness in judging educational merit?

This brings us to the issue of justice and equity in the use of cognitive enhancements. Since these technologies will be distributed through the market place, there is great likelihood of unequal distribution of enhancements, due to differences in the economy and social status of individuals and nations (Sarewitz and Karas 15). The rich, who will necessarily have the means to easily access these

enhancements, may gain unfair advantage over the poor. Besides, various nations may adopt different approaches to the idea of cognitive enhancements. Democratic nations that are more inclined towards egalitarianism may opt for strict regulations on enhancements due to ethical challenges; while those that prefer growth over equality may be more liberal. Some authoritarian governments bent on global advantage may become committed to enhancements of all sorts, with little control. This can lead to further social stratifications and inequality, division into different human caste systems, and the discrimination of unenhanced individuals or nations. Bostrom and Roache note that "In particular, people with radically enhanced cognitive capacities might gain vast advantages in terms of income, strategic planning, and the ability to influence others; in other words, an enhanced cognitive elite may gain socially significant amounts of power" (15). In worst case scenarios;

> The enhanced, having gained cognitive abilities that far outstrip those of the unenhanced, could band together and use their superior skills to dominate and exploit the unenhanced. If the cognitive enhancements in question were brought about through germline genetic intervention, the resulting improvements could be inherited by the children of the enhanced, with successive improvements eventually resulting in the enhanced forming a new species which may prove a threat to unenhanced humans (Bostrom and Roache 15).

This could make it difficult for the poor masses and other persons uninterested in enhancement to compete fairly in educational settings. Regarding this challenge, Bostrom and Roache observed that "the possibilities offered by cognitive enhancement might lead us to view those people with below-average cognitive ability as diseased, rather than as part of the normal human spectrum of abilities" (16). Consider a scenario where the owner of a MOOC is committed to cognitive enhancement. The pace and comprehensibility of the course could be tailored to fit the cognitive capacities of the enhanced. In order to play fair or avoid a situation of the unenhanced crying foul play, such a MOOC may be restricted to only the enhanced. Even if they are not restricted, the unenhanced may choose to shun such online learning platforms in order to avoid being frustrated or marginalized in the end. Individual rights could also conflict with the community good, since individual enhancement may not automatically translate into an enhanced community.

Cognitive enhancement also reeks of several ethical uncertainties. There are several grey areas regarding the pace, future direction, outcomes and consequences of cognitive enhancements. For example, we will have a hard time resolving whether humans have the right to selectively determine the features of posterity using germ-line editing. Also, some of the pharmaceutical means of cognitive enhancement, as well as the use of other hybrid technologies such as virtual reality simulations, can become addictive and also create unhealthy dependencies that make natural cognitive functions redundant without them. Let us further consider whether it would be fair for some individuals to possess intellectual advantage over others in an educational setting due to cognitive enhancement. As a tribute to equity, there is currently a prohibition of the use of performance enhancement drugs in sports. Since cognitive enhancements represent a similar situation, the use of human enhancement technologies in education could also be considered as cheating. As such, there is a sense in which it will be reasonable to also apply the same regulatory measures in the educational field (Cakic 612).

The Precautionary Principle: An Intervention
Regarding the extent to which we should be open to embrace radical technological ideas, there is the proactionary approach and the precautionary approach. The proactionary approach advocates for scientific autonomy, whereby decisions regarding the production and use of technological products are at the discretion of the scientists and consumers. Adherents of the proactionary principle hold that fear and caution are counterintuitive to technological progress, and they slow down or limit the freedom of scientists to fully explore their domain (More 264).

On the other hand, the precautionary principle holds that "when an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically… In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof" (Qtd. in Grandjean 206). The European Union considers the precautionary principle to be "a general rule of public policy action to be used in situations of potentially serious or irreversible threats to health or to the environment, where there is a need to act to reduce potential hazards before there is strong proof of harm, taking into account the likely costs and benefits of action and inaction" (206). Judging from several definitions, Grandjean outlines four conditions that warrant the precautionary principle, "(a) the existence of a threat, (b) uncertainty about its implications, (c) anticipatory action, and (d) a command to act" (206). Hence, considering some of the irreversible processes involved in cognitive enhancements, the potential risks involved, and uncertainty regarding some future implications, I believe it is best we stay on the side of caution for the present, as we seek to further understand and manage the impact of such enhancements to our lives and the future.

Conclusion

Having considered the prospects and challenges of cognitive enhancements and its potential impact on education; one would wonder whether it is to be desired or not; whether it is to be approved or not; whether it is morally or legally justifiable or not. Fears and suspicions of future hazards alone are not sufficient to put a lid on the subject of cognitive enhancement. It would be unreasonable to hinder technological advancements at the slightest fear of a hazard. History has shown that the fictions of yesterday are gradually becoming the realities of today and some technologies that were hitherto criticized are gradually becoming the life-savers of today. The world is in a flux and the new challenges that are emerging require dynamic problem solving approaches. However, there are several parameters that ought to be considered in determining whether a technological idea should proceed unhindered or with the utmost caution. According to the precautionary principle, these parameters can be determined by asking questions such as, does it constitute a threat? Are there many grey areas or consequences that are uncertain? Are the consequences reversible or irreversible? As we have seen in the paper, cognitive enhancement from a precautionary standpoint does not check all the right boxes. At the moment, there is too much at stake if it is allowed to be used without censorship in the society. Hence, there is the need to toe the path of caution in the use of these technologies for the present, while we continually study, manage, and improve on them. Hopefully, in the future, humans will be able to use some of these technologies in ways that maximize their benefits while minimizing their dangers.

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AVERSION TO WORK: AN ANTHROPOLOGICO-THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION OF THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN WORK IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

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Abstract

Work is a unique anthropological character of man. It basically evidences partially the creative power of man. In work, man expresses himself, fashions his own reality as well as assimilates a part of this world's reality, and partially utilizes the cosmos to his advantage. In contemporary times, however, there is a growing aversion to work by man in the New World Order. The true nature of work has been misrepresented, misconstrued and misunderstood. The pride of hard work is quickly being replaced by laxity and the dignity of work is daily being shortchanged by various loathsome practices. There is therefore urgent need to recover the true anthropological and theological status of work in contemporary society, which this study seeks to do. Data for this work were collected through secondary sources. The expository and evaluative tools were used to analyse the data. The study found out that the aversion of contemporary man to work is a major cause of societal degradation which has manifested itself in different forms of social ills such as armed robbery, banditry, kidnapping and their likes. The study recommends that since work is an activity that is basically predicated of man, humans should embrace it with pride and work towards restoring its dignity. The study concludes that given the benefits of work which include enhancing of man's environment, procuring food and clothing, fashioning better means of communication, transportation, et cetera, it is incumbent on contemporary man to intensify working so as to attain the maximum benefits derived therefrom.

Keywords: Aversion, Ethics, Human Dignity, New World Order, Work.

Introduction

Among the life-teaching statements of Mahatma Gandhi are the seven deadly sins. One of those sins is the attraction of humanity towards "wealth without work" (Covey 87). This is a vice by which Gandhi identified the missing link between the human quest for wealth and the struggle to acquire it. In the contemporary epoch, where human work seems to have been divested of its dignity from various quarters; and where there is an obvious large scale aversion to hard work suggesting an attachment to pleasure without work, there is need for a clarion call towards a re-orientation. Such re-orientation and re-awakening towards work require urgent attention because without work, the human person and society in general, would be in danger of extinction. If the present perceived aversion to work is left untamed, life will degenerate to a level of effacement. Human beings will only become slaves of nature and reduced to the level of brutes who work according to the whims and caprices of nature. As it has been highlighted by many elite anthropologists, work like other distinguishing features such as freedom, will and intellect, distinguishes humans from animals. Work therefore has to be embraced by every capable individual so as to transform nature to man's needs. This is why this work seeks to explore the anthropological and theological import of the dignity of human work in a new world order that seeks to aver work.

Conceptualising Work

The term 'work' features in many academic fields and is defined variously. Work in this discourse is used in reference to human activity that exerts energy to produce results that are both material and spiritual. According to Okuma, "work is a universal term, often used to designate occupation, labour, toil, business and drudgery" (7). Etymologically, the term 'work' comes from the "Greek *ergon* meaning action in contrast to idleness. In its English form, 'work' comes from the Anglo-Saxon *worc* or *weorc*, which means labour, action, deed, but it is used practically to mean affliction, pain, trouble or distress" (14-15). Rather unfortunately, this understanding of work does not bring out its complete value. Mondin gives a more encompassing explanation of the concept of work. He articulates that, "work is a fatiguing activity (in Latin, *labor* also means fatigue) intended to modify things through the use of the body and instruments with which humans search to satisfy their needs" (174). This understanding is more embracing because it takes cognizance of work as an activity that transcends the material level.

Human work has two main dimensions: the subjective and the objective. Corresponding to these two dimensions of human work are subjective elements (thought, will, action, ability) and objective elements (matter and instruments). The subjective dimension of human work consists in those activities that develop the person precisely as a person. This means that the dignity of work lies first and foremost in this subjective dimension (Okuma 28). Indeed, this dimension of work establishes the fact that work is meant for the human person and not the human person for work. This view of work confronts and challenges attempts of using the human person as mere instrument of production by the misguided economic structures within some societies.

The objective dimension, on the other hand, emerges clearly where the relation of the community of persons with regard to the non-personal world, uses the goods of nature to sustain personal life in various ways. Here work exists not only for the ultimate purpose of a person or of a worker, but for those in the human community. This dimension also covers the instruments used by human beings for work. (31). This clearly entails that human work is of great value, by the very fact that through work human beings are able to produce what they need to make a living valuable. Work is good for people, even when it is difficult and tasking, and not just in the sense that it produces some good that people want or need. Work is good "in the sense of being something worthy of the person, corresponding to personal dignity and increasing it" (Otonko 105). Through work, people transform the earth and its resources, adapting them to personal needs and desires, and they also fulfill themselves as persons, becoming more human, developing their humanity further (Gonsalves 441). Commenting on the value of work, Thomas Aquinas, the thirteenth century scholastic philosopher, identifies four purposes: "work provides for daily livelihood; it prevents idleness which is a source of evils; it curbs the rebellious flesh and enables human beings to give alms from their material surplus" (qtd. in Mondin 186). Thus, human work has both personal and social value. Work has personal value, inasmuch as it proceeds from the human person or in that it finds in the human person its final end. As a matter of fact, work is a good of a person, since it does not only transform nature to human needs, but also helps the person involved to realize himself/herself. This is because the work of a person does not only record to that person's advantage or damage, but also to others' in a community owing to its social value. Finally, "work can also assume an ethical value depending on whether it is morally good or evil" (Mondin 187).

The Christian Theology of Human Work

Curiously enough, the theme of human work is spread through the Holy Scripture. Right from the Old Testament to the New Testament, there abound instances where the virtue of hard work is loudly appraised. According to Okuma, "the Scriptures in general conceive work as a means of sustaining human life" (18). This shows that biblical faith, contrary to other religions and worldviews, contains a positive attitude to human work. The Hebrews of the Old Testament held physical toil in high

esteem and work permeated their whole social fabric. In this avenue, Okuma writes that "the Hebrews were a working people, despite the existence of mitigated forms of slavery and serfdom" (19). The biblical account shows that when the Israelites were freed from bondage in Egypt, they served God in work, rest and worship. The pattern of work and rest were taken from God's creative work and rest, for it is written: "….On the seventh day God had completed the work He had been doing. God blessed the seventh day, and made it holy, because on that day He rested after all His work of creating" (Genesis 2: 1-3).

The New Testament goes the same line of the Old Testament. Indeed, the New Testament values work and sets it in the light of Christ's work: His ministry, miracles and work of redemption (John 4:34). Here one is presented on several occasions with the scenario of people at work: farmers, fishermen, harvest personnel, vinedressers. Jesus Christ Himself belonged to a worker's family and even spoke of His supreme duty in terms of work in His first public appearance which He unleashed His manifesto and mission statement based on work and nothing else than work. He emphasized justice and service, and laid the rule that the worker was worthy of wages. The apostles built firmly on this theme of work and propounded it strongly as a moral essential of the Christian life (Orkuma 20). On certain occasions, the New Testament admonished that those who did not work should not eat (2Thes 3: 8-15). All of this shows the beauty and necessity of human work for both material and spiritual wellbeing.

Against various traditions that have failed to recognize the dignity of human work, the Christian religion has from its resources developed a theology of work that showcases its dignity as a means for the material and spiritual perfection of the human person. In this admirable theology, the dignity of labour is tied closely to the dignity of the human person. The general conception is that since work is the by-product of human efforts, it helps to advance the wellbeing of the human person. This theology has been made most glaring within the Catholic Social Teachings. Many papal encyclicals and exhortations have come up in this regard. One of the leading figures in this direction is Pope John Paul II of Blessed Memory. John Paul II following the antecedent of Leo XIII in *Rerum Novarum* ("On the Condition of the Working Person" 1891) advances the view following the Book of Genesis that work is a participation in the activity of God (Whitmore 1337). In this regard, Davis writes that "in the Genesis narrative, work is depicted as a basic dimension of human existence. Its character is shaped, first, by the fact that human beings are made in God's likeness… with the capacity to participate actively in the wider creation" (Davis 728). Linking his theology with the *Imago Dei* doctrine, John Paul writes that the word of God's revelation is profoundly marked by the fundamental truth that [the human person], created in the image of God, shares by his[or her] work in the activity of the Creator, and that, within the limits of his [or her] own human capabilities, [the human person] in a sense continues to develop that activity and perfects it as he [or she] advances further in the discovery of the resources and values contained in the whole of creation (John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens*, No.2).

The Christian theology of work is in constant struggle to maintain the dignity of human work in a number of ways. It has always recognized the continuing and fundamental importance of work for human existence and well-being. The mandate is for every human being, every generation, at every stage of economic development. However, inasmuch as we welcome the release from drudgery which automation may bring, a 'leisure society' is not a valid goal. There is no end to useful work within the created world. This theology also considers the intrinsic value of work in the light of the problems of authority, control, technology and alienation. It engages with contemporary critiques in order to develop an appropriate ethics for these times. Finally, Christian theology of work has always faced the challenge of social (dis)organisation of work, especially mass unemployment. Where the means of livelihood, social identity and participation are obtained or denied largely through the labour market, the social right to useful work must be established as a matter of priority (Davis 729).

Attitude to Work in Contemporary Society

It is a fact that the state of every era is dependent on the amount of hard work and production of the preceding one. If this supposition is anything to go by, then one can slightly comfortably say that what the world enjoys today is the toil of yesteryears. It implies that whatever work we do today determines what the future generation will be. Through work, human beings benefit from past generations and work for the benefits of generations yet to come (Okuma 25). John Paul II confirms this connection when he admonishes that "man must work as one who is at the same time heir to the work of past generations and a co-operator in the work being done by the present generation to improve the condition of life of generation yet to come" (qtd in Okuma 26). To make sense of this analysis, it is expedient to balance the reasoning by looking at the attitude of those who do not work and the condition of those who actually work. Such a consideration reduces the biases that may characterize this work in the sense that there are people who are allergic to work and have settled for pleasure; there are those who work but do not give work its proper meaning and dignity; there are those who actually work but are not made to find in work any fulfilling experience; and there are those who are ready to work but are deprived of the opportunity. All of these categories of persons have a lot of impact on the kind of future generation that today's generation will build. The cumulative effect of these shades of disposition towards work constitutes the *laissez faire* attitude towards work today.

The aversion to work, especially hard work, occurs in many ways today. This shows vestiges of some ancient and medieval attitudes that saw work as a curse, punishment and an activity meant for slaves. People are no longer willing to exert any amount of energy to make a living. They have very high taste with low willingness to exert energy to satisfy this taste. Consequently, very cheap means of satisfying daily wants have become the order of the day. People are ready to apply the fastest and easiest means of amassing wealth without thinking of the consequences. The truth embedded in the age-long wisdom that nothing good comes easily has become a fable. No wonder then those criminal activities are on the rise and have become the order of the day. The desire to get on without hard work explains the attraction to rituals and theft in all its forms for wealth. This attitude of making gains without work permeates every system in our world today. It is rather unfortunate that this kind of attitude does not guarantee a future for human society; it is only the road to doom and perdition.

Closely related to the dimension of aversion for hard work just analysed is the engagement in activities that do not give work its proper meaning and dignity. Work is not mere exertion of energy; it goes beyond that. Conceiving work in that light will reduce it to the activity of brutes, if not something lower than that. In every work or labour, there should be a goal that benefits the subject and the common good. In the opinion of Otonko, "this is why there are two closely related dimensions to the significance of human work, namely, the personal and the social dimension" (173). Work is not to be engaged in if it leads to personal or communal destruction. Within this category are those who spend their energy working towards goals that have nothing to contribute to the common good and all those who through their acclaimed work downgrade their dignity. All those who fuel social ills with the energy and resources of whatever form belong here. Such are the people who cause chaos in society and leave human beings in constant tension. No matter the amount of energy and resources spent in this kind of work, it does not leave work with its unique meaning and dignity.

Mention must be made here too of those who fail to produce expected results in their work. These are people who must have been rightly designated to carry out a particular kind of work for the common good but refuse to do that. For such persons, their concern is their profit or gain and nothing more. They may be employed either in public or private settings, but never will they deliver. They are ready to loot their employers to bankruptcy. This is common with those working in government parastatals especially in most Third World nations of the world. Societies where this category of work predominates are only guaranteed of a bleak future and nothing more since the whole scenario is like infecting the system with a virus.

Another category worthy of consideration is those who actually work but are deprived of a fulfilling experience in the work. Attention here is more on the employers of labour whether within the private and public spheres. It has always been observed that workers are rarely given the best of treatments they deserve. The common experience is the fact that the wages workers receive are not commensurate to the amount of work they do. There is general exploitation of workers by their employers. This attitude deprives the human person of his/her dignity and by implication the dignity of labour/work since the dignity of the latter is dependent on that of the former. The dignity of labour or work depends on how those who work are treated. This is what many world scholars have called the attention of employers of labour to. The industrial revolution fueled this exploitative attitude of employers who became concerned about nothing but their profit at the expense of their workers. Such an attitude makes workers see nothing good in work since it increases their pain and anguish. A worthy and meaningful labour/work should consider the good of the worker and the society at large. When either of these two aims are lacking, there is always an abnormality.

The ravaging attitude that fuels unemployment in our world today deserves a mention here. The evident reality in the world today is a scenario where people who are qualified to work rarely have working opportunities. Pope Francis describes this situation in striking terms when he laments that "… masses of people find themselves excluded and marginalised , without work, without possibilities, without any means of escape…. We have created a 'throw away' culture" (7). Part of the reason for this is the failure of the existing powers within society to find any value in human work. There are many who are denied working opportunities in the world because of discrimination based on religion, sex, tribe, political affiliations, and language among other indices. By this discrimination, they are denied the opportunity of furthering their humanity and applying their potentials to the common good. The consequence of this deprivation has most times been the use of incompetent and inexperienced hands in handling sensitive responsibilities within society. Thus, the apparent condition of most societies has been an ever-expanding problem of underdevelopment in most quarters. This type of attitude does not spell any good for the future generation since it will only be building a defective edifice for the future.

The above analysis gives a glimpse of the challenges facing human work today. These challenges also stand in the way of human dignity by virtue of the connection between work and the human person. In sum, the challenges facing human work today cover the wrong interpretation of work as a curse, punishment and something to be avoided because it causes pain; the wrong application of work to pursue causes that do not promote human dignity and bring about the common good; the poor attitude to work which makes people enjoy wages without carrying out their responsibilities for the service of humanity; the inhuman condition of workers who give their best to their work – a condition arising from the profit-oriented attitude of employers which makes them wound the dignity of the human person and never give their workers the type of treatment that is commensurate to their work; and finally, the intimidating wave of unemployment that runs across the world today. All of these challenges help to destroy the dignity of human work. But what can be done to salvage the present situation of things?

A Way Forward
Considering the unsavory effects that accrue from aversion to work by modern man, there is urgent need for the restoration of the dignity of human work. One potent way forward is the clarion call for rediscovery of the 'gospel of work.' This is important because work must be understood in its entirety. The present attitude towards work reduces it to only the material level. Such a view is lopsided because the subject of work, the human person, transcends the material level. The spiritual dimension of work relates it to the Creator and raises it to the status of a vocation directed towards God and humanity. This is the true understanding of work that is lacking, leading to the loss of the dignity of work.

In attempting restoring the dignity of human work, greater emphasis must be laid on benefits of work. This would disabuse the minds of those who are allergic to work. The gospel of work as an activity sanctioned by God should be spread the more. Those who idolize leisure and idleness must realize that they need to work to attain their full humanity and dignity. Work should not be seen as a punishment, but a way of increasing and making better the wellbeing of the human person.

In addition, people who engage in 'bad work', that is, activities that reduce work of its dignity should be discouraged through proper societal measures to shy away from such. An effective legal system that promotes the dignity of the human person can help in this regard since by tempering with the dignity of work, human dignity is also wounded. Religious bodies could help in re-orienting their adherents on the need to engage in work that is dignifying. So too government, public orientation and the various basic communities must be involved.

Further, a lot of work needs to be done on people who rarely give time to the work they were employed to do, but are interested in enjoying wages. The consequence of this attitude to work has left many nations and societies bankrupt and rarely developed. Such people need to see their work as a special calling to participate in God's work of creation by the service they render. In this vein, the worker offers service to others in the spirit of charity. Thus, "by work, an individual ordinarily provides for self and family; is joined in fellowship to others; and renders them service; and is enabled to exercise genuine charity and be a partner in the work of bringing divine creation to perfection. Adequate measures also need to be taken by the existing societal authorities to checkmate this habit of enjoying wages without carrying out ones' responsibilities.

On the other hand too, the working conditions of workers need to be improved to make work an activity that ensures human dignity. Religious bodies have always called the attention of the world to the need to understand that work is meant for the human person and not the other way round. Employers of labour who tend to use human subjects as objects to satisfy their means need to reconsider their profit-monger attitude; they need to treat their employees as subjects with dignity. There is need to ensure that remuneration for work done is commensurate to the service rendered and should be able to cater for the needs of workers and their families. Employers of labour should not put their profit over and above the dignity of their workers. Bordering on this, John Paul II emphasized the need for work to be "rescued from the logic of profit, from the lack of solidarity, from the fever of earning ever more, from the desire to accumulate and consume" (Fournier 71). Workers must be made to find in the work they do a fulfilling life experience; it should not be made to be seen as an activity one must engage in since there are no other options for securing one's livelihood. To change the condition of workers, the governments of the world need to lay down guidelines that will balance the interests of the employers and the employees ensuring that they are followed accordingly.

In another development, the evil of unemployment needs to be fought stringently by the society. This calls for emphasis to be laid on the rights of the human person to work. Given that "employment is the normal way of obtaining a living in the economic structure of modern day society" (Okuma 34), there is need for people to be employed to work. Thus, it is the onus of the state to intervene and provide employment for its citizens as a means of upholding their right and dignity as persons.

Conclusion

No human society has ever made any great strides without inculcating the virtue of hard work in its members. Even cultures in history that showed negative attitude towards hard work, had ways of enjoying the benefit of hard work and sustaining their societies. This makes work a virtue that all the peoples of the world should imbibe. Human work must be considered as a means of promoting humanity in its entirety – physical and spiritual. The best way to find meaning in work is to understand it as a callingand a vocationgiven to humans by the Creator. Work is a means of

promoting human dignity and perfecting human nature. The extent of our dignity depends on the extent of our readiness to work. In an era where human work is treated with levity, it only becomes necessary to re-ignite or re-discover the dignity of human work. The virtue of hard work needs to be exhumed in order to save the world and the future generation from impending doom.

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AN EVALUATION OF HOBBESIAN NOTION OF RIGHT AND OBLIGATION FOR NIGERIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

This article aims primarily at examining the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes which is woven around his notion of right and obligation. The most dominant political theory around the 17ᵗʰ century was the divine right of the king, giving the rulers absolute power. The subjects were denied their rights on the ground that they had no inalienable freedom. This was a period of contending political, religious and economic principles, leading to a fundamental ideological shift.To avoid chaos, disorder and political instability,Hobbes postulated the social contract, which was about erecting a sovereign.The sovereign would be given the rights of all their subjects, except the right of self-preservation.The cessation of rights by the whole of society results in the creation of a commonwealth or a leviathan to which our peace and defenceare owed. At the same time, I shall revisit the view of other scholars on the theme in question as well as draw out values for the Nigerian political sphere. The work adopts the critical, analytical and evaluative methods.The work contends that Hobbes recognizes that humans possess rights but the search for peace and avoidance of war made them surrender their rights to a sovereign and this does not amount to a denial of rights.

Keywords: Rights, Obligation, Nigeria, Sovereign, Leviathan

Introduction

Ourenvironment of in one way or other do influence our life, action and thinking pattern. This influencemay be consciously or unconsciously. Thomas Hobbes was no exemption to this existential life phenomenon. The turbulent and unsolicited wars(civil and religious) and regicideof his time suchWar of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), Great Northern War (1717-1720), Seven Years' War (1754-1763), Anglo-Mysore Wars (1766-1799), First Anglo-Maratha War (1775-1783),American Revolutionary War (1775-1783).The absolutism of monarchical rulership was also dominant in the political space of England and the kings claim to rule by Divine Right.(Strauss 28).This was the socio-cultural environment in which Hobbes' was born and nurtured and he, therefore, sought to restore order. Yes, he believed after many studies that a stable society is feasible and attainable. Hence, he came up with the theory which the work intends to investigating; the theory that man was born by nature with rights.(Malcom 51). In course of the intellectual voyages of Hobbes, he also postulated other worth deliberating issues which with close attention will be possible premises of his deductive conclusion that man has inalienable, undeniable and innate rights such as the right to freedom and liberty, right to life, happiness et al (Malcom 51). He sought to create an English society that would be devoid of fear and trauma scarce of war, where life will be safe and peace and tranquility upheld as the highest human value (Malcom 51).

Hobbes further established that in the "state of nature"which was a society before civil society, the man was a wolf to his fellow man (*homo homini lupus*) and life was constantly threatened and annihilated against his basic axiom that the greatest instinct in man is self-preservation. In this pre-colonial, pre-civil society,Hobbes opined in Leviathan chapter XIII Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as Concerning their Fidelity and Misery which he wrote in France(Hobbes x) that Whatsoever, therefore, is consequent to a time of War where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their strength, and there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no instrument of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge

of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts, no Letters; no Society, and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the lifeof man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes x).

For this kind of condition and situation, Hobbes postulated, people would be willing to surrender their powers and rights freely especially their dangerous freedoms (rights) to an absolute government that will protect them from everyone else. He calls this the "sovereign". This sovereign could either be a single person or some powerful individual or parliament. It is against this backdrop that this work investigates,the Hobbesian notion of rights and on the other hand corresponding obligations that may follow at the same time spicing it with views of other scholars that fall within the ambience of the subject matter and how his notion of rights and obligation shapes his entire political philosophy. But briefly, a quick look shall be made towards understanding how other scholars understand right *pariparsu* with an obligation.

Scholarly Positionson Rights Andobligation
Manypolitical scholars have various understandings which consequently influenced their views of rights and obligation. Some tend to have a point of convergence while not doing away with divergence especially when the issue of obedience to the civil government is discussed.Dudley Knowles in his text *Political Obligation: A Critical Introduction*posits firmly that political obligation refers to the moral duty of citizens to obey the laws of their state (61). For him, in cases where an act, or forbearance that is required by law is morally obligatory on independent grounds, then political obligation simply gives the citizen an additional reason for acting accordingly. He continues that law tends to extend beyond morality, forbidding otherwise morally innocent behaviour and compelling acts and omissions that are discretionary from an independent moral point of view. In such cases, he continued, "the role of one's moral duty to comply with the law is his or her political obligation" (64).

John Horton while buttressing this position of Knowles employed the example of Socrates to pin his point to the wall. For him, Socrates obeyed the laws of Athens by maintaining that his long residence inAthens shows that he has entered into an agreement with its laws and committed himself to obey them. (63) Putting this in a clearer perspective, he opines unequivocally that:

> Socrates shows that political obligation is the moral duty of citizens to obey the laws of their state by acknowledging that he owes his birth, nurture and education, among other goods, to the laws of Athens …it would be wrong for him to disobey its laws (63).

Horton holds that apart from the obvious prudential and self-interested reasons to avoid punishment, loss of reputation, and so forth that Socrates valued and cherished, he was principally bound by a political obligation to obey the law of his society. H.L.A Hart the Great British philosopher and professor of jurisprudence at Oxford University suggests a transactional account of political obligation. For him, political obligation is acquired through some morally significant transaction between the citizen and his compatriots or between the citizen and his state anchored on the principle of fairness. He continued that a political community is a cooperative scheme that is geared towards the production of benefits for its members: security, transport, clean water etc. reiterating the fruitfulness of this venture he continues that:

> The venture is fruitful in producing these benefits because those participating observe certain restrictions and pay their taxes. To enjoy the benefits of the scheme without submitting to its restrictions is to free-ride on the sacrifice of others, which is unfair. The demands of fairness thus yield political obligation (185).

For Hart, when many persons conduct any joint enterprise, according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to those restrictions when required, have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefitted from the submission. John Rawls subsequently adopted this principle in an influential essay of his own, referring to the duty derived from the principle as the "duty of fair play" (97). The stance of this principle is that everyone who participates in a reasonable just, mutually beneficial cooperative practice, must bear a fair share of the burdens of the practice (Rawls 97). Cooperation, therefore, becomes the canon of enjoying any benefit that could be accrued from the enterprise. Those who do not cooperate forfeit their benefits automatically. From this Rawlsian perspective, the principle of fair play applies to a political society only if that society can reasonably be regarded as a cooperative society where everyone contributes his quota for the growth and sustenance of the enterprise. And when the society is equated to an enterprise as vouched by Rawls, the principal form of cooperation is abiding by the Law. When the laws of the society are obeyed by the constitutive members, they equally enjoy not only protection from the civil government but also their other rights are secured and upheld. On the other hand, they are denied their rights if they do not fulfil their obligation to obey the law just as they would have been denied all benefits due to a lack of cooperation in an enterprise.

Harry Beran in his book *The Consent Theory of Political Obligation*argues unswervingly that political obligation is grounded in a natural duty to obey the law (38). For him, to have an obligation is to be bound to do or not to do something. In other words, the political obligation for him implies obedience to the law (38). Shedding more light, he buttressed that:

States should require their members openly to undertake an obligation to obey the law or   to refuse to do so. Those who decline the obligation will then have the option of leaving the state, seceding to form a new state with like-minded people, or taking residence in a   territory within the state reserved for dissenters (38).

Beran established in the cited text that political obligation is grounded in people's voluntary consent. This makes one responsible for the choices he or she makes. For instance, if he or she chooses to disobey the law, he or she also has two options: to leave the state or to be put in a correctional facility where dissenters of his or her like are kept.

Apothegmatically, Margaret Gilbert posits that political obligation is a genuine obligation. In her view, political obligations fall between "the dictates of morality on one hand and the other hand, on one's inclinations and … self-interest, on the other" (293). She continues that political obligation has an abiding force which ties all obligated persons to obey the dictates of the law as well as the spirit of the law too.

Ronald Dworkin is his book *The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Readings*, argues that political obligation is best understood as an associative obligation grounded in membership. According to him, "if we are members of a group, then we are under an obligation, *ceteris Paribus*, to comply with the norms that govern it"(206). For anyone who acknowledges membership in a particular polity must therefore acknowledge that he or she has a general obligation to obey its laws (Dworkin 206). At the core of the associative approach of Dworkin, is the idea that a political obligation is a form of non-voluntary obligation on a par with familial obligations. It is like a family or friendship or other forms of associations that are more intimate and task-burden, they are all filled with a bunch of obligations. Horton makes a close and fitting analogy of the family about the society or polity (150-151). Horton argues unwaveringly that both the family and the political community figure prominently in our sense of who we are: our self-identity and our understanding of our place in the world (150-151).

Furthermore, D.M Walker did not skip the intellectual gymnastics on political obligation when he asserted that political obligation is a general obligation to obey the law (191). This implies that those who have political obligations are duty-bound to obey the law.For him, "political obligation is the obligation to respect and uphold the legitimately constituted civil authority_ to obey the laws enacted by the civil authority" (191). He further maintains that someone who has a truly political obligation will owe her polity more than mere obedience to its laws. Such a person will have a positive duty to take steps to secure safety and advance the interests of her country. Elucidating further, he writes:

The person who benefits from X has an obligation of gratitude not to act contrary to X's interests. Every citizen has received benefits from the state. Every citizen has an obligation not to act in ways that are contrary to the state's interests. Every citizen has an obligation of gratitude to comply with the law (Walker 192).

This obligation of gratitude for Walker is not restricted only to persons but also to institutions and polity or state. As the debate on rights and obligation is stretched, we have some political philosophers who believe that there are no satisfactory grounds for a general obligation to obey the law. A principal advocate of this current is Robert Paul Wolff. For him, there can be no general obligation to obey the law because such obligation would violate the primary obligation of autonomy, which is the refusal to be ruled (18). Wolff believes that autonomy combines freedom with responsibility. Thus, to be autonomous, one must have the capacity for choice and therefore freedom. But the person who has this capacity also has the responsibility to exercise it – to act autonomously (Wolff 18).

Failing to do so is to fail to fulfil his primary obligation of autonomy. He, however, inserted an exception to the string of his arguments as he puts that except in the highly unlike the case of direct democracy in which every law has the unanimous approval of the citizenry (Wolff 4). He continues that under every form of government, authority and autonomy are simply incompatible. He added that:
Authority is the right to command, and correlatively the right to be obeyed, which entails that everyone subject to authority must obey those who have the right to be obeyed. But if we acknowledge such an authority, we allow someone else to rule us, thereby violating our fundamental obligation to act autonomously (4).

With the above-established position, Wolff blinks not in his argument against general obligation as he insists that there is no general obligation to obey the laws of any polity that falls short of a unanimous direct democracy.

Lastly, John A. Simmons in his book *Justification and Legitimacy: Essays or Rights and Obligations*, asserts that his position is not to show that a satisfactory defense of political obligation is impossible but that no defense has proven satisfactory despite the efforts of some of the best minds in the history of philosophy (103-104). He continues that all attempts toward establishing an indomitable platform where the political theory of general obligation can stand sturdily have failed. He, therefore, concludes that only those relatively "few people who have explicitly committed themselves to obey the law, perhaps by swearing allegiance as part of an oath of citizenship, have anything like a general obligation to obey the laws under which they live" (Simmons104).

All these analyses above notwithstanding their enormous richness did not tread the path towards establishing peace, order, harmony, protection or safety in a society in which some agree on a general political obligation and others aver against it. This great lacuna in this intellectual expedition is what Hobbes will seek to address and shall be the thrust of our deliberations. But just before then, there is a pertinent need to highlight influences that shaped his thought pattern of Hobbes in the development of his political philosophy.

Development of Hobbes Political Philosophy: Influences on Hobbes

Apart from the social environment of the age in which Hobbeswas born, philosophically and methodically, he was also influenced by new developments in the physical sciences of Francis Bacon, Johannes Kepler and Galileo Galilei stand tall among others. This age was characterizedby new strides in sciences as the curiosity about nature was in crescendo while that of the supernatural was nose-diving (Macpherson 43). The tone of this age was vividly expressed by Mukherjee and Ramaswamy who noted that "the general tone of the new science tried to despiritualize nature, by abolishing the distinction between animate and inanimate. It identified and established the difference between the inner from the outer worlds" (169). This age was also featured with the enthronement of subjectivity and reason such that it influenced Hobbes that he even accepted the argument of the sceptics by positing that a man couldn't have a direct and honest experience of the external world but only the internal activity of the brain. The science of geometry was also helpful for him as it aided his deductive reasoning. For him "geometry provided the intellectual method to solve the problems of political life" (Hobbes 254). Galileo's technique of resolve, idealizing and recomposing influenced his political science of the Leviathan in no small measure too (Hobbes 243).

Like Baconand Hamilton, Hobbes regarded power as the end of knowledge and an instrument to harness the forces of nature. For him, all individuals were equal, but differences arose due to their differing capacity for knowledge. All these influences on Hobbes shaped his goal of philosophy in the universe that ought to give a mechanical theory of the universe. This mechanistic conception implied that the whole was no more than a total of the parts that comprise it. The whole was not more important or greater than the constituent parts applying this to the state, Hobbes viewed the state as an aggregate and not a compound of individuals.

Hobbeson Human Nature

Contrary to Aristotelian and Medieval thinkers who saw the state of nature as innately social, Hobbes viewed human beings as "isolated, egoistic, self-interested, and seeking society as a means to their ends" (Hobbes 30). He sees human beings with purely selfish desires that are mostly insatiable hence, drives him constantly after his goals irrespective of the means and methods employed. He continues that every human action, feeling and thought was ultimately physically determined, yet he allowed ample scope for voluntary, self-designed and administrated changes in the human condition. In *Leviathan* too, he introduced the need for an "arbitrator" or "judge" whose primary task is to resolve rational disagreements since no individual's reason was necessarily "right", so disputed parties will seek an arbitrator whose sentence they will both obey (Hobbes 32). A keen observer will quickly note the preeminence of order and peace in the political philosophy of Hobbes especially as scripted in his *Leviathan*. In re-echoing the need for an arbitrator, he asserted thus:

> The need for an arbitrator was not due to a lack of sufficient reason. The more compelling factor was the barriers erected between human beings as a result of their natural passions. These passions were directly related to individuals valuing their life above everything else, and sticking to it at all costs. The appetites and aversions were passions (35).

He continues that humans are constantly in natural need of the body such that man has several passions such as fear of death, the quest for power etc. corroborating this stance, Minogue contends that "since individuals would like to do their own thing, pursue their desires, there was no ultimate human good as a criterion of ethical judgment" (Hobbes 38). For Hobbes, "there is no such thing as perpetual tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because life is but motion, and can never be without Desire, nor fear no more than without sense" (46). Summarily, on human nature, Hobbes maintains a firm position that human beings stood nothing to gain from the company of others except pain. He added that a permanent rivalry existed between human beings for honour, riches, and

authority, with life as nothing but potential warfare, a war of everyone against the other. This will lead us to his notion of the state of nature.

Hobbes on State of Nature
In the bleak and pessimistic human nature, the picturization of the state of nature was gloomy and sordid. He picturized in his mind the moment before the civil rule of human society. It is important to note that his understanding of the human person to a large extent influenced this pre-civic society which he calls a state of nature. He posits that human relationship in the state of nature was dotted with floods of mutual suspicion and hostility. In this ill-condition, there was no law, no justice, no notion of right and wrong, with only force and fraud as the two cardinal virtues. And so the life of man will certainly be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Hobbes 89). And from this assertion, we can deduce that the principal cause of the conflict was within the nature of man. Unhealthy competition, diffidence and glory were the three reasons that were responsible for quarrels and rivalries among the individuals in the state of nature. In competition, man uses violence to become masters of others and their properties; diffidence protects the acquired wealth won in the competition while glorying for trifles (Hobbes 98).

Hobbes did not attribute the predicament of the natural person to either sin or depravity, but to human nature as said earlier. The individual was the author of his ruination. The state of nature degenerated into a state of war, "a war of every man against every man" (89). The words of Minogue tend to make this point clearer on the state of nature and the need to avoid the evil that befalls man as well as the necessity of civil authority that checks and balances human errors and limitations, thus:

The state of nature dramatizes what Hobbes takes to be the fundamental dilemma of human existence: that men both need each other and grieve each other. Most social life, he tells us, is for gain and glory, and as we have seen, men pay for these pleasures by a host of small pains and humiliation at each other's hands. Such things are but hints of what would happen did we not live under a government. They would very rapidly have impelled men into civil society so that the state of nature cannot have existed for long, though it is approximated whenever authority breaks down (26).

In this state of nature, as said earlier, no law works, no sense of justice or fair play, no covenants forged between people but principles based on self-preservation which is the greatest instinct in man according to psychology. Therefore, civil society only either controls or suppresses this instinct and other passions in man that would have made man a wolf to his fellow man through promulgation and execution of cogent and salient laws that can tame the beast in human nature. When the question of why does man behave like a beast to his fellow man? A definite answer could never be begotten but an explanation that man by nature is attracted to what he thinks will help him survive, conversely, hates whatever he judges to be a threat to him. Stumpf tends to express this relativistic principle of Hobbes in a clearer light, thus:

The words good and evil in Hobbes' state of nature, have whatever meaning each individual will give them, and people will call good whatever they love and evil whatever they hate. There being nothing simply and so. Humans are fundamentally egotistical in that they are concerned chiefly about their survival and identify goodness with their appetites (231).

This position of Stumpf shows clearly that in the state of nature, there is no obligation for humanity to respect others or that there is no morality in the traditional sense of goodness and justice. Given this egoistical view of human nature, it would appear also that humanity did not possess the capacity to create an ordered and peaceful society. But Hobbes will react quickly that several logical conclusions or consequences could be deduced from humanity's concern for survival, among these is what he calls natural laws which shall be the epicenter of our next deliberation.

Hobbeson Natural Law

Hobbes pointed out that even in the state of nature, certain laws are natural. Natural in the sense that they are not man-made but existed even before man's existence. People know these laws by undiluted instinct and are recognized based on their logical consistency with people's principal concern for their safety. According to him, natural law is "a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, telling what to do and what not to do" (110). He contends that in the state of nature, individuals enjoy complete liberty, including the natural right to everything, even to one another's bodies. Berlin softly expressed this finely that "Hobbes' natural laws are nineteen in all, and are considered as Articles of peace. They are dictates of reason and are proper laws since they were delivered in the word of God. These laws were counsels of prudence" (26).

Natural laws for Hobbes's theory did not man eternal justice, perfect morality or standards to judge existing laws as the stoics did. Nor did they imply the existence of common good, for they merely created the common conditions which were necessary to fulfil each good. Thus, he opined that these laws were immutable, and out of the nineteen, only three were important:
  i. Seek peace and follow it;
  ii. Abandon the natural rights to things; and
  iii. Individuals must honour their contracts (112).

Oakeshott nailed it well to the wall in the following sentences:

The first law of nature is therefore that every man ought to seek peace and follow it. Now, this law that urges me to seek peace is natural because it is a logical extension of my concern for survival. I have a better chance to survive if I help create the conditions of peace. My desire for survival, therefore, impels me to seek peace… The second law states a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think necessary, to lay down his right to all things: and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself (55).

Oakeshott highlighted in this above periscope that Hobbes used the concept of the natural law to stress the fact that peace demanded confidence, for society depended on mutual trust. This led him to conclude that supreme power ought to coincide with supreme authority. Shedding more light on this, he reiterated that "governments had to be always backed by force, if not direct, at least, implicit; for covenants without swords are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all" (117).

Hobbes on Contract and Sovereign Power

In the preceding sections of this research work, we explicated the laws of nature and since the laws of nature enjoined individuals to seek peace, it follows that the only way to attain it was through a covenant leading to the establishment of a state. Hobbes captured it finely thus:

Individuals surrendered all their powers through a contract to a third party who was not a party to the contract but received all the powers that were surrendered. The commonwealth was constituted when the multitude of individuals was united in one person when everyone said to the other, I authorized and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner (119).

The notion of contract as a free agreement between self-interested individuals became the prevalent answer to the problems of social cohesion. The third person even as mentioned above was a consequence of the contract, an artificial person that is distinct from the contracting parties such that he or she could be fair, unbiased and free from fear or pressure. And this third person according to

Hobbes could be a single individual or a group of people who could act such that peace and safety could be achieved (120). He added that as each consented to this bond of contract, all are subjected to a set of rules, that guarantee basic equality with one another, and no one possesses more rights than another. The sovereign who is an embodiment of the rights treats all individuals equally in matters of justice and levying of taxes. To this end, he defines justice as equality in treatment and equality in rights. He further equated justice with fairness such that one treats another in the manner and way he would like to be treated. The great Leviathan in which all owe rights and obligations to keep to the term of the contract assumes the role of a mortal God to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and defense (120).

For him, he prefers this third person to be a monarch. Giving cogent reasons for his preference for the monarchy, he echoed: "Monarchy was preferable to an aristocracy or democracy because the self-indulgence of one compared to that of many would-be cheaper; the existence of an identity of interests between the king and his subjects; and fewer intrigues and plots, which were normally due to personal ambitions and envy of members of the ruling elites" (Hobbes 112). His position was pinned around the reason that commonwealths differed not due to the nature of the sovereign power, but in the numbers who wielded and exercised this power. And that this power of the sovereign is "unlimited, inalienable and permanent" (Hobbes 112). Plamentaz commented on this:

> Hobbes' theory of sovereignty was a precursor of Austin's theory. The sovereign enjoyed absolute powers only because the individuals had surrendered their powers. Hobbes conceptualized an absolute sovereign power only because of his thorough-going individualism. The absolute sovereign represented the individuals, and was constituted by them for providing order and security, and averting the worst of all evils, civil wars   (112).

For him, Hobbes was able to create order and stability by subordinating non-political associations, including the church and not recognizing any pre-political order of society based on kinship, religion, and other associations, which normally contributed to sociability in the individual.

Hobbes on Rights and Political Obligation

Hobbes believes that the cessation or forfeiture of rights to the sovereign is the best way to outlive the life depicted in the state of nature. And that the sovereign having accumulated all the powers, would have the authority to carry out the wishes of the population as a whole by granting them safety and protection from both internal threats and external cohesion. It is germane to note here quickly the flow of this power: the sovereign does not enter into a contract with anyone such that he will cede power to anyone; rather the people involved are those who are in contracts with themselves so that the cede rights to the sovereign who is independent and un influential. The sovereign too cannot commit an unjust act because he is not bound by the covenant except if the sovereign orders his subject to kill themselves, then self-preservation which is the greatest human desire, would override the orders of the sovereign and the subjects would have the right to rebel (Hobbes 253). Putting simply, in as much as the subjects have given their rights to the sovereign freely, the sovereign too is obliged to protect and secure. He rather punishes those who act unjustly in the state (Hobbes 236).

Hummels adds firmly that perhaps the most important role of the sovereign in the state is to "prescribe the rules, whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects" (26). This will certainly help to regulate the unnecessary competition for scarce resources in the state which is a key factor that erupts war in the state of nature, and a state of war is the worst scenario that can befall man as life eventually becomes "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." And Elber added that the sovereign is required to force a member of the society to act in such a way that shall be beneficial to the society as a whole, to even force a person not to kill even when they could have gained from it (50).

Summarily, in Hobbes's notion of rights and obligation, everyone in the state is free to enter into a covenant with another in the state. And once this is achieved, their rights are limited and exercised by the sovereign who gives them protection and safety from internal and external threats to avoid a state of war. This sovereign too has unlimited and undivided right to promulgate and execute laws that will benefit all in the state such that anyone who defaults is punished accordingly (Sorrel 33). The sovereign has to do whatever possible in the interest of the state to avert the state of war which is intolerable for all people.

Import of Hobbes Political Philosophy to Nigerian Society

Having carefully and extensively but not exhaustive discussed the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, it is very pertinent to situate its benefits in the Nigerian setting which daily tends to swing towards oblivion and annihilation. It becomes a necessity (if this work shall be a veritable tool in the Nigerian educational system) to import values from Hobbesian political thoughts into the Nigerian political life stream. This holds truer as the Nigerian state has varieties of elements present in the Hobbesian state of nature. Vices such as fraud, fear and strife, lawlessness and impunity, a spike of injustice, autocracy etc. this has made the Nigerian state a state of nature where every man has the disposition to wage war against every man. Achebe agreed with this position when he noted that two of the troubles that have plagued the geographical location called Nigeria are that self-interest otherwise called greed and systemic corruption. (Bibliography of Corruption in Nigeria)

Hobbes demonstrated time and again that the sole aim of the emergence of a sovereign is the avoidance of a return to the state of war which is synonymous with the state of nature where life is short, brutish, poor etc. hence, all have to surrender rights and entrust it in the sovereign who uses it to for the common interest. In Nigerian society, government officials assume fittingly the position of the sovereign. But unlike the Hobbesian sovereign who ensures justice and fairness, Nigerian elected officials are exactly the opposite: they instill and promote injustice and lawlessness. Hence, man is safer in the bush than in Nigerian society. The worst place to be present in Nigeria.

It is important to learn from Hobbes that the primary role of the sovereign is to ensure the safety of the members of the state that have surrendered their rights to him. Government and policymakers across all tiers of ruling must allow this to reverberate in their eardrums such that the citizens will have no just cause to rebel or revolt.

Again, we see in Hobbes's political philosophy the enthronement of equality for all members of the state. This natural equality is lacking in many societies today and most especially, in Nigeria. In the state, since all are equal, the scarce resources ought to be even shared and distributed to all. This is not the case with the enormous natural resources flooding the geographical location named Nigeria.

Furthermore, Hobbes championed absolutism of the sovereign which is formed based on the free consenting of the people. In other words, the sovereign is a legitimate representative of the masses. Inadvertently, Hobbes install the idea of democracy where the assembly or sovereign is a conglomerate of representatives from the composite units. For equity and fairness, this representation must be justly met. The Nigerian government especially the present regime is not only gerontocratic in nature but also kits and kins.

Another feature dominant in Hobbes' political thought that has a replica in the Nigerian situation is the sovereignty of the Sovereign. There is virtually no separation of power among the three arms of government in Nigeria. And the one that tends to suffer it most is the defender of the powerless _ the judiciary. The judiciary has been infringed and trespassed for coon's age by the executive in course of lurking for power and all her cries fell on deaf ears. The adverse effect of this ugly trend makes the rule of law dead down in slumber.

No less can one skip the hike of insecurity ravaging the entire land. While the Hobbesian state of nature was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short", the Nigerian situation has merited an adverb that qualifies each of these deprivable statuses. A typical Nigerian is not just solitary but very poor, nasty, brutish and with a very short life expectancy due to dwindling economy, sky-crapping poverty, and increasing population which is inversely proportional to the infrastructural development.

Conclusion

It was Sir John Dalberg-Acton, better known as Lord Acton who remarked that absolute power corrupts absolutely while reviewing the lives of people like Napoleon Bonaparte and some other Roman emperors. Hobbes tends to have preempted this unique thought of Lord Acton and so having been influenced by the physical scientists of his era and the incessant war ramping and ruining England and its environs, he decided to come up with a unique political philosophy on rights and obligations that binds both the ruler and the ruled. In his thoughts (as expressed above), he vouched to strike a chord of resonance between the rulers' responsibility and the corresponding obligation of the citizens of the state to avoid a chaotic and bloody society where life has no worth and meaning. It is in this case that Hobbes' work becomes a pertinent tool worthy of emulation for Nigeria, a Country where human life has no value and insecurity, kidnapping, rape, cultism, bombing, Boko Haram, bandit, armed robbery etc. are the new normal.

Therefore, using the device of a social contract, Hobbes explained the nature of sovereignty, its relationship with the individual, its location and the essential functions of the government. Thus, in other to avoid chaos, disorder and political instability, Hobbes recommends the erecting of a sovereign who will be given the rights of all subjects except the right of self-preservation in return for the enforcement of peace. This cessation of the entire rights results in the commonwealth or a leviathan to which peace and defense are owed, but the obligation to obey natural right, the command of God is supreme and is evident to reason, which constitute the obligatory character. Hobbes' theory on obligation and rights is still open to further review.

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MORAL SLEAZE IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA: THE TRANS-SOCIALIZATION AND TRANS-CIVILIZATION OF THE 21ST CENTURY YOUTH

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Abstract
This treatise adopts the expository and hermeneutical methods to demonstrate that the social media as the new order of education is doing good and at the same time doing great harm. This paradox makes this media of contemporary education of youths relishing and at the same time palpably fraught. Relishing because been an endless source of information it makes information swiftly handy. On the other hand, they fill us with the feeling of fraught as a consequence of their lack of censorship and quality control and assurance. This fundamental limitation is responsible for the proliferation of inappropriate and disruptive information that are causing negative social change globally. Consequently, the objectives of this treatise include to: expose the inadvertent negative impacts of social media to education; highlight the philosophical significance of social media to the character and intellectual formation of youths in Africa; conclude that the overtly openness of the social media creates room for credibility, quality assurance and control issues. It is therefore, recommended that there is the expedient need for the development of effective quality control and assurance mechanisms to forestall real and imagined disruptive tendencies of the social media.

Keywords: Education, Moral Sleaze, Social Media, Trans-civilization and Trans-socialization.

Introduction

This treatise is a hermeneutical enquiry concerning how the social media causes moral sleaze among contemporary day youths. In the modern world order, the social media provide enriched and state of the art virtual environments for research, teaching and learning. They provide digital and smart space and contrivances for robust teaching and learning. The social media is flooded with gargantuan sea of information. This smart library consists of a plenum to such an overwhelming extent that whatever information one seeks concerning anything and everything is readily present in its digital shelves. Hence, teaching and learning in all the forms of education is now increasingly done online/offline. This treatise which consists of a philosophical cum literary qualitative discourses, adopts the expository and hermeneutical methods to demonstrate that what makes the social media such an enviable and veritable springboard for information or knowledge generation and dissemination is that social media is accessible, interactive, immediate and relevant.

Ironically, the social media as the new citadel and tool for education are doing good and at the same time doing great harm. This oxymoronic paradox makes these media of contemporary education

relishing and at the same time profoundly fraught. Relishing because they are endless sources of information, they make information handy, swift and in real time. On the other hand, they fill man with the feeling of fraught as a consequence of their disruptive tendencies, stimulation of negative attitudes and habits and credibility issues (lack of censorship, quality control and assurance). These fundamental loopholes are responsible for the proliferation of destructive pieces of information that is causing negative social change globally. Consequently, the prime thrusts of this treatise is to review the extent to which technology has revolutionized education; expose the inadvertent negative impacts of social media to education in general; and, particularly demonstrate the philosophical significance of social media for the character and intellectual formation of the average African student and youth. This hermeneutical analysis reveals that the social media has far reaching moral and intellectual significance in Africa, for it signifies a tool for trans-socialization and trans-civilization. This implies that it traffics the culture of ethical relativism and subjectivism (liberalism and nihilism) that is apparently diametrically disparate to the objectivist and conservativist ethical consciousness of the African mind. Therefore, the paper deductively concludes that the smart environment and contrivance provided by the social media is ineluctably expedient and priceless for the 21st century education of youths. Consequently, despite the identified advertent and inadvertent negative consequences of this smart learning tool and digital territory, it remains an inviolable necessary evil that humans must invest in. Meanwhile, since the overtly openness of the social media creates room for quality assurance and control issues; it is therefore recommended that, inter alia, there is the expedient need for the development of effective quality control and assurance mechanisms to forestall real and imagined disruptive tendencies of the social media.

The Social Media

Scores of scholars have attempted to conceptualize their understanding of the term "social"; hence there are countless definitions of the term. However, a significant definition of the concept views it as an essential attribute of living things. Mathur designated the term as the intercourse of a specie of living beings with other living beings. The essence of this intercourse is to foster collective co-existence not minding whether or not such interaction is voluntary or involuntary. Humans are gregarious animals, as such they can neither exist nor live nor survive nor flourish outside the context of social intercourse or dialogue (1). Little wonder then Aristotle designated humans as social animals. Therefore the term social ontologically refers to people's interactions, relations, activities and collective experiences as humans. This interaction may be situated within a geographical area or clime and may not also be limited to any identifiable physical space or place (this interaction can happen in virtual environments). Humans enjoy an ontological social cobweb or networking that simply indicates that each and every individual human being's life, survival and flourishing are inexorably yoked to this ontological social cobweb. Hence, aided by the quantum or mega shift in communication and information technologies we can now talk about virtual social interactions. To be specific, humans' interactions or dialogues at the virtual space provided in the cloud and made possible by various medium called (social) media, represents the contemporary phase of this essential ontological social cobweb.

The term "social media" is formed by the amalgamation of the words 'social' and media' or by placing both side by side. Literally, the term social media can be interpreted as the media for the peoples' interaction or the media of social dialogue or activities. It could also be described as the platform for social activities outside the natural physical environment or space. There are countless definitions of social media advanced by scholars from different fields or disciplines and by social scientists. For instance, social media has been described as Internet-based software and interfaces that allow individuals to interact with each other through the exchange of certain details about their lives-such as biographical data, personal photos, professional data and current ideas (Social Media). The keywords in the above definition are internet-based, software and interfaces. These words leave us with the impression that first, social interactions at this level are enabled by the internet in the virtual

arena (software); second, it also involves networking or it integrates networks (interfaces of networks). Examples of the social media include Facebook, WhatsApp, Messenger, Telegram, Yuletide, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, Tiktok, Pinterest, Linkedin, Flickr, Wechat, Vimeo, Viber, Bizsugar, Zoom, Google Classroom, etc.

The General Implications of Social Media for 21ˢᵗ Century Global Education

It is very important to state here that the foregoing hermeneutical philosophical discourse demonstrates that the most modern medium of informal and formal education powered by the phenomenal revolution in information technology is the social media. Ours is the digital age of information. Like the internet, social media are flooded with gargantuan sea of information and knowledge. Whatever information or knowledge one seeks concerning anything and everything is readily present in the social; hence, the popular slogan, 'garbage in, garbage out'. The lion's share of human population globally are virtually living and doing almost everything online. Being offline definitely is being out of existence in the new world order of global networking created by the social media. As the newest agent of socialization and civilization, people's behaviour and frame of orientations is today continuously subject to change because of the vast see of information accruing from the social media. Global character formation that was hitherto the prerogative of traditional formal and informal educational systems is today largely inadvertently left to the mercy of the social media. One of the main indexes that have made the social media so powerful and so epistemologically penetrating is the fact that they allow their audience to interact with one another in a way that is fascinating, enticing, engaging, immediate and relevant. As a result, social media are the contemporary most formidable catalyst of social change and the bulwark of moral and intellectual formation. Young people who are of school age spend more time engaged in social media chatting and they barely give limited time to studies because of countless fascinating and enticing contents that distract them. The present generation's intellectual and character formation is overwhelmingly influenced by the social media than traditional systems of formal and informal education.

According to a recent study in the US, time spent by users on social media sites rise to 83% each year. Nielson's recent study revealed that on the global scale, young people spent more than 6 hours on social networking sites. Mostly, people of this age grade take advantage of these sites to connect and interact with family and friends (Sanusi & Adelabu 26). A more recent study in 2008 of students in the age range of 1-18 in 13 urban high schools in the US demonstrated that 94% used the internet, 82% go online at home and 77% have a profile on social networking site. Concerning what young minds learn whenever they are involved in social media networking, select students outlined communication skills, technological skills, docility towards new trends and views and creativity skills as the utmost skills that make the social media irresistibly attractive to them. Subsequent studies demonstrate that social media usage enables students the avenues to practice 21ˢᵗ century skills that are expedient for proactive living in the prevailing contemporary society.

No doubt, the social media provides information on a wide range of issues relating to life, relationship, health, politics, religion, science and technology, morality, ethics, news, etc. Therefore, because the social media traffics and proliferates limitless information that influence peoples' worldviews, behavioural patterns, attitudes, values, etc. it is the most viable source and agent of contemporary informal and formal education. These days, not having internet subscription in one's mobile phone is like not existing. Experts working for multinational telecommunication networks have taken advantage of people's obsessive attachment to the social media to articulate an advertorial slogan. The slogan is, 'data is life'. The simple implication of this slogan is that when your mobile data subscription is active, you are indeed connected to the world and thereby living in the new order of the network of global citizens. However, if your data subscription is inactive, you are cut off from the new order and isolated like one who is almost non-existent.

The Social Media and the Raising of the Contemporary Day African Youth
The African continent like other continents of the globe has rented a residence in the synthetic social media environment. "With the ever increasing numbers of people from this birthplace of humanity (Black race) using social media, Africa, no doubt is progressively gaining fame in the spheres of social networking. African youths have completely fallen for this catchy and trendy new technology of social media" (Ephraim no p). Youths in Africa make use of social networks multi-purposely. They use it for personal connection, entertainment, gossip, research, etc. According to Ephraim, statistics emerging from a research carried out in three African countries (Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa) indicate fascinating patterns of social media use amongst adolescent youths. Consequently, the social media has become a powerful and innovative tool for moral and intellectual education of young minds in the present dispensation (no p). As a formidable tool for informal education, the African people are now consciously and unconsciously learning, unlearning and relearning values and patterns of orientations. As such, the social media is smartly displacing traditional systems of formal and informal education in Africa and asserting itself as the extant innovative agent of African re-socialization and re-civilization. As it stands today, one cannot deny that the character and intellectual formation of an average African child is profoundly influenced by what he/she learns from social networks. And this makes proper parental and societal upbringing of children in the African world today more herculean than ever.

Everything that has advantages, they say, invariably has disadvantages. This is true about social networking in Africa. The disadvantage of social media use is that its abuse is causing maladaptive and abnormal behaviour among youths in and out of the physical school environments. "For instance, as it is the case with other globalizing continents of the world, the African states are now confronted by negative effects of social media technologies (Ephraim no p). These negative effects fundamentally impact both their formal educational attainment and their proper value orientation and socialization. Generally, social networking sites arrest students' attention and divert it to non-educational and inappropriate interactions and worthless chatting (Kuppuswamy & Shankar 28-29). An outline of these malaise include increase in antisocial behaviour, abnormal or maladaptive classroom behaviour, decline in reading culture, disrupt in English Language proficiency, increased failure in academic achievement and increase in exam malpractices and cybercrimes. The cumulative effect of these malaises is the ironic increasing poor performance of students and the rebellion of young folks against traditional institutions and the widespread moral decadence in the African continent today. It is germane to place on record here that whatever affects formal educational formation, inevitably affects the informal educational sector. Therefore, (as it shall be made explicit below) the cumulative effect of the disruptions in informal education is the antisocial and vicious behaviours that constitute a formidable pushback to effective informal education in Africa. Let's take close look at these main disruptive tendencies that are of great concern.

Abnormal or Maladaptive Classroom Behaviours
As far as formal schooling is concerned, social media has the tendency of disrupting the moral formation of learners. Many students in African schools today consciously and unconsciously exhibit traits of abnormal or maladaptive behaviours that are antithetical to their schools' moral codes or normative expectations; thanks to their inordinate and obsessive social media networking. The school as a crucial agent of socialization has moral codes, norm or standard of behaviour or behavoural patterns or normal behaviours expected from students. Hence, "normal behaviour is that behaviour that is supportive and responsive to the desired demands of academic and social activities in the school" (Amarachi-Udogu & Chukwunonyeim 236). Going by the dictates of the polar concept, abnormal behaviour becomes a behaviour that deflects from expected behavioral patterns. Abnormal behaviours are considered maladaptive and disruptive in nature. According to Ekechukwu and Amaeze, disruptive behaviours are those voluntary or involuntary actions of students that are capable of inhibiting effective teaching and learning in an academic environment (19-27). Practical

examples of disruptive behaviours outlined by Honolulu Community College and cited by Ekechukwu and Amaeze include physical or verbal psychological harassment or threat to the teacher, lecturer, a member of staff or towards fellow students. For Ekechukwu and Amaeze, verbal assault, bullying, gaming, eating, sleeping, singing, incessant or inordinate movement from one point to another, passing notes to friends during class sections, writing of love letters, poking and excessive talking are to be seen as disruptive behaviours in the classroom (19-27). In addition, passiveness and inactive participation in the class can also be categorized as a disruptive behaviour in the classroom.

At this point, the question that ensues is, what is the relationship between social media networking and disruptive behaviours in the African classroom? In response to this question Opurum opined that the social media is responsible for most disruptive behaviours amongst students. He contended that contemporary day students swiftly adopt all manner of abnormal behaviours owing to quick access to internet facilities (20-29). The contention that social media networking is responsible for most disruptive behaviours that undesirably impact behaviour of students in Africa as in elsewhere in the globalizing world is not based on mere speculations. This assertion has been validated by several studies in Africa. For instance, a study carried out to ascertain the nexus between social media and students' disruptive behaviour in faculties of education in three Rivers State Universities, Rivers State, Nigeria established that there is a positive high connection between the use of Facebook, Instagram and students' disruptive behaviours. The use of e-mail and WhatsApp has deleterious connection with students' disruptive behaviours (Amaechi-Udogu et al 236). On the strength of these findings, the study plausibly predicted that increase in the use of Facebook and Instagram will result to a corresponding increase in disruptive classroom behaviours (Amaechi-Udogu et al 236). It must be quickly submitted that social media in themselves are not automatically the causes of disruptive behaviour rather the uncritical, indiscreet and abuse of them in the form of addiction is responsible for abnormal behaviour that ensue. This factual claim is justified by the findings of a study carried out by Uzonna which reveals that inappropriate and habitual students' use of Facebook is causing grave problems in their academics because of addictions (20-29). Moreover, the addictive use of Instagram for sharing images and photos is also causing avoidable distraction to students both at home and within their school environment.

Recent studies, have lucidly established that disruptive behaviours which are consequences of abuses and inappropriate use of social media by students in Africa have of recent become one of the most formidable classroom problems militating effective classroom control, management and teaching achievement (Amaechi-Udogu et al 236). Teachers, tutors and lecturers in the today African schools would agree no less that effective classroom control and management is increasing becoming difficult if not herculean. This quagmire is not the exclusive preserve of the classroom and school environment. The home and the larger society also unfortunately notice all sorts of deviant behaviour in the children and wards. The latter are becoming more and more un-teachable and uncontrollable; thereby frustrating the attainment of the lofty goals of informal education in Africa.

Decline in Reading and Increase Plagiarism
Before the advent of the social media and the subsequent explosion of information and knowledge, students were accustomed to digging deep into the recesses of published materials for knowledge or information in order to properly carry out their take-home school assignments and projects. However, with the advent of the social media and the internet in the post information and digital age, students developed the bad habit of laziness, procrastination, indiscipline and dishonesty. The development of coldness towards reading and its attendant consequence of unwillingness to think but assume, dastardly gave rise to the habit or practice of copy and paste. The natural and logical inference from this is that this is responsible for the high level of plagiarism experienced today in scholarship in general. Hitherto, students go to tutors and also consult books to help them do their assignments, but now they browse or page through relevant websites for ready-made papers and

other academic works. The high level of decreasing educational attainment today and the general malpractices that characterize internal and external exams globally is also attributable to this degeneration of learning rates among students. To say the least, this is an arduous destructive consequence of the social media. This of course constitutes a significant disruption in informal and formal education of youth agents in Africa.

Increase in Exam Malpractices and Failure in Academic Achievement
A study in Ghana on the use of social media and its impacts on academic performance of tertiary students, discovered that majority of students in Ghana got entangled in social networking sites; and that most youth-users of social networking sites employed them for chatting and downloading materials that are not relevant to their studies and this resulted in poor academic performance (Owusu & Agatha 1-9). Another strong reason responsible for the increasing abysmal performance of students in African was pointed out by Adeniyi who argued that many students perform woefully because of their inability to spend quality time studying (126-131). The logic is simple, students' reading culture has decline and less time and concentration is given to studying within and outside classrooms. In agreement with inductive logic there would be corresponding increase in exam malpractices and failures.

Anti-Social Deviant Behaviours
Antisocial and deviant behaviours constitute the zenith of the disruptive consequences of inordinate and morally repressible use of social media by youth agents in Africa. The most essential and fundamental goal of formal and informal education is proper value orientation and moral formation of students. This is why character or moral formation is seen as not just one of the cardinal pillars of education but the foundation of education. However, as it stands today, the prevailing culture of social networking and the trans-valuation of values (unlearning of traditional socialization and civilization and relearning social media's trans-socialization and trans-civilization), is unfortunately militating against this wholesome goal of formal and informal education in Africa.

Inordinate social media usage has grave implications not just for the school environment but also for informal education and the larger African society. Most antisocial and deviant behavoural traits or vices prevalent in the larger African society today are aftermaths of imprudent social networking by young folks. Using Nigeria as a case study, Adeniyi observed that today a teaming population of secondary school students in Nigeria learnt certain antisocial behaviours like fraudulent habits, bad attitudes and other related character traits and vices which are unique to social media. Citing a concrete example to substantiate his claims, he alluded "four Nigerian teenagers who murdered a girl in Ogun state in early 2022 for ritual in their confessional statement held that they learnt such abominable act from the social media (126-7). Similarly, a 2018 research in Ghana established that social media fosters disruptive behaviours among students of Tamale Technical University. The study revealed that students of this tertiary institution are exposed to fraud, drug use and abuse, pornography and other vulgarities that disrupt students' academic attainments (Kojo & Agyekum 47). One of the major social vices that is rampant among Nigerian youths and elsewhere is Africa is the quick money syndrome (cybercrime) known as "yahoo yahoo" or its rebranded G+. Every now and then, the social media and the Nigerian online and print dailies are a washed with news of youths and even under age boys and girls involved in ritual killings and selling of human parts. Human parts are required for the ritual fortification of those involved in the G+ internet cum social media fraud. Some other fraudulent vices African students learn from the social media nowadays are cybercrimes like cyber violence against women and cyber bullying. Cyber bullying is today rampant in the African society, thanks to the social media.

Antisocial and abominable behaviours such intimidation, harassment, bully are profoundly antithetical to the African normative system and everything that the African traditional philosophy of education represents. Uzomah makes sense of the African traditional education thus:

The African traditional concept of education was erected on the concept of the African mind. The African mind is an ideology that believes in the cyclic nature of the world. This consists of three worlds- the world of the unborn, the world of the living and the world of the living dead. The hallmark of the African education is for moral development and a harmonious communitarian living. An upright living is necessary to maintain harmony between these three worlds. Since African morality and worldview is theo-centric, the child is to believe in the continuum of life, the unity of the worlds: world of the living, world of the living dead, and the world of the unborn. One is to be conscious against committing abominations, for this upsets the moral order and immanently spells doom for both the offender and the mother earth (1-13).

The disruptive and deviant behavoural traits synonymous with the prevailing social media culture deflect from the mode and goals of the traditional African education system. "In ancient Africa, there was no formal mode of teaching, rather, time honoured cultural values, attitudes, expected pattern of behaviour, gender lore, morals and norms were veritably communicated through folktales, parables, riddles, proverbs etc., in family gatherings and at moon light plays. Girls were instructed by their mothers on how to be well behaved, be of high moral probity and rectitude. They are to be meek, gentle, chase, obedient, submissive and genial. They were taught that purity (preservation of one's virginity before marriage is a supreme norm of purity), is the womanness of the woman" (9). "The education of women was to make them virtuous to form them into perfect homemakers. Hence, they were trained to be submissive in all things and to be morally upright. In other words, through education, women were socialized to be good home keepers. The men were educated to be strong, hardworking and honest. Generally, integrity was the supreme value which education instills or bequeaths to the learner" (Uzomah 9). However, today the availability of the social media is undermining this teleology of African informal and formal educational ideology. Boys as well as girls, men and well as women are now exposed to sensational information that construes traditional episteme and value system as obsolete and ridiculous. The intellectual and moral formation of the African child is now profoundly influenced by social media bloggers and influencers. Celebrities are powerful social media influencers. As such, their ostensible lifestyles and licentious living have far reaching influence on the teaming population of social media users, especially youths. This is revolutionizing virtually all we have ever known about human values and the essence of society.

Parents as well as their children are distracted by social media, although not in the same magnitude. Parents are seen most times glued to their phones instead of spending quality time educating their children morally. Most African children today regard the social media as a valuable source of moral education instead of relying on their parents. It is unfortunate that contrary to the objectivist and conservative view of morality that the African parents epitomise, the social media traffics the civilization of ethical relativism, subjectivism and moral nihilism. This extant normative culture of the social media ought to be most worrisome to every well-meaning African mind and educationist because it distorts the proper essence of the African formal and informal educational sensibility and object. "It is germane to assert that, if education has just a sole aim, object or goal, this would be that the essence of education is to transmit accumulated human experience and knowledge epitomized or reposed in the reservoir called culture to the present generation and posterity (Uzomah 1). The foundation of the African culture is its conservative and objectivist normative system. This normative system is the custodial and reservoir of core moral values and ethical frameworks of antiquity that foster moral rectitude and peaceful and harmonious co-existence of the African people. The school system (whether formal or informal) is saddled with the noble responsibility of transmitting these inestimable legacies to posterity by coercively inducing adolescents (youth gents) to walk in the path constructed by this rubric.

Conclusion

The forgoing philosophico-literary discourse in this treatise is a hermeneutical attempt towards conceptualizing the practical significance of the social media to the raising youths. Among other feats attained, the discourse has lucidly demonstrated that the gradual and sustained integration of the social media into modern day education has pragmatic and relishing prospects because they provide states of the art digital and smart estates for quality and standard education. However, pursuant to the identified disruptive issues, the overtly openness of the social media that creates room for credibility, quality assurance and control issues; and the deviant and maladaptive behaviours that have become inadvertent and advertent aftermaths of the social media, there is sufficient reason for agitation about the future of informal and formal education especially in Africa. However, notwithstanding these genuine concerns, the social media smart learning is a necessary evil that humans cannot but embrace in this extant digital and smart age and society. Indeed the future of mankind's knowledge or education economy is in the bosom of information technologies. The social media emerging technologies in particular and the technology in general, per se are not ontologically disruptive or destructive rather it is the abuse or inappropriate use of technologies that gives rise to real and imagined disruptions and destructions. Therefore, the treatise recommends thus:

i. There is the expedient need for the development of effective quality control and assurance mechanisms to forestall real and imagined disruptive and destructive tendencies of the social media.

ii. Parents and other informal institutions of education should rise up to their responsibility and device formidable modalities to counter the negative trans-socialization and trans-civilization going on in the social media.

iii. All stakeholders to the African educational economy must be actively involved in social media networking so as to be conversant with the happenings in that terrain, in other to be well-fitted to counter undesirable and deleterious tendencies associated with the social media networking.

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MY JOURNEY TO SELF-REDISCOVERY AS AN EX-SEMINARIAN ON THE WINGS OF SOREN KIERKEGAARD'S EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

The inner spark of this paper is to share a personal testimony of how my brief voyage with Kierkegaard so far is helping me overcome the array of psychological setbacks, crises of faith and other depressive emotional ups and downs that greeted my unforeseen exit from a Nigerian Catholic seminary formation for the catholic priesthood where, for more than fourteen years, in my most productive years, I was fully opened to the intellectual, psychological and spiritual overhaul technically called formation with all the intention and attention of ending up as a catholic priest but eventually my 'vocation' was cut short by an inner turmoil that necessitated my decision to discontinue. In this paper, with continual reference to Kierkegaard, and perhaps other towering figures of existentialism, narrating in the first person, I will try to dissect how the seminary formation crushed by ability to be fully alive outside the seminary, show the insights I received from Kierkegaard in search of ways out of my predicament and that way inspire the Kierkegaard's kind of hope and emotional renewal in those who might have slipped into angst, depression or despair as a result of loss of their lifelong ambition as it happened to me.

Keywords: Kierkegaard, self, seminary, self-rediscovery, Struggle, Existentialism

Introduction

One peculiar quality that marks existentialist philosophy out is that the thinker thinks himself first before he thinks others or other realities. In existentialism, since existence precedes essence, as Jean-Paul Sartre, the acclaimed greatest proponent of existentialism in the 20th century tells us, genuine philosophy begins, or rather should begin with man, and not just man in the traditional anthropologists' abstract conception but, man as he lives his life every day and his experiences, similar to what Heidegger would call Dasein. (Sartre 22). This is because existentialism as a philosophy of life, over and above all other aspects of philosophy ponders on, philosophizes on, gives pre-eminence to and tries to find meaning in man's everyday experiences, challenges, fears, feelings of meaninglessness, disappointments and failures, successes, risks, in decision making, frustrations in human relationships and so on. According to Popkin, and Stroll in *Philosophy Made Simple* "existentialism is about those thoughts that occupy us each time we honestly ask questions about our life or our existence in the world". "(Popkin &Stroll 302) Gordorn Marino in *The Existentialist Survival Guide*: *How to live Authentically in an Inauthentic Age*, discussing the basic characteristics of existentialism says "though without a body of unifying creedal convictions yet if there was one judgment that unite existentialists, it was an antipathy towards academic philosophy". (Marino 7). Existentialists reject a re-rehearsal of intellectual history; construction of castles of abstractions by academics that most times have no direct bearing on peoples' lives. Against building mere ideological systems, existentialism, encourages dealing with our experiences now; with the hurly burly of real life. It encourages fierce engagement with life; with our stories or our experiences and philosophizing on them, locating our meaning in them.

It is against that existentialist backdrop that this paper, following the Kierkegaardian saying paraphrased from an entry in his journal that life can only be understood backwards but it must be lived forwards, in a kind of autobiographical philosophy which is apropos to existentialism and indeed to Kierkegaard, shares the story of my personal adjustment struggle to regain or recreate my lost 'self' since 2006, when I discontinued my bid for the Catholic priesthood after fourteen years of training in the seminary.

The problem the paper deals with is that the seminary formation I received, like many others too, to say the least left me emotionally dry; without passion for normal life outside the seminary or the priesthood mindful of the whole lot that Kierkegaard said about passion – about what brings passion to life and what makes it atrophy. The seminary formation system leaves a kind of classical involuntary conditioning, to use the expression of Ivan Pavlov, to the priestly kind of life: discipline, gentility, self-order and composure, protocol and due process, an attitude of unquestioned or acquiesced obedience, more disposition to external guide than personal initiative and a general psychology which Kierkegaard would regard as suffocating. Some seminarians in a haste to redefine themselves or rediscover themselves, or assert themselves cheaply fall prey to some strange ideologies. Philip Ogbonna in "Existential Authenticity in Contemporary Age" asserts that in recent times modern man in search of himself, especially in the hands of ideologies and movements claiming to be humanists, commit himself and the entire image of man to a very low stature, and in the name of liberating man, promotes the manipulation of man (Ogbonna 6).

The objective of the paper therefore is to briefly examine my past melancholic, passion-stifling and loss of self-seminary formation and show how hanging on the wings or prescriptions of Kierkegaard, the struggle to shake off the reclusive effect of the formation on me became a little easier and in adjusting to normal life outside the seminary. Readers would certainly, leveraging on the different ways I have anchored on Kierkegaard in dealing with my predicaments distil the 'Kierkegaardian Perspectives and Prescriptions for their own Mental Health Issues'(Bearing in mind that the theme of this conference is **"Kierkegaardian Perspectives and Prescriptions on Mental Health Issues.")** as an ex seminarian. While the story of my existential romance with Kierkegaard may give some insights to all ex seminarians yet it will be most helpful to those of them who spent a long time, like me, in the catholic seminary formationin the Nigerian system, where I am conversant with and more particularly to those ex seminarians who, while in the seminary, were fully opened to the formation. Although, faithful autobiographies, because of their subjective nature, are traditionally considered almost impossible, as (Dostoevsky 39) in *Notes From Underground* notes, yet as anyone with an inkling of Kierkegaard knows truth is first of all 'auto' or subjective hence Kierkegaard's deep value for the "I," and the first person narrative. "It is this first person inside out perspective combined with the conviction that our truth needs to be passionately appropriated and expressed in the concrete medium of our actions that helped earn Kierkegaard recognition as the undisputed first champion of existentialism" (Marino xvii).

The paper will set the ball rolling by attempting to show what Kierkegaard understands by the self, the existential processes of acquiring or loosing self and that way set the stage to see how the seminary formation silently suppresses passion in seminarians and leads to loss of self as it happened to me, akin to the family upbringing effect on Kierkegaard. Then the paper will show how, I was able to re-create myself after leaving the seminary by appropriating the thoughts of Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard on the Self
Soren Aabye Kierkegaard was born on the 5th of May 1813 in Copenhagen, Denmark and died on November 11 1855. He was the youngest of seven children of his father Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard – a man who lived his own life. At the time of Soren's birth, the father Michael Kierkegaard, 57, was a deeply religious Protestant living with a depression following some inner feelings of guilt for all his moral failures. The result was that he tried to give the children a rigid, stern oppressive Christian formation. The highly sensitive and idealistic Soren was influenced to the roots by the stern and strict religious upbringing but during the period of his studies at the university, he deviated from the religious upbringing he received from his father and eventually abandoned not only his religious beliefs but also his moral convictions and became rather indifferent and uncommitted to any religious or moral way of life and, determined to lead the life of an aesthete, as a

deliberate reproach to the stern training his father had given him. He began to live in high style, carousing and drinking, and even had, while drunk, an encounter with a prostitute. In William Lawhead's words in *Voyage of Discovery: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy* "he tried to squeeze out of life all the pleasure he could and worked hard at developing the reputation of being a happy-go-lucky, man-about-town" (Lawhead 441). After six months of estrangement, he returned home in response to his father's agonized entreaties. They were reconciled, and a year later the father died. To make things worse, he seemed to have inherited his father's guilt while he lived a life of reproach, which constantly haunted and weighed heavily upon him and rendered him depressed and unhappy almost all his life. According to his journals, he was been eaten up by despair behind his care-free mask. "I have just returned from a party of which I was the life and soul; wit poured from my lips, everyone laughed and admired me - but I went away – and the dash should be as long as the earth's orbit – and wanted to shoot myself" (Lawhead, 443).

Eventually however, Soren Kierkegaard, underwent conversion in two stages. First he disliked the aesthetic way he was living his life and underwent a moral conversion following which he committed himself to certain moral principles. From the position of a mere aesthete, who lived his life according to instincts, he became personally involved and consciously committed to a moral reason-guided way of life. This is the level in which Kant and many others stopped. Existence from then had a new meaning, for a new dimension was added to his notion of human existence. Next he underwent another conversion, this time a religious conversion, and he 'personally' committed himself to the Christian faith. The journey of self-discovery for Kierkegaard thus passes through three stages: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious.

Soren Kierkegaard's self is not just synonymous with person. A self, for Kierkegaard, is a set of relations. On the simplest level, a self is a set of relations between a person and the world around him or her. A self is not just a body and a brain but is defined by external and internal relations. A self is relating to oneself (Baloyannis 20). It is akin to what psychologists would call self-esteem, sense of one's own existential direction healthy ego or harmonised appreciation of sense of being in the world. Patrick Stokes in "The Naked Self: Kierkegaard and Personal Identity" (Stokes 22), in trying to locate the Kierkegaardian idea of the self-discussed the radical changes any human being undergoes between infancy and adulthood as all that impress, nourish, hurt, diminish, or improve in the course of life. For Stokes we can see the self by separating the personage from the person as we reckon all that happened over the years. The former is what features in biographies (and obituaries), the elusive self-same-self being reserved for its point of view as when we assume first memories before reflection. Of the naked self, 'central to its entire trajectory' is the distinction between "our phenomenal sense of self and our reflective awareness of being a particular person."(Stokes 23) Stokes further opined that it is the self's own sense of being that particular person that is distinguished from whatever self has that sense. Putting the emphasis on 'particular' the reference to Kierkegaard slips into place as Sylvia Wash in *Kierkegaard and Religion: Personality, Character and Virtue* convincingly shows that Kierkegaard's view of the formation of the human self is from his most youthful writings robustly teleological, guided by free choices and strongly informed by his Lutheran Christianity (Walsh 76). Similarly, Jeffrey Hanson, in *Kierkegaard and the Life of Faith: The Aesthetic, the Ethical and the Religious in Fear and Trembling* affirms a robust continuity between the various pseudonyms in search of the Kierkegaardian self. If the aesthetic is also 'resigned' along analogical lines to the resignation of the 'ethical' then *Fear and Trembling* proffers insights that help deepen our understanding of Kierkegaard's idea of the self (Hansen 20). Woolver Susan in her paper "The Process of Self becoming in the thought of Soren Kierkegaard and Carl Rogers" adds that the self-concept is organized around 'the perceptions of 'I' of 'me' and the perceptions of the relationship of the 'I' or 'me' to others and to various aspects of life (Woolver 23)

The Seminary programme in Nigeria and the possible in-training Loss Self of an Average Seminarian

An average young man in Nigeria enters the seminary with a kind of docile piety and is deceived by the seminary institutional mask as a religious house of prayer, a mask that wears off on confrontation with the academic, social, and cultural trappings of the seminary system. Generally the Catholic seminary programme in Nigeria for a diocesan priest, particularly in the Igbo Eastern part of Nigeria, where I attended is a 6-1-1-4-1-4-1 programme. This means six years in the junior seminary (an equivalent of high school), then a one year compulsory pastoral service to the church, generally done living in a parish house or church affiliated institution or duties under a priest and participating actively in the church prayers and activities. This is followed by another one year spiritual preparation before embarking on a four year degree programme in philosophy. There is another one year pastoral service interruption in the church after philosophy before another four year intensive degree programme in Catholic Theology. If all the aforementioned are successful, then they are capped up with a one year internship programme also in the church before one is finally ordained a catholic priest in Nigeria. Along the process, a seminarian can decide to discontinue for personal reasons, like I did or can be asked to discontinue, for whatever reason or reasons held on by the formators, either during one of the yearly screening exercises or any time at all with a recommendation to the diocesan bishop (Oguji 4). I left the seminary in my first year of Theology, that is in my 14th year in the formation programme.

Going through the junior seminary, the apostolic work, the spiritual year or novitiate, philosophy and for some theology with the intensive sometimes dogmatically compulsory studies, the academic and liturgical assignments, the daily domestic functions, the liturgical celebrations, the music, the drill, the regimentation, the chaste and celibate life or general self-abasement and mortification, the silence, the robotic obedience to formators, hanging around priests and parish houses the seminarian comes out a polished and civilized person, yet most times with a crippled emotional connection with the hurly burly of real life.

An average ex seminarian, open fully and receptive to the formation, is usually caught up in tensions between the regimented   and duty conscious life of the seminary and the somehow lousy, non-challant attitude that soft pedaling which characterizes the average society. Such a person usually has difficulty finding oneself. For James Ferreira, to be human; to find oneself is to be caught in tensions between where one is at the moment and where one senses he ought to be. It is to live in the tensions of subjectivity, suffering the inevitable gap between performance and aspiration. This is because the seminary system still adopts a kind of banking system of education or formation, as the Brazillian philosopher of education Paulo Freire (Paulo Freire, was a Brazilian ideologist whose radical ideas have shaped the modern concept of and approaches to education. In his essay, "The 'Banking' Concept of Education," Freire passionately expounds on the mechanical flaw in the current system, and offers an approach that he believes medicates the learning-teaching disorder in the classroom. The flawed conception, Freire explains, is the oppressive 'depositing of information (hence the term banking) by teachers into their students.) would call it where the seminarian is simply expected to receive instructions or drink from the formator, without any personal input and vomit it whenever needed. Most seminarians lose the capacity to be themselves, to think for themselves. Woolever Susan in her paper, earlier mentioned "The Process of Self becoming in the thought of Soren Kierkegaard and Carl Rogers" holds that persons, in that kind of situation or environment generally act, in part, in reaction to what is in their awareness and not their consciousness of self. For Rogers, Susan writes, perception and consciousness, or awareness are both constitutive of the self, but the two concepts differ in the broadness they describe. Awareness encapsulates symbolic representation of internal or external stimuli and the significance these symbols have for the organism. Against the position of most personality theorists like Freud, Jung et cetera that true human development occurs more in an environment that encourages self-expression more than suppression; (The Austrian

psychologist Sigmund Freud and his Swiss counterpart Carl Jung generally believed that self-expression allows people to distinguish themselves from others, to reflect their own beliefs and needs, and validates their own self concepts.) in auto formation than in external formation, the seminary environment lacks flexibility, freedom, inclusiveness and self-expression. The military and mechanical nature of obedience to rules and regulation, akin to the kind of intensely oppressive training that Kierkegaard received from his father, robs off on the seminarian as an existential attitude of unquestioned or acquiesced obedience, more disposition to external guide than personal initiative and a general loss of self in the Kierkegaardian sense. The impact of such experience and how it is integrated into the seminarian's self-concept is usually enormous with infinite possibilities, most of which is that some seminarians lose self-capacity, acts in ways that are not self assuring, even though it is the person's own understanding and constructive interpretation of the understanding that decides the self.

This is not however to undermine, the existential fact that the construct of the self is always changing. From moment to moment, the self may be experienced and represented in various ways. Rogers notes that a client may leave a counselling room feeling confident and armed with skills, only to return to the next session unable to use those same skills. This changeability of the organism indicates that although the existing individual has a built in tendency to realize growth and development, this actualization is not a given, rather, it is something that must be achieved. That is why while claiming to civilize and polish the person under formation, the seminary regimented system, like Michael Pederson (Kierkegaard's father) to his children, gradually produces a human being without passion, guts, audacity, bravado, and the capacity to dare. Again, the intensive academic activity in a secluded single gender environment generally produces a one sided human being with sometimes highly charged intellect but with little or no emotional life. The externally regulated performance of spiritual activities tends to produce an individual with a fearful religion which Kierkegaard detested, a spiritually suffocating person, ready to assert his spiritual freedom with the slightest opportunity. Hence depending on how long the seminarian stayed in the system, his kind of personality disposition and how assimilating he was to the formation rudiments, the system, like Kierkegaard under his father, gives him a rigid, stern and highly controlled personality marked by excessive self-order or composure, protocol and due process, or what Nietzsche would term a slave morality – morality guided from outside.

Gradual Adjustment and Self-Recreation on the Prescriptions of Kierkegaard

In my struggle for self-recreation, Kierkegaard notion of the self as in *Either/Or,* opened my eyes to the depressive, reclusive, paranoid personality I left the seminary with; how it robbed me of the courage to live and beclouded my thoughts with negativity. I realized I had lost the capacity to take pleasure, to form relationships, to meet my obligations as a family member, friend and citizen. That kind of life, without passion, for Kierkegaard amounts to not living at all. I experienced such existential crises akin to what Kierkegaard stated in his journal in 1838, that 'at times, there was such noise in my head that it was as though my cranium were being lifted up. It is exactly like when the hobgoblins lift a mountain up a little and hold a ball and make merry inside', a depressive experience as Kierkegaard believed nearly developed into despair – into spiritual malady (Kierkegaard 24)

To deal with my emotional predicament, immediately I left the seminary, I went through 'The Stages' of existence (the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious) not in a rigid manner but in a gradual scaffolding of possible existential journey of reinvention of my passion for life. Out of the seminary, like Kierkegaard, who away from his father 'tried to squeeze out of life all the pleasure he could and worked hard at developing the reputation of being a happy-go-lucky man-about-town, the immediate temptation after leaving the seminary was an impulsive search for fun, to rush into aesthetic living. It appeared, particularly, that the most urgent thing to do, in a kind of quick psychological compensation, was to get a girlfriend which I felt the chastity cum celibacy

obligations, while in the seminary, had denied me. But Kierkegaard's lessons on the helplessness of the aesthetic, helped me manage the accompanying despair behind my care free mask. Similarly, under the inspiration of Kierkegaard's ethical stage of existence; of the need to commit to a moral way of life, I refused to discard those very important formations I received in the seminary particularly self-regulation and discipline, having realized that self-regulation is important even in my new found 'freedom' status, if I must make anything out of life.

Even though the torture of the ethical struggles without God soon surfaced and the realization of the Kierkegaardian religious life for a fulfilled life became imperative, yet Kierkegaard helped me to discern true religiosity. I was able to move away from the seminary monastic social withdrawal consciousness that tends to suggest that 'the right way to live is found away from real involvement with life. From Kierkegaard/Climacus story of the Deer Park – that large wooded and carnival/amusement park area of Copenhagen - the place that represents for Kierkegaard/Climacus Copenhagen's public and social commons, I got the inspiration that disconnectedness from the world, a mindset the seminary foisted on me, is not the way to God; to being good. Kierkegaard's *Postscript* explicitly argues against any spirituality that refuses to live in the world. Barrie Rose Bliss in "The Absolute Conception of God and the Humility of Creaturehood," inspired by Kierkegaard, observed that "the entry price into the religious life is not the sacrifice of humanity. Rather this life demands that one live his finite existence before the absolute conception of God"(Bliss 117). Hence, out of the seminary, instead of spending time hanging around parish houses and priests eating free lunch, I started spending more time in social gatherings following my Kierkegaard inspired consciousness that authentic existence is in 'involvement not in withdrawal. Like Kierkegaard when he left the family house to the university, I discovered the world anew with awe and wonder. I consciously, in a kind of Kierkegaardian aesthetic drive started working on my psychology to unwind from the 'damage' of the seminary monastic formation with conscious striving towards a more public and communal life. M. Jamie Ferreira, in his work, *Kierkegaard*, holds that "what is interesting in the extent to which the aesthetic and the ethical might be realized, and the extent to which, as the judge has it, is responsibility for self and acknowledgement of the historical and cultural forms of life one inherits, edits or disowns or reproduces these in practice. This is the birth of subjectivity in Kierkegaard's philosophy" (Ferreira 76).

Kierkegaard employs the concept of subjectivity to invoke a first-personal point of view especially with regard to ethical matters bearing singularly on the individual. The contrast (objectivity) is third personal points of view that bear on everyone and no one in particular. Subjectivity refers to an actor's (or sufferer's) standpoint rather than a detached observer's perspective. Sometimes it evokes the position of a decision; at other times it evokes the patient position of receptivity to passions or appeals, the needs or requirement of others or of one's position before God (the latter functioning like the Kantian regulative principle.) In the words of Ferreira, "subjective attention means cultivating intimate self-exploration, attending to the dark centre of one's motives, and to the shifting and obscure edges of moral identity in climates of reflection that are adverse or hostile to such attentions. Subjectivity is also vigilant attention to one's self as actor and receptor, resisting the temptation to leap out into more tractable arenas of public appraisal, deliberation and moralizing, or of public and academic theory construction and validation, where the anomalies of personal aspirations and shame are examined in the objective point of view. The greatest moral sensitivity to my own inner life or struggle for subjectivity and its public expressions, was that as I tried to become subjective, it increased my distress of moral seeking and suffering. With Kierkegaard, I had no problem with increasing my subjectivity, but I soon got to the wide cultural arena where subjectivity marks shortfall from an ideal of objectivity essential to internal harmony.

Michael Strawser's "Kierkegaard's Erotic Reduction and the Problem of Founding the Self, questions the attempt to show that the core self is tacit and non-thematic structural feature of

conscious experience (ie the first personal givenness of experiential phenomena in pre-reflective consciousness) and with these attempts, he questions Stokes claim that Kierkegaard is connected with the phenomenological tradition through his affirming a similar view years before Husserl. Strawser suggests, instead, that "it is through the first-person access" to pre-reflective conscious experience that the latter "takes on the quality of mineness." As a consequence "the argument that the 'sense of self' given in pre-reflective consciousness is the purely subjective first person givenness of what it is like to be me is at best a normatively constituted product of reflection (Welz 88). While this criticism is incisive, Strawer's attempt to find an erotic reduction in Kierkegaard's edifying discourses "Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sins (1843) and in Works of Love (1847) which leads not only beyond sin, but beyond self as well is not convincing – for how could one love another without being oneself and surrendering oneself.

Furthermore, the religious faith challenge of most ex seminarians is that having come too close to the church and her priests, and ' having seen it all' so to say, and then having been forced to leave, many tend to grow cold in their faith and general relations to the church. A few out of the bitter frustration of expulsion from seminary, of course under the heavy dose of atheistic tendencies in some philosophies they studied, tend to become outright enemies of the church. But Kierkegaard lesson of the religious existence saved me from the temptation to abandon my Christian faith and most importantly in my *Scala Paradisi*, (journey to paradise), or search for spiritual anchor as Kierkegaard insisted, my spiritual journey transcended "public cult" to personal relationship with God. For Kierkegaard Christian faith is not a matter of regurgitating church dogma, rather a matter of individual subjective passion, which cannot be mediated by the clergy or by human artefacts.

The next very silent but very disturbing experience was the problem of existential identity. Out of the seminary, the realization that I was then in the world, and fully for that matter, yet bearing every inch the mark of a seminarian ushered in me a dialectical pressure of identity, a feeling of double mindedness and multiplicity. But against the background of the edges of Kierkegaard's polyvocal personae in his different literal pseudonymous characters, the feeling of inauthenticity waned as I tried on and took off many of Kierkegaard pseudonymous personae in my search for personhood as each occasion requires. (Ogbonna 7) wrote that "to know the self (oneself) is to be stunned by the depth and sublimity of one's own nature. Self-knowledge is like authenticity that one cannot be taught or given from without. It can only be awakened from within. Unless something begins to stir and come to life in each of us, no genuine and authentic understanding of the self will be possible. Authenticity and self-knowledge lie at the end, it is mystery revealed in all its complexity and depth.

Conclusion

The individual's self-realization is central in Kierkegaard's thought. Kierkegaard maintains that the individual is solely responsible for his self-realization going through the stages. My sojourn and later departure from the seminary was a great predicament occasioned by the fact that I was formed for a special kind of life – life as a priest which prevails on you to live differently or to pretend to do so not out of choice but in obedience to the regulations of the priesthood. Discounting, or disguising the inward or subjectivity which resulted in loss of the self was the greatest part of my psychological undoing in the seminary. But with the knowledge of the central point of Kierkegaard's thought, namely the nature of the single individual and what it means to be a human being, I was able to decolonize the hyper externality entrenched in me by the seminary. I have gained so much from my association so far with Kierkegaard that, now, looking at the courage I have now to be myself, despite the noise out there, I can now declare with Kierkegaard as in the entry at the outset of his intellectual autobiography *On My Work as an Author*.

> I certainly do have faith in the rightness of my thought despite the whole world, but next to that the last thing, I would surrender is my faith in individual human beings. And this is my faith , that however much confusion and evil and contemptible there can be in human beings as soon as they become the

irresponsible and unrepentant 'public,' 'crowd etc. – there is just as much truth and goodness and lovableness in them when one can get them as single individuals (Kierkegaard 11).

Like Kierkegaard wrote in journal 'what I really need is to be clear about what I am to do, not what I must know... the thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to find the idea for which I am willing to live and die." Finding this truth which is an important consciousness of being alone in the world was what Kierkegaard thought could unite our existence, overcome melancholia and help an individual to become more fulfilled. Although my struggle to find my own truth is on yet on-going but the courage is high. I agree with Kierkegaard that frequently human existence is an unfinished process, in which "the individual" must take responsibility for achieving an identity as a self through free choices. Such a choice is described as a leap, to highlight Kierkegaard's view that intellectual reflection alone can never motivate action. A decision to end the process of reflection is necessary and such a decision is generated by passions of inwardness of subjectivity passing through the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious stages of existence in the journey to selfhood, which for Kierkegaard is the goal of existence.

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CONTEMPORARINESS OF ALDO LEOPOLD'S LAND ETHICS

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Abstract
Aldo Leopold's land ethics reasonably indicates that the land of the earthly environment belongs to human and non-human beings, and as such, the human persons have the ethical duties with all sense of moral consciousness towards protecting, promoting and respecting the values of the land for the achievement of common good and benefits. Outside this moral consciousness, the philosophy of Aldo Leopold's land ethics call to question the roles of the human persons in the pollution and degradation of the environment, where the land practically houses all other elements of the environment. Such ethics indicates that the care of the land for human and non-human animals or beings determines what happens to other elements of the environment. For Aldo Leopold; what we need among other things is an ethics of land, owing to the fact that the air, water and land belong to all of us. Humankind needs, at least, a land ethics, an acceptance of our needs and responsibilities in promoting our common existence and living. The land makes our existence possible. Adopting phenomenological mode of analysis therefore, the essay concluded that human actions and values choices are to be directed always towards the promotion, protection and respect of the environment, and demanding that the human person should ethically long to explore rather than to exploit the land.

Keywords: Environment, Human Person, Land Ethics, Human Community, Animals, Moral Consciousness

Introduction

Every rational and discerning person, ought to be humble, simple and docile in all activities. This is because all the things which are the sources of his or her prosperity, wealth, might, exaltation, advancement and power are, as ordained by God. The very earth which he lives and thrives was created not by him but by God and not his power, as such, humans should always accept their human nature and be humble. There can be no doubt that whoever practices this truth is cleaned and sanctified from all pride, arrogance and vain glory. There is a fundamental difficulty in addressing ecological crises today, that is, the lack of consensus within the scientific community as to the extent and gravity of its various expressions. There are also strong political and economic interests involved. This is reflected, for example, in the difficulty that governments have in addressing together, such questions as the greenhouse effect, the depletion of the ozone layer, loss of biodiversity, the depletion of non-renewable resources or toxic waste and nuclear safety. The basic difficulty is found in the lack of a morally coherent worldview.

Philosophy, contrary to nebulous assertions which claims that "it has little or nothing to do with solving human existential predicaments" (Anscombe 34), is not a totally abstract discipline. In fact, philosophers like other citizens of the world, are concerned about the plight and survival for the global citizens, and also show concern for the future and fate of the natural environment (Mines 299). But we remember that, there are different environmental problems in the world that affect the land, especially in Nigeria. These are deforestation, oil spillage, flood and erosion, desertification, etc.

despite the expressions and concerns for the environment, these environmental problems continue to abound and, as stated above, worsen. Species continue to die out on a daily basis; air quality continues to worsen in cities; the earth's ozone layer is thinning; heaps of trash is mounting, and many scientists argue that emissions of carbon dioxide and methane gases are turning the earth's atmosphere to a greenhouse. Though these problems receive considerable media attention, it is still worthwhile to consider them in the Nigeria context, and attempt to suggest a relevant solution, as proposed by Aldo Leopold in his 'land ethic'.

Hence in this work, we shall expose the theory of the Land Ethic in Aldo Leopold's environmental philosophy. The environmental problems and difficulties are on the increase because there is little or no regard for the environment. To put an end to this, we need among other things, an ethics of the environment. And also, this work set to recommend the land ethic proposed by Aldo Leopold as a solution to the environmental problems being experienced in our contemporary environment for the sustainability of the commonness of existence and living.

Brief Biography of Aldo Leopold

Aldo Leopold was born in Burlington, Iowa, U.S in 1887. He received a Master of Forestry from Yale University in 1909. After earning his degree, he went on to serve for nineteen years in the U.S Forest Service. In 1928, he quit the Forest to do independent contract work which primarily consisted of doing wildlife game surveys throughout the country. He became a professor in 1933. Leopold taught at the University of Wisconsin until his death in 1948. He is best known as the author of "A Sand County Almanac", A Volume of Nature Sketches" and philosophical essays recognized as one of the enduring expressions of an ecological attitude toward people and the land. The notion of land ethic was rooted in Leopold's perception of the environment, and that perception was deepened and clarified throughout life.

Social Background: Leopold lived in the frenetic era of economic development in the United States. People conquered nature and used natural resources, and at the same time brought the ecological crisis to the environment. In the 1960s and 70s, people began to become concerned about the future of the ecological environment. The U.S. Government has also begun to pay attention to it and take measures to strengthen the management of natural resources. That's the context of the growth of Leopold's Land Ethics. His ideas in the book *Sand County Almanac* were gradually accepted by people. People started to focus on the social living environment, not just immersed in the great wealth which brought by the rapid development of science and technology (Yonggang 25).

Theoretical Background: The creation of Leopold's Land Ethics is based on certain philosophical theory, which mainly includes the following three aspects: First, the value theory of philosophy; Second, the criticism of anthropocentricism; Third, the ecological idea of Christianity. Firstly, Leopold's thinking on the value theory of philosophy is mainly reflected in two aspects. One is thinking as a mountain-eco-holism which takes animals, plants and rocks together. The other is recognition of the wilderness value of philosopher Muir's thought. Secondly, Leopold's land ethics is based on the criticism of anthropocentrism, which advocates that human beings are the core of all social relations. His land ethics regard man and nature as a unitary whole and ask people to expand the scope of the moral community. Thirdly, is based on the ecological idea of Christianity. Christianity has played an important role in the formation of people's ecological values. Christianity advocated the re-establishment of ecological concepts between mankind and nature. Therefore, the ecological idea of Christianity is also one of the important theoretical bases of the land ethics. The status of Christianity in environmental protection is becoming increasingly obvious (Zhao 22-23).

Clarification of Terms

What is Land? Land is the earth's solid surface that is permanently submerged in water. Throughout history, the vast majority of human activities have been taken place on land, and at such, it supports agriculture, habitat and various natural resources (Allaby, et al, 239). The land does not only

comprise human beings carrying out their day to day activities on it, it also comprises other natural resources which aids man to live well on it, and when these are tempered with, becomes harmful to the land, as well as man and other living creatures existing on it.

What is Land Ethics? All members of a community are expected to treat one another with respect for the mutual benefit of all. A land ethic broadens the definition of community to include all parts of the Earth, not just humans: soils, waters, plants, and animals, or what Leopold referred to as "the land." People and land are inextricably linked in Leopold's vision of a land ethic: care for people cannot be separated from care for the land. A land ethic is a moral code that emerges from these interconnected caring relationships. In *A Sand County Almanac*, Leopold did not define the land ethic with a laundry list of rights and wrongs. Instead, he presented it as a set of values that naturally grew out of his lifetime of experiences in the outdoors. For Leopold, "We can only be ethical in relation to something we can see, understand, feel, love, or otherwise have faith in" (217). He believed that direct contact with the natural world was crucial in shaping our ability to extend our ethics beyond our own self-interest. He hoped his essays would inspire others to embark or continue on a similar lifelong journey of outdoor exploration, developing an ethic of care that would grow out of their own close personal connection to nature. Hence the land needs care human beings should see themselves as part of the land. This brings about the 'ethics of care'. With this ethics, many environmental anthropologists have provided one of their first comprehensive theories of care and argued that caring is the foundation of morality. They see relationships between the environment and the human person as ontologically fundamental to the wholeness of humanity, with identity defined by the set of relationships people have with other people, as well as people's relationship with their environment (land inclusive). For them, a caring relation (a relationship in which people act in a caring manner) is ethically basic to humans and their environment in suggesting that caring is a universal human attribute.

Aldo Leopold's Concept of Land Ethic
Meaning of Land: Leopold's teaching is based on his belief that the land is one organism. Many of his famous aphorisms and images reflect this conviction. He opens the 'land Ethic' by retelling the story of Odysseus, who, upon returning from the Trojan War, hanged a dozen of his slave girls for misbehavior in his absence. This was possible then, he said, because slaves were understood as property. Leopold writes that "during the three thousand years which have since elapsed, ethical criteria have been extended to many fields of conduct with corresponding shrinkages in those judged by expediency only" (216). In other words, many years after Odysseus, moral standing has been extended to all human beings, including slaves. He therefore, calls for a further extension to include land, which at the mid-century was understood as mere property: "we have privileges in respect to land but no obligations to it" (DesJardins 175). Hence, the ecological understanding of land therefore rebuts the Lockean view of land as property. Land should not be treated as a mere object, or as dead matter, that can be used, and shaped in any way that humans desire. For DesJardins, "land should be viewed as a living organism that can be healthy or unhealthy, injured or killed" (DesJardins 175). It is on this valuation that Leopold writes that, "land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals" (37). For him, soils, waters, plants and animals are collectively known as land which accommodates and sustains other environmental elements of collective and common living.

The Ethical Sequence: Leopold says the extension of ethics is actually a process in ecological evolution. He distinguishes between 'an ethic ecologically' as a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence, and 'an ethic philosophically' as a differentiation of socially from anti-social conduct, claiming they are two definitions of one thing which has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individual or groups, to evolve modes of cooperation known as symbioses. For him,

ethics developed in sequence: "The first ethic dealt with the relation between individuals, the Mosaic Decalogue is an example. Later accretions dealt with the relation between the individual and society" (200). This means that there is yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the annals and plants which grow upon it. Alluding to the episode of Odysseus' slave girls, Leopold opines that land is still property and that "land relation is still strictly economic entailing privilege but not obligations" (Leopold 202). Hence, he identified the third step in the seep, which is extension of ethics to land (the third element in human environment), as an evolutionary possibility and ecological necessity.

The Community Concept: "The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land (Leopold 204). Aldo pointed out that all ethics so far evolved rest on a single promise that the individual is a member of community for interdependent parts and his instincts prompt him to compete for his place in that community and also to cooperate. He opines that this may seem simplistic, but he readily points out the difficulties, which are evident in the manner humans treat the soil, the plants that grow on them, the waters and the animals. "A land ethic of course cannot prevent the alteration, management and use of these resources, but it does affirm their right to existence, and at least in spots, their continued existence in a natural state" (Leopold 206). Leopold teaches that humans are but members of the 'biotic community' and as such, should see themselves as 'biotic citizens', rather than conquerors. "The land ethic changes the role of *homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his or her fellow members, and also respect for the community as such" (Leopold 204). Thus, it is the land community that is to be granted moral standing, and humans become accountable for the health of the land, and its conservation.

According to Leopold, that the human person is, in fact, only a member of a biotic team is shown by an ecological interpretation of history. He concretizes this in many historical events, hitherto, explained solely in terms of human enterprise, as being actually biotic interactions between people and land, and that the characteristics of the land determined the facts, as potently as the characteristics of the men who lived on it. He gives the example of the settlement of the Mississippi valley which decided the some of the colonial migration into Kentucky, years following the American Relation. The native Indians, the French and English Traders, and the American settlers contended for its control as a result of its natural endowments. If not for this, Leopold says, there might never have been any "Louisiana Purchase" or any Civil war. This will be better understood, once the concept of land as a community really penetrates our intellectual life, Leopold adds.

The Ecological Conscience: Conservation is a state of harmony between man and land, and Leopold observes that despite nearly a century of propaganda, conservation still proceeds at a snail's pace (Leopold 207). He noted that to create a paradigm shift in how humans relate to the natural world has several obstacles. Leopold speaks of three obstacles he considers especially pressing (Leopold 224):

1. The trend of the educational and economic system which is headed away from intense consciousness of land.
2. The adverse attitude of the farmer towards land.
3. The fallacy that economics determines all land-use (Leopold's emphasis).

On this last obstacle, Leopold suggests that, although economies plays a role, the bulk of all land relations is determined by land-users tastes and predilections (Leopold 225). Leopold gives several insights as to how to go about overcoming these obstacles. For Leopold, the key to advancing a land ethic is to quit thinking about decent land-use solely as an economic problem, and instead to examine each question in terms of what is ethically and aesthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient(Leopold 224). Such an ecological conscience rooted in love, respect and

admiration for the land, he affirms, requires the need for an internal change reaching our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, affections and convictions.

The role of education, religion, and philosophy in effecting such change, Leopold says, is vital. He attributes the failures of conservation to the ultimate failure of these three areas to instill in people, an ecological conscience. For him, religion and philosophy have simply never heard of conservation. Education on conservation, on the other hand, is not only too scarce, but it is also teaching the wrong thing; "it is not only the volume that needs stepping up, there is something lacking in the content as well (Leopold 224). Hence, Leopold further suggests that the reason conservation is not much successful is because land use norms are governed wholly by economic self-interest. Accordingly, such governance proves inadequate for worthwhile conservation for the following three reasons:

1. It tends to ignore and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value but which are for its essential healthy functioning.
2. It assumes falsely... that the economic parts of the biotic clock (nature) will function without the uneconomic parts.
3. It tends to relegate to government many functions the government is structurally incapable of adequately performing (Leopold 224).

Leopold argues that in the light of these maladies, the only visible remedy for conservation efforts is the evolution of a land ethic, that is, an ethical obligation on the part of the private owner.

Biotic/Land Pyramid: Whereas Leopold acknowledges the well-intended attempts of conservation education in Universities and Institutions, he seriously critiques the anthropocentric content of such education expressed in the central teaching 'balance of nature, and its failure to teach ethical obligations. Alternatively, to advance a land ethic, Leopold suggests that the curriculum be rooted in the concept of a biotic pyramid. He used the image of the biotic/land pyramid to aid the understanding of the biotic or land community. For DesJardins, "the land pyramid is a highly organized structure of biotic and abiotic elements through which solar energy flows" (176). This structure can be represented as a pyramid, with soil on the button, followed in turn by a plant, an insect layer, a bird, and rodent layer, and so on up though the various animals groups to the apex layer, which consists of the larger carnivores. Thus, species are arranged in layers or trophic levels according to the food they eat for "each successive layer depends on those below it for food and often for other services and each in turn famishes food and services to those elements or conditions above (Leopold 215). He says this is expressed in the pyramidal form of the system, which reflects a numerical progression from apex to base. He refers to the lines of dependency for food and other services as the food chain. Leopold writes:

> Each species, including ourselves, is a link in many chains. The deer eats a hundred plants other than oak, and the cow a hundred plants other than corn. Both, then, are links in a hundred chains. The pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as to seem disorderly, yet the stability of the system proves it to be a highly organized structure. Its functioning depends on the cooperation and competition of its diverse parts (215).

Leopold directs focus on power, light, energy and its transmutations in the pyramid as he says:
> Food chains are the living channels which conduct energy upwards; death and decay return it to the soil. The circuit is not closed; some energy is dissipated in decay, some is added in absorption from the air, some is stored in soils. Pits and long lived forests, but it is a stand circuit, like slowly augmented revolving fund of life (215).

Although, approving of stability, Leopold is not opposed to change for he says, "when a change occurs in one part of the circuit, many other parts must adjust themselves to it" (216). The Land Pyramid is a network of shifting procedures, and these in turn, via the worrying of evolution, after the character of the pyramid as a whole. Evolution is a long series of self-induced changes, the net result of which has been to elaborate the flow mechanism and to lengthen the circuit (216-217). Leopold, however, argues that not all change is good, for human development of tools and later agriculture have upset the system as a whole, introducing changes of unprecedented violence, rapidity and scope. Thus, in redeploying members of the animal kingdom, in over use of soils, in redirecting, canalizing and polluting rivers, we bring about alterations within energy chains that have incalculable consequences elsewhere. He summarizes his argument into a thumb nail sketch:

I. The land not merely soil.
II. That the native plants and animals kept the energy circuit open; others may or may not.
III. That man-made changes are of a different order than evolutionary changes, and have effects more comprehensive than is intended or foreseen (218).

Hence, the sustainability of land and environment is possible and guaranteed if only humans can consider these three factors when cultivating and developing lands. A land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience, and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for the health of the land. The conservation education is our effort to understand and preserve this capacity of common living (Leopold 13). Leopold opines that it is inconceivable that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value (value in the philosophical sense). Furthermore, Leopold writes that the evolution of a land ethic is an intellectual, as well as emotional process. "I think it is a truism that as the ethical frontier advances from the individual to the community, its intellectual content increases" (13). Accordingly, the moral extensionism that is at work in Leopold's writing, which grants moral standing to communities, symbolically represented as the land, is concisely summarized in his most celebrated and controversial statement:

> A thing is right when it tends to preserve the stability, integrity and beauty of the biotic community, and wrong if it tends otherwise (224).

Critiques of Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic

The historical significance of Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic does not secure it as the only, or best, or even most appropriate statement of an environmental ethic, Within the Western philosophical tradition alone, there are a variety of well-known positions which challenge Leopold's land Ethic, Tom Regan's Nights-Based Animal Liberationism, as well as Paul Taylor's Kantian-Based Deontological 'Respect for Nature' Ethic, object (albeit on different grounds) to the failure of a Leopoldian Land Ethic to take seriously the sentiency, moral rights, or moral considerability of individual animals. Therefore, we shall separate challenges to Leopold's land ethic into two, the move from the facts of ecology to the values of ethics, and the ethical implication of Aldo Leopold's holism.

Facts of Ecology and Values of Ethics: A central challenge to any attempt to ground ethical values in natural facts is the claim that a logical gap exists between statements of facts and judgments of values, between the 'is' and the 'ought', (i.e. what we are doing and what we ought to be doing). "Identified in recent decades as the naturalistic fallacy, the conclusion that something is good or right based solely on a description of what is natural, is rejected by many philosophers as fallacious (DesJardins 181). Leopold's famous dictum- 'a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community; and wrong when it tends otherwise'- would seem to be

an example of exactly this type of reasoning. The point is not that we cannot support ethical judgments by appeal to naturalistic facts. Rather, it is that, in defending something as right or wrong, we need to do more than simply say that it is normal or natural. There are indications in the 'Land Ethic' for how Leopold might respond to these challenges. Leopold suggests that the ethical revolution implicit in his extension of ethics to the land can come about only alongside a radical change in human psychology. "This change in psychology, brought about through moral and ecological education might bridge the gap between 'is' and 'ought' (DesJardins 183).

Holistic Ethics: The second group of challenges centers on its holism. Can a meaningful account of ecological wholes be defended, and are its ethical implications acceptable? "The most serious ethical criticism of the land Ethics holism is that it condones sacrificing the good of individuals to the good of the whole (DesJardins 184). Various critics have offered versions of this challenge: Marti Kheel has called ethical holism totalitarian, and Eric Katz has claimed that it subverts respects for individuals (DesJardins 183). Tom Regan labels Leopold's approach 'environmental fascism' in the sense that it grants extreme rights to the environment (DesJardins 186). These are serious charges, and various responses have been given in defense by defenders of the Land Ethic, like Don Marieetta, Jon Moline, and most especially the American philosopher, J. Baird Callicott has written extensively in his defense. Callicott's work offers valuable insights into Leopold's thinking and provides a creative interpretation of the land Ethic, and it demonstrates that his approach remains a rich resource for continued work in environmental ethics. Hence, Leopold's vision is best captured by studying his work as a whole, and reading beyond the theoretical passages to the tableaux of nature of the seasons which Leopold conjures up.

Leopold's Land Ethic on the Commonness of Human Existence and Living
We have examined the thoughts of Aldo Leopold's land Ethic, hence we shall relate it to the Nigeria situation on the issues concerning the land and the environment, and then, according to George Ehusani:

> In an environment such as ours, there is very little room for the dreamer. In a land of greed and graft, of lies and subterfuge... In a country where lawlessness is the norm and corruption has acquired the status of a virtue... amidst a harvest of debauchery, and widespread apathy and despondency... And in a generation that is almost fully surrendered to the mundane, where progress is defined only along the parameters of the moment (26).

With this situation offered by Ehusani in view, one wonders whether a healthy physical environment is obtainable in such a country. The question today is not 'how we shall live', but indeed if we are going to live for very much longer. These gloomy tidings come to us from ecologists, men and women whose work most of us had not heard of a decade ago. Exhaustion of mineral resources, famine, catastrophic spread of poisons - these are only a few of the disasters they say are looming" (Harney and Disch 1) Moreso, the community system depends first upon the sum, the net production of photosynthesis after respiration, upon the water and upon the cycling and recycling of the materials in the system by the decomposers. The process requires that the substance or wastes, the output of one creature, are the imports or inputs to the others. The oxygen water of the plant were input to the man, the carbon dioxide of the man, input to the plant; the substance of the plant input to the man, the wastes of the man and plant input to the decomposers, the wastes of these, the input to the plant and the water went round and round (Harney and Disch 7). This is how the world works. United we are as humans, plant parasites, happily consuming the oxygen wastes of plant metabolism, rescued from encompass ordure by both the decomposer and the plant, cutting and burning and thus, sustaining life from the energy of the sun, transmuted by photosynthesis.

Moreso, with such commonness of human existence in relations to the values of the environment, John Kenney opines that "a nation is no stronger than the numerous little communities of which it is composed…, performance of our duties in community teaches us prudence and efficiency and charity." (see, DesJardins 178). As such, it is a pointer to the need for an ethic. At this point, we shall mention several elements of the Land Ethic that make it an active philosophical option. First, the Land Ethic offers the contemporary environmental praxis, a fairly comprehensive perspective. At first sight it appears to offer a decision process or policy guide for most, if not all, environmental and ecological issues. It can offer contemporary's policy makers, normative guidance for issues as diverse as wilderness preservation, pollution, conservation, resource depletion and so on. Second, it also can avoid many of the counter intuitive conclusions that burden the individualistic bio-centric approach. The continued healthy functioning of the system is the primary concern. Finally, the Land Ethic is thoroughly non-anthropocentric and as such, contemporary humans have no privileged status away from their activities on the land, and such, they are scientifically and technologically enslaved by what they do on the environment. We are reduced from conquerors to mere members. Not only does this shift accord natural objects and systems moral standing, it also is more consistent with the teachings of ecology. For many environmentalists, this is the single most important pro-requisite for a sound environmental perspective.

Evaluative Conclusion

Considering Leopold's view '*Health of the Environment*' it points greatly to the fact that our environment should be nurtured and managed for both human and the environment sake. It has real biological meaning because the surface of the earth is truly a living organism. With the countless and immensely varied forms of life that the earth harbors, our planet would be just another fragment of the universe with a surface as drab as that of the moon, and an atmosphere inhospitable for the human person (Dubois 27). Our reluctance to practice moderation, prudence, and restraint to compensate for environmental ignorance has led many commentators to speculate that we will never reform until our arrogance is tamed by one or more localized disasters. But, do we have to wait for disasters? After all, there is yet no shred of evidence to suggest that the atmosphere contains an early-warning system that will selectively punish a few offenders, so that the survivors may repent and enter a new covenant with the biosphere. Rather, what we need do to save ourselves from oblivion is neither more esoteric technology a foolhardy reliance on the lessons to be learned from disaster. We must develop entirely new attitudes and practices that will have as their objectives, the integrity of the here (environment), the preservation of a habitable world (Harney and Disch xxi). Hence, in the outstanding contributions of Aldo Leopold, the dangers of environmental degradation have been identified and defined for laymen and scientists alike. In his *Land Ethics*, Aldo Leopold observed that the extension of ethics to our relationship with the land and its living community is an evolutionary possibility and ecological necessity. We conclude with the words of Joseph Bast, *et al* which echoes what a society should be like, that:

> Civilized nature should be regarded not as an object to preserve unchanged, not as one to dominate and exploit, but rather as a kind of garden to develop according to its own potentialities and in which human beings develop according to their own genius. Ideally, man and nature should be joined in a non-repressive and creative functioning order (211).

In light of Economic globalization over the pass fifty years, and its inclination to treat all life forms and natural resources as objects, one may ask if Leopold's possibility has become so remote, that only the collapse of the economy will allow humans to live in harmony with the earth? After World War II, many watched with confusion and dismay as environmental desecration became increasingly widespread, severe and inescapable. But, although, many objected to the war on aesthetic grounds (in the sense that it destroys the beauty of the environment), there were few who

could see that the technological bludgeoning might portend disaster. Hence, can an individual afford not to participate, to do what he can to make certain that decisions reflect his needs? To be effective one needs better insight into the complexity of environmental issues (CIMS 1). Therefore, as we move consciously through life, confronting the ethical dilemmas presented by daily choices in our contemporary society, the words of Leopold cries out, like the species subject to great extinction now underway. Deep down, we suspect that globalization has proceeded to the point of no return. Yet, our instinct for survival and Leopold's words of hope provide the impetus to find the way. For now, the *Land Ethic* began with is now global disciplinary exploration in the field of environmental ethics - a remarkable legacy.

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FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: A TOOL FOR ADDRESSING DISPARITIES IN GENDER RELATIONS

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Abstract
This work examines the role of feminist jurisprudence as a tool towards achieving equitable gender relations. It is important to note that discrimination, stereotypes, differences in social roles and relations and sex binary-conscious socialization, practically define and construct gender. Men and women are born equally into the biological world, but in the name of the social construct "gender", society inequitably reconstructs them into fictitious pictures by overstating, exploiting and exaggerating the biological differences existing between the two sexes. The legal systems of nations have sustainably perpetuated these imbalanced discriminations thereby subjecting women to hegemonic masculinity. Since the 1980s, a good deal of feminist pundits and critical legal scholarship have expressed strong reservations regarding the compromised and hegemonic patriarchal posture of the law and have sued for a review of the legal system so as to reposition the law for the common good of all in society. This attitude of mind has been named feminist jurisprudence. Using the analytic and expository methods, the work exposes and explicates the role of the law towards promoting generational denigration, oppression and dominance of women. The paper asserts the thesis that the law has been an instrumental tool the patriarchal society has used for the subjugation, oppression and exploitation of women. Therefore, there is the imperative need for the reformation of the legal systems of nations for the outlawing of obnoxious and unjust practices and imbalances that impact on the dignity of women. The paper concludes that man's abuse of the law for the purpose of imposing artificial inequalities that prioritizes males over females is repugnant and should be rejected by all a sundry.

Keywords: Artificial Inequalities, Feminism, Feminist Jurisprudence, gender equity, Hegemonic Masculinity,

Introduction
In the past five decades, gender gap, imbalances and oppressive patriarchal assertiveness which has characterized social relations from time immemorial has fiercely been challenged. The demeaned status of the female gender orchestrated by this oppressive patriarchal regime has become a very compelling and critical issue all over the world. Men and women are born equally into the biological world, but in the name of the social construct "gender", society inequitably reconstructs them into fictitious image by overstating, exploiting and exaggerating the biological differences existing between the two sexes. Humans are recreated in gender socialization from the cradle through the systematic and gradual internalization of gender roles and double standard social relations.

Formidable patriarchal structures have been constructed to socialize, entrench and sustain this imbalance social and cultural arrangement that favours and priorities the male gender at the expense of the female gender (an arrangement that exploits and subjugates the latter). One of the formidable social structures employed as a tool to perpetrate gender discrimination is the law or legal system.

In Ancient Greeks, thoughts, views and opinions about women found in different ideas later have an effect in later thoughts. For instance, the idea of private and public life which is arguably distinguishable with the confinement of women to only private sphere of life. Since the 1980s, a good number of scholars and creative legal scholarship have come to be known as feminist jurisprudence whose views are quite diverse. Just as it has been noted that there is no one feminism, so there is no one feminist legal theory. The question then is: what is feminist jurisprudence and what makes it worth attending to? What (if anything) do all these divergent views have in common that binds them together and distinguishes them from all other theories? (What makes them all feminist?) Secondly, what do they tell us about law? (What makes them jurisprudence?) Thirdly, what is important about this form of legal analysis? Supposing that there is a distinctively feminist jurisprudence, why is law in need of it? All these questions shall be pondered on at the course of this treatise.

In the 18th, 19th and 20th century however, the feminist campaign for the elimination of discriminatory laws against women marked the beginning of the contemporary feminist thoughts. The primary reason for the rise of the feminist movement in law was the apparent injustice and inequality between the male and the female genders with regards to the law. Feminism as a movement with a range of ideologies share a common goal of defining, establishing, and achieving equal political, economic, cultural, personal, and social rights for women. This includes but not limited to seeking to establish equal opportunities for women in education and employment. A feminist advocates or supports the rights and equality of women. Feminist movements have continually campaigned for women's rights, including the right to vote, to hold public office, to work, to earn fair wages or equal pay, to own property, to education, to enter contracts, to have equal rights within marriage, and to have maternity leave. Feminists have also worked to promote bodily autonomy and integrity, and to protect women and girls from rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence.

Furthermore, Feminist Jurisprudence also includes the study of different strands of feminist theory and the themes that have emerged and developed within feminist thought, as well as the application of theory to issues that interest members of class (Law 815-001 A and B) Fall 2010). It is the law's neutrality as the very mechanism that perpetuates injustices against woman. Feminists embrace a view that attempts to challenge the existing legal status by focusing on what kind of institutions and laws would be necessary to redress the imbalance against woman in society (Pappas 13). Stevens is of the view that feminist Jurists question the very core of our society. They argue that we must look at the norms embedded in our legal system and rethink the law. What is "equality" or an "injury" in light of broader understandings of those norms?

Feminist Jurisprudence is of the opinion that what is neutral or natural for one person is a distortion for another person. This corroborates a saying: "different strokes for different folks". The pervasive influence of patriarchy on legal structures, demonstrates its effects on the material condition of women and girls, and develops reforms to correct gender injustice, exploitation, or restriction (Francis 2015). Promoting freedom and equality for women reflects a profound shift in basic assumptions about the nature of women and their proper place in the world: a shift from inequality to equality of the sexes, along with re-examination of what equality itself requires. Using the analytic and expository methods, the work exposes and explicates the role and contribution of the law towards the perceived generational denigration, oppression and dominance of women in the society.

The Nature, Meaning and Features of Feminist Jurisprudence

So many authors, scholars and pundits have defined Feminist Jurisprudence differently and similarly. Common to all the definitions is that, feminist jurisprudence is a legal theory that is based on the belief that the law has been fundamental in women's historical subordination. Jurisprudence is derived from the Latin word, "jurisprudential" this means "the study, knowledge or science of law or skill in law". A meaningful study of the subject involves a deep seated conceptualization and analysis of legal concepts and their complex relationship with practical realities and novel legal situation in the ever-changing world (Akomolede 2). It is the continuous appraisal of the effectiveness and usefulness of positive laws to existing social facts and prevailing needs and yearnings of the society where such legal codes hold jurisdiction.

John Austin, cited in Akomolede further established that:

> Jurisprudence is the science concerned with the expositions of the principles, notions and distinctions which are common to systems of law in developed societies. A science of jurisprudence is concerned with positive laws or laws strictly so called without regard to their goodness or badness (2-3).

The above definition agrees with typical legal positivist stance and this kind of attitudes towards law breed unjust laws and oppressive laws especially laws which feminist jurisprudence objects. According to (Uzomah 212) "the overall interest of Gender Studies in the study of feminist concept of law is to determine the crucial role of law for and against the apparent disparities and social injustices existing between people of the different gender groups"(Uzomah 212). This role is very vital due to the unique and important place of the legal system in the life, existence, survival, and flourishing of humans in societies. Also, the choice to reflect on the concept of law is inspired by the avid conviction of the role of law to engendering social control and coercion.

Again, legal naturalists view jurisprudence as a philosophical study of the concept, nature, validity and abidingness of law strictly in line with its correspondence to the principles of justice, fairness, goodness, etc. Philosophical jurisprudence avers that law and morals are intrinsically related, and that the latter is the validating substance of the former. The critical place of law in the society cannot be overemphasised, this is because law is the only institution of the state that itself instituted the state. It is of the essence of the state or society because it is a fundamental and inalienable system, for human survival and it is impossible for society to flourish in the society without the law.

Schumpeter simply defines jurisprudence as, "the sum total of the techniques of legal reasoning and of the general principles to be applied to individual and of the general principles to be applied to individual cases" (Akomolede 3). Simply put, jurisprudence is the scientific study of law: a study that emphasizes the concept, nature and justification of law. The major argument of jurisprudence is the debate on the relationship between morality and law. That is, the attempt to establish whether the validity and binding force of the law lies with the law itself, as "it is", or proceeds from laws' conformity to extra-legal normative expectations like justice, equity, fairness, common good, etc.

Having said that, it is important to note that feminist jurisprudence is a philosophy of law based on the political, economic and equality of the sexes and as field of legal scholarship, it began in 1960. Feminist jurisprudence entails the scientific or systematic study and appraisal of the concept, nature and essence of law from the feminist perspective. It is a critical approach to the study of law aimed towards exposing and explicating the role or contribution of the law towards the perceived generational denigration, oppression and dominance of women. According to feminists legal jurists, "the logic, language nature and structure of law are male created and reinforces male values. They argue that by presenting male characteristics as the 'norm' and female characteristics as 'deviation'. From the norm, the prevailing notion of law reinforces and perpetuates patriarchal power". Therefore, feminist jurisprudence could be described as a critique of gender stereotypes and

hierarchies codified in positive laws in the legal system. Uzomah opines that:

> Feminist jurisprudence generally is a theory sought to dismantle the positive legal barriers that had denied women equal opportunity with men. The theory behind these goals stems from the belief that the rights of individuals as traditionally understood in liberal society should transcend gender differences. Owing to this belief, he posits that, for the feminist, law is seen as an instrument to change the distribution of power, whose regimes not equal treatment but an astrymentical approach that adopts the perspective of the less powerful group with the specific goal of equitable power sharing among diverse groups (220).

From the above opinion, it can be deduced that feminist jurisprudence aims at power devolution or decentralization of power. Hence, it becomes a political activism and engagement aimed at wrestling power from men who have unjustly arrogated the same to themselves. Feminist law also known as feminist jurisprudence is that which is based on the belief that the law has been central in women's historical subservience.

At this point, it is important to highlight some fundamental features of Feminist Jurisprudence, being a call for total reconstructing of the entire legal system so as to make it credible to eradicate all forms of discriminations and disparities against women:

a) Domestic violence

This is one of the social predicaments against women in the supposed patriarchal world is the issue of domestic violence against women. They pointed out that legal theories and positive laws emanating from the male dominated legal system do not take to cognizance the unique experiences of women. For instance, in the Nigerian Legal System there is inter alia, the Violence Against Women (VAW). This is an act of parliament aimed at punishing all gender-based violence against women. This therefore, seeks to place all crimes seen as directed primarily at women into a special category.

b) Stalking and Battered Woman's Syndrome

Stalking simply means a combination of teats, harassment and surveillance against women which has itself been made a crime. According to (Stevens No p.), "we should not avoid to wait until an overt act of violence occurs to take action". This suggests that, the society must not wait until a crime is committed before erecting a legal framework to correct the same. Rather laws seek to be preventive instead of remedial. On the other hand, feminists want the perpetuators of the act of stalking and battering to be liable to punishment by law. Hence, they advocate for appropriate statute to act as both a preemptive, preventive and remedial measures against the battering and stalking of women. In other words, the legal system must seek to create a safe haven for women.

c) Marriage and Oppression

The main thrust of feminist jurisprudence is marriage. Feminists focus on marriage due to its effects on women's life chances. Marriage as seen by the radical feminist is an institution of oppression against women, an institution that subjects women into home labourers. Feminist legal advocates and activists, aimed at ensuring vigorous legislation that would alleviate the pathetic predicament of women in marriage. To grant women as well as their daughter equal rights and privileges with their husbands and brothers.

d) Sexual Harassment and Discrimination

The notion of sexism has been recorded to be prominent amongst the purported maladies feminist jurists protest against. Feminists alleged that men are in the habit of expressing their superiority over women in the act of love making; as such sex reflects men's dominance over women. This happens habitually within the context of marriage and, regrettably also in sexual harassment outside marriage. Many men are of the opinion that they have sexual strength and energy, they see women as sexual toys used to quench male sexual urge. A vivid example can be

seen in Kargbo's *Let me Die Alone,* where most characters like, Gbanya, Lamboi, Musa, etc. who believe that women are just made for sexual gratification. Thus, "of what better use is a woman to man if not for that be" (3).

Different Approaches Of Feminists Theories of Law
Based on the feminists study, the role and function of law is examined in relation to women; they form their own opinions on the nature of law. This is called as the feminist theory of law. The four major schools of thoughts or main approaches in feminism include; liberal, radical, cultural and postmodern feminists. An early central thought and pursuit for feminist thinkers about law was equality. At this Juncture, it is important to explicitly look at the different approaches:

1. Liberal Feminism
Liberal Feminism believes that law, rights, and freedom should apply in the same way for men and women. They argue that women are just as rational as men and women should have the equal opportunity with men to exercise their rights to make rational self-interested choices. Thus, they place emphasizes on the concept of rationality, equality, individuality and the availability of legal rights. There are several features of feminist liberalism. Firstly, they make emphasis on the priority of freedom of an individual from undue political, legal and economic restraint. Secondly, they make emphasis on the freedom of individual to rationally plan their lives. Here, they put forward the view that a person should not be restricted in how they are to pursue their lives. Again, this school of thought prioritizes the element of equality, which means that no individual or group of individual shall have any privilege in any manner which would cause inequalities to any other persons. The last feature is the enforcement of individual right.

Mary Wollstonecraft is one of the feminist liberalists who had sought to eliminate the practices and laws which have discriminate women in the public and social life. They also insisted that all that is needed to change the status of women is to change the existing laws that are unfavorable for women which then will open up more avenues for women to prove themselves as equal to opposite sex. Liberal feminists believe that women have the same mental capacity as their male counterparts and should be given the same opportunities in political, economic and social spheres. Women should have the right to choose, not have their life chosen for them because of their sex. Essentially, women must be like men (Martlett). Hence, being like men, they must be given equal treatment with men. In other words, equals should be treated equally.

2. Radical Feminism
Catherine MacKinnon one of the radical feminists argued that law in general and traditional legal theory is 'male' and that legal reasoning enforces men's domination over women and she wishes to invert this. She identified the central question which was no law should be justified on the basis of gender alone.

Unlike the liberal feminism which revolved around the concept of equality, Radical Feminism sets the idea in more radical way and sets apart in the feminism ideology. The theory of radical feminism adopts the focus to solve the problem of universal domination of men over women and women correlative subordinate to men which clearly shows gender discrimination. The radical feminists do not accept the idea that equality will be achieved for women if the legal inequalities and disabilities are removed from the law (cited in Uzomah 150). Therefore, rather than focusing on legal inequalities, the radical feminists challenge the core structure of society and laws by focusing on its patriarchal ordering and the practice of patriarchal culture.
The classification of gender itself is socially constructed on the fundamental ground that men and women are different. According to Ogunrotimi:
> Radical feminism as explicated by Bryson (1999) and Firestone (1972) sees men as

the oppressors of women and the sole beneficiaries of women's subordination. Patriarchal society has shunted women to the minor position and has continued to utilize all its cultural appurtenances to ensure that they remain in the ancillary status. To the radical feminist, the family is the most oppressive tool of patriarchal domination as it used to perpetually keep women in the home as mothers and home-makers, thus, refusing them access to positions of authority and power. Some feminist hold that, it is through acts of violence (e.g. rape) that men maintain their hold on women. Others see women's biology, and the fact that they give birth as the source of women's oppression by men (229).

Therefore, radical feminism could be plausibly seen as a movement aimed at the total transformation of the structures of the society. The stand of the liberal feminist is faulted by the radical feminists who claim that the scope of liberal feminist theory is limited and does not encapsulate other areas of women's oppression.

3. Cultural Feminism

Luce Irigaray could be numbered among the leading cultural feminists looks at women exclusion from society. She argues that the law and legal profession are male construct which exclude the women's difference. As a result, to seek for equality on the same terms as men in terms of equality in the work force, without recognizing women's differences will be accomplished at women's expenses.

This school of thought focuses on the women's differences from men in terms of psychological, physical and social. In recognition of these differences, cultural feminists demand that law should be adopted to include women on the basis of their differences from men and also their innate right to equality with men. They insist that all that is needed to promote equality is to recognize the differences in women's characteristics from that of men, and change the existing laws to the effect that the differences may be well addressed. For cultural feminists, women's difference from men is not a source of potential weakness but a source of strength. The differences between men and women are something to be celebrated. Cultural feminists also are interested in the way that the law may implicitly reflects a male point of view, for example, in the law of provocation rape or "the reasonable man's test". Cultural feminist opined that western society values asserted male thought and the ideas of independence, hierarchy, competition and domination; at the expense of female values such as interdependence, cooperation, relationships, community, sharing, joy, trust and peace. (Gilligan). This implies that the wars rampaging the world, internal conflicts, dissents, external aggressions abound, because men have not the right quality to rule the world.

4. Postmodern Feminism

Julia Kristeva is a postmodern feminist, she rejected the idea that the biological man and biological woman are identified with the masculine and feminine respectively. She argues and insists that people are different because of their anatomy to force both men and women into a repressive structure.

Postmodern feminists engage with the philosophical rejection of grand theories, such as those with the traditional jurisprudence. They are concerned with multiple identities and subjectivities. Besides that, they are more interested in the socio-legal construction of the legal subjects and the categories of sex and gender, masculinity and femininity. Postmodern are both a reaction against theorizing the post and critique of the former modes of thought. In postmodern, what is scrutinized is deconstructed to the root. Deconstructing the subject entails to recognize the multiplicity of subjectivities, identities, which inhere in the individual and recognizing that each individual are of various prejudices. According to the postmodern feminists, woman is a debatable category complicated by class, ethnicity, sexuality and other facets of identity and thus gender is performative based on the

heterosexuality rather than socially or culturally constructed (Jagger and Rosenberg).

In summary, for liberal feminists, equality amounts to opportunity. Radical feminists such as Littleton and MacKinnon, focus on differences between women and men and support affirmative measures to challenge inequalities. Cultural feminists also emphasize difference, but view it more positively. They use the rhetoric of equality to advocate change that supports the values such as caring and relational connectedness of this difference. Postmodern feminism sees equality as a social construct and, since it is a product of patriarchy, one is in need of feminist reconstruction, but it warns against searching for a new truth to replace an old one. It denies that there is a single theory of equality that will benefit all women.

Conclusion

The various imbalances and inequalities that have lingered for ages created, perpetuated and sustained by patriarchal hegemony through the law precipitated feminist jurisprudence. Feminist jurisprudence advocates for a just, equitable and fair legal system that would promote the rule of law. To attain this, feminist opined that women must be equitably integrated into the legal system. In other words, they must be involved in the making, interpretation, adjudication and enforcement of law. When this is done, feminists believe, there would be an effective legal framework to address the varying degrees of inequality that permeates every level of human experience in the society. Since it emergence as a crusade, It has incredibly and tremendously influenced the enactment of laws that are both gender sensitive and inclusive locally, regionally and internationally. For instance as unequivocally revealed above, laws pertaining to employments, divorce, reproductive rights, rape, domestic violence, and sexual harassment have all profited from the legal excursus and principal acumen of feminist jurisprudence; to even an unacceptable degree that one can plausibly hold that the legal system as it is today fosters reverse discrimination. Although an appreciable progress has been made, yet there is need for more reformations in the jurisprudential systems of nations. In order to foster fair and equitably inclusion legal system that guarantees and promotes equitable gender parity and rule of law.

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FOUNDATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE BUILDING IN AFRICA

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Abstract
History has furnished us with the fact that there certainly was a time when humans lived in a peaceful society, where relative solidarity and orderliness prevailed. Thus, the question as to what went wrong and how such savagery, disputes and conflict evolved comes to mind. Africa's root of armed conflict's history is not entirely different as there exist a radical compatibility between African nations. Such root cause is what this paper is examining. Using the historical method, it analyses the line of history surrounding common conflicts in Africa – including the driving force, African Union interventions and finally uses the evaluative method to situate the causes within the philosophical history with deeper emphasis on Jean Jacques Rousseau's position and African philosophy. This was necessary because aside Rousseau, scholars and philosophers of Africa are much concerned on proffering solutions. Though their voices are often unheard or unheeded in debates over peace building, its definition, strategies and tactics, the researcher intends to reiterate and advance both old and new panaceas. The paper advances the decolonization of the African colonial condition whose roots are a violent conquest and domination as well as the neo-colonial realities of post-colonial Africa. Thus, for peace to be propagated more finely in Africa, there is a need to redirect our attention to a unique and indigenous peace-building policy and strategy that will be uniquely 'African'. Also, for significant progress to be recorded, there should be corresponding effort to mobilize adequate financial and technical resources for the implementation of our defined priorities.
Keywords: Armed conflict, peace building, decolonization, neo-colonialism, interculturality

Introduction

Within the universalizing phenomenon of globalization, Africa has discovered a greater part of its missing link through "interculturality". It is this *interculturality* that has created the similarities that existed in Africa's peace building strategies. That the world has become a global community is no longer an issue. What has become an issue is the paradox in the midst of this 'globality'. This paradox manifests in the inability to actually fathom the reason as to why conflicts, chaos, crisis etc., still prevail intensively in the African continent. There were expectations that the end of the Cold War would usher in a peace dividend for Africa, but the reality has been more complex. Whilst some countries adopted liberal democratic practices (multiparty political systems, regular elections and free market economics, for example), these were insufficient to quell high levels of internal discontent – which, in some countries, led to armed, intrastate conflict or civil wars. The character of these violent conflicts has changed over time. Hence, some conflicts of the 1990s and early 2000s were organized contestations for power at the level of the central state by groups with clear political objectives, and decisive outcomes with wide legitimacy. In Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda, authoritarian regimes, military rulers and one-party states were dislodged, and more inclusive politics prevailed. This is in contrast to many of the armed conflicts today, where the motivations of the belligerents are complex and varied and may even include a desire to break away from the central state, rather than to take control of its levers, as in Mali, Nigeria and Libya. Such factors make the challenge of reaching sustainable peace in Africa an ambitious undertaking. The African Union (AU) had aimed to "silence the guns" by 2020 (Grävingholt 3-4).

In a recent article, Chris Nshimbi summarized some of Africa's current theatres of conflict. They include civil wars in Libya and South Sudan and a war waged by separatist Anglophones in Cameroon, and regional conflicts in the Sahel (affecting Mali, Burkina Faso, northern Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Eritrea); the Lake Chad area, including Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria; the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya; and the Great Lakes Region, including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda (Doyle and Sambanis 2).

This paper examines the basic foundations of the current iterations of violence in Africa and assesses whether the policy measures and strategies adopted at the international, regional and national levels are bringing the continent closer to sustainable peace. In doing this, the writer uses the historical method of research to situate the discussion within the parlance of history and as well highlight the various concerted efforts employed over the years to combat and reduce such menace. The evaluative method will apparently be used to situate the discourse within the African Philosophical position on tackling conflicts in a uniquely African way.

Africa's Root Cause of Armed Conflict in Focus

For decades now, there has been a steady rise in armed conflicts in Africa. Several key factors were said to have been responsible for the propagation of such conflicts. A United Nations (UN)/World Bank study entitled *Pathways for Peace* published in 2018, pointing out that more countries had experienced violent conflict in 2016 than at any other time in the past 30 year. The study noted that the surge in violence affected not only low-income countries, but also middle-income countries with relatively strong institutions (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)). This challenged the trickle-down theory of economics – the assumption that growth in national income will invariably lead to peace, along with social, economic and political advancement. Based on current trends, the study argued that by 2030, more than half of the world's poor would be living in countries affected by high levels of violent conflict (UNDP 2016).

1. Contested Political Transitions

Election-related violence had increased, and this violence occurs before, during or after voting periods. In some cases, violence was triggered or exacerbated by amendments or revisions of constitutions to serve incumbents or their parties, by prolonging their years in office. Other triggering factors were the closing of space for civil society to engage meaningfully in political processes and debate, the passing of restrictive laws, and the state resorting to 'intimidatory' tactics or the use of undue force, as examples of how citizens were prevented from exercising their rights in Nigeria's 2023 elections. Another trigger might be the refusal of an incumbent to relinquish power to the winning party after an election, leading to violence between supporters of the respective candidates or parties.

2. Interstate Rivalry

A second factor driving the increase in violent conflicts, identified in the *African Politics, African Peace* report is the phenomenon of interstate rivalry. This debunks the idea that African states "do not go to war with each other" and are essentially free of conflict, united by a common set of interests due to their shared colonial past. This transposition of the "liberal peace" idea has disguised the harsh truth of competition between African states. As the report stated, some armed conflicts, in spite of being described as "intrastate", are characterized by high levels of "clandestine cross-border military operations and various forms of support to proxies by neighboring countries" (World Peace Foundation). These dynamics are a substantial reason for the prolonging of conflicts in countries that can little afford the scars of violence.

3. Violent Extremism

A third factor contributing to armed conflict in Africa, according to the *African Politics, African Peace* report is violent extremism. The study noted that there was a tendency for such violence to flow across borders. An extensive UNDP study, *Journey to Extremism in Africa,* paints a picture of alienation, poverty and marginalization as being significant drivers for why people are attracted to violent extremist groups. Some 495 inmates in detention centers – all of whom had, at some point, been involved in violent extremism – were interviewed about what had motivated them. Most of the respondents were male (although not exclusively) and almost all said they had resorted to violent extremism as a means to a livelihood. Most of them had also grown up in remote border areas, where services were often neglected by state authorities. Their perception of their opportunities was that these were extremely limited; in fact, many saw themselves – their ethnic group or religion or something important to their sense of self – as being under threat. As a result, they did not trust the state authorities – in fact, most of these extremists said that the trigger for becoming involved in violent extremism had been some negative experience they had encountered at the hands of the state. The effects of violent extremism are devastating. The UNDP estimates that more than 33 000 people in Africa lost their lives in violent extremist attacks between 2011 and 2016 and still counting 7 years later. In addition, millions have lost their livelihoods due to forced relocation or loss of breadwinners as a result of this violence. Recently, in Nigeria alone 86 persons were reported to have been murdered in cold blood in Benue state, 36 of which were killed in internally displaced (IDP) camps where they sought for refuge far from their ancestral homes. It was alleged by the Governor of the state and other survivors in an interview by Nigeria's AIT news correspondents on the 7th of April, 2023, that the Fulani extremist groups (herdsmen) were responsible for such attacks in the state.

4. Disputes over Natural Resources and Boundaries

A fourth factor contributing to further violent conflict was disputes over natural resources and boundaries. At a local level, competition for resources can lead to conflict – for example, conflict between pastoralists and farmers in the Sahel countries is a source of ongoing tension. On the other hand, disputed boundaries have not in themselves been sufficient to drive violent conflict.

5. Economic Marginalization and Social Inequality

The lack of state investment in key sectors, such as education, health and community security, has fuelled grievances. In some instances, non-state actors have stepped in to fill the vacuum, offering the security and protection the weak or indifferent state has failed to provide. They have used the advantage of proximity or access to propagate ideologies that promote intolerance and violence, as with *Boko Haram* and banditry attacks in northern Nigeria and *Al-Shabaab* in the Horn of Africa. The resulting violence has led to militarized responses from the state, leading to a further drain on resources. This is a vicious cycle that is damaging to the economies of the affected countries, and which causes grave insecurity for the people.

6. Easy Access to Weapons

A question that has to be asked is: where do weapons come from for armed violence? Studies have shown that Africa is awash with illegal weapons (some estimates put the number at 100 million illicit small arms) (Porter 21), and that their easy availability is fueling conflicts. Some are legacy weapons from past conflicts; others are stolen or captured from the arsenals of militaries in the region, whilst others arrive in Africa through illicit maritime trafficking – for example, in Somali waters, or in the Gulf of Guinea. These weapons then make their way into the hands of extremist groups. The interconnectedness of illicit weapons smuggling, other forms of trans-border crime and poorly equipped and trained enforcement capabilities consign the people in affected countries to hardship and insecurity.

Elusive Peace: What fundamentally is the Problem? A Brief History

Ali Mazrui thinks of Africa today as haunted by the curse of Berlin, referring to the 1884–1885 European partitioning of Africa into unviable states that embedded the paradigm of violence at the very foundation of African statehood, a paradigm Africa is struggling to disentangle itself from (23). This produced what Ngugi wa Thiong'o calls deep dismemberment that has defied efforts at unity, peace and development long after independence (20). For him, this is partly because the African elite that took over were brought up in that same Euro-North American modernity which fashioned the current African condition. For this reason, efforts at peace, development and liberation without re-memberment of Africa at various levels have only helped provide for temporary respites rather than lasting solutions. It is in this analytical context that we consider the AU's approach to peacebuilding and its efficacy in fulfilling the African dream of peace, where peace means removing the gangrene that set in centuries ago and keeps manifesting as resurgences of conflict, poverty and despair (Césaire 72). Peace is about a fundamental shift from the paradigm of violence at the root of the African states to a paradigm of peace that fosters the African renaissance (Du Bois 53). Therefore, it is at the same time a process of decolonising the African colonial condition whose roots are a violent conquest and domination as well as the neo-colonial realities of post-colonial Africa.

Given the ambiguity of violence in Africa, peacebuilding processes tends to be complex, multifaceted and messy, with several processes overlapping or running concurrently. These can include political transition, where political actors must sort out their differences, level the playing field and work together in a common geographical territory. Another trigger for the reigniting of conflict may be the failure of those who attain power to attend to the issues of socio-economic justice. A further challenge to peacebuilding is the varied and asymmetrical threats that peace operations must continue to respond to, even as peacebuilding work must proceed.

Continental Peace Architecture: Towards Peacebuilding in Africa

The continental peace architecture provides an institutional framework for implementing the concept of a comprehensive peace that encompasses conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. At the pinnacle of this architecture are the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2004 with ten members elected for two-year terms and five for three-year terms in order to provide some stability and continuity to the Council's leadership. The focus of the PSC is to prevent and resolve conflicts by monitoring potential security threats throughout the continent (Baregu 14–25). It sends fact-finding missions and can authorize AU interventions in the form of peace envoys, observer missions, mediators, good offices, technical support teams, and armed forces to keep peace after agreements. Article 7 (e) of the Protocol Relating to Establishment of the Peace and Security Council operationalises the AU Constitutive Act's principle of non-indifference by empowering the Council to recommend military interventions for authorisation by the AU Assembly in cases of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes (African Union). This is a new dynamic in Africa's peace agenda – a continental decision-making platform for peace building plus the principle of non-indifference towards violence within states. Its success will be related to whether and how the continent manages to undo the curse of Berlin which infects the states, the economies and society in general. Otherwise, this architecture will be remembered only for its great promise rather than its actual effect on the ground.

AU-Regional Economic Communities (RECs) interface

The African Standby Force consists of five regional brigades and enables the AU to intervene in a coordinated fashion in a conflict situation. In this regard, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECASS) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) have responsibilities to make, secure and build peace in the regions. In this way, the AU framework for peace building encourages regions to take responsibility

for peacebuilding in conflict situations; thus the AU implements the principle of subsidiarity in order to build the capability of RECs to ensure peace in the regions (Adibe 105–114). No other continent in the world uses regional structures for peacebuilding in the same fashion. In all occasions, the impact is, among others, a stronger capacity to building peace at the regional levels. It is an approach that is designed to help strengthen regions and promote a regional integration that transcends the limitations of involved nation states with their logics of power as dominance rather than cooperation (Adejumobi 29–53). A lasting peace must accompany the building of national unity, regional cohesion and continental integration – a set of conditions opposite to those arising from the curse of Berlin.

The AU thinking and the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework

Many of the lessons learned from various experiments in peacebuilding during the latter years of the AU were integrated into the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework whose development began when in 2002 the implementation committee of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) decided that Africa's peacebuilding approach would be an all-embracing strategy including: a) restoring security; b) managing political transition; c) anchoring socio-economic development; d) promoting human rights and justice; and e) resource mobilisation (NEPAD). These five dimensions are designed to be mutually reinforcing and complementary.

The following analyses of key AU peacebuilding interventions will enable us to determine whether the AU has evolved a unique approach to peacebuilding and, if so, what this implies for the renaissance of a peaceful and prosperous Africa.

The AU Record of Peace Interventions:
Burundi

The AU inherited from the OAU several peace interventions, the first being in Burundi where the OAU had been involved since 1994 in de-escalating conflict, using good offices, peace envoys, esteemed mediators in Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela, peacekeeping and confidence-building measures (Muyangwa and Voigt 10). The OAU had succeeded in bringing the parties to a power-sharing agreement in 2001 that led to a three-year transitional government. The AU however was unable to end the conflict totally; the United Nations (UN) and the Eastern Security Council had to intervene.

Somalia

The AU intervention in Somalia was conditioned by factors quite different from those that prevailed in Burundi because Somalia had experienced a complete collapse of government in the early 1990s and had become a complex den of militia-driven and terror-linked conflict (Murithi 81). All efforts by stakeholders became abortive; the UN was required to step in. The UN deployed a force of 1 700 peacekeeping troops from Burundi, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Uganda in 2009, to first secure a political dialogue called the Somali National Reconciliation Congress. Since then, however, it has mainly been focused on protecting the fragile transitional government and helping to contain the security threat posed by the emergence of *Al-Shabaab* militants (AU Peace and Security Council). While the AU approach helped to contain the deteriorating security situation, it has not provided the conditions for peacebuilding further than relative stability or a security stalemate between government and militia.

Sudan

The AU peace intervention in Darfur in Sudan showcases a dimension of the AU peacebuilding approach which differs slightly from that in the cases outlined above, namely: co-ownership of the peace efforts between the AU and the UN. It is clear that this is an experiment born out of the

realization that without adequate financial and technical resources, international networks and the force of international law, good AU peacebuilding models will have a limited effect. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established in the year that the PSC was born, i.e. 2004. The mission was to minimise the impact of the conflict between government forces, militias and rebel groups on civilian populations in Darfur as well as to secure the environment for political interventions aimed at finding peace agreements among key political actors. Fought largely through proxy forces like militia and armed bandits, this conflict in western Darfur descended into deadly ethnic conflict and banditry pitting indigenous Africans against Arabic Africans. The news of mass killings and the displacement of two million people from western Darfur led to the AU intervention through President Idris Deby of Chad in September 2003. This led to the Abeche Agreement signed by the main rebel group, Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), and the government that agreed to observe a ceasefire, to disarm irregular armed groups and to provide a safe passage for humanitarian assistance (Murithi 81–82).   Inadequate financing of the mission meant that it relied on Western funding for its essential capacities, thus undermining the pan-African ideal of self-reliance. The reliance on NATO to transport AU troops to Darfur between 2005 and 2007 meant that this Western military alliance was given legitimate presence on African soil. Thereafter NATO would not depart from the African space, and played a prominent role in the Western military campaigns against the government in Libya in 2011 that led to the assassination of Muammar Qadaffi and undermined African diplomacy (Campbell 97–105). The AU peacebuilding approach has this serious weakness: it is one of those great African ideas that Africans cannot fund. They have to look to the West for finance, and this obviously brings divergent political visions, peace orientations and priorities which weaken the AU model to the point of failure.

Factors Contributing to the Uniqueness of the AU Peacebuilding Approach
The uniqueness of the AU peacebuilding approach, born out of the African experience does not mean features that cannot be found in some form in peacebuilding outside Africa. But it does mean that these features are from Africa's contribution to thinking and practice about peacebuilding. What is principally unique about the AU approach to peacebuilding is its historical genesis from peace initiatives driven by the OAU and then the AU. Part of it has to do with the contextualisation of central tenets of the UN's Agenda for Peace. Methodologically speaking, we have learned from the writings of Archie Mafeje and others that the authenticity of what is African arises from the fact that Africa's unique history presently produces particular African realities, thought patterns, approaches and orientations. This is true of all areas of public policy and politics including peacebuilding (66–71).

Factors Impairing the Uniqueness of African Peacebuilding
(1). Over-reliance on external funding for peacebuilding
The reliance on former colonial powers and other external forces for financial and technical resources seriously undermine the AU's peacebuilding. 'Borrowed waters do not quench one's thirst' is an African proverb that supports the pan-African ideal of self-reliance. Thus, dependence on external financing of peacebuilding defeats the very purpose of the AU approach. We have shown that the AU approach is founded on African renaissance and on the ideals of decolonising the world; but these ideals cannot be achieved while allowing Western powers space to influence what Africa thinks and does to this end. The failure of the AU to finance its programmes generally and the inability of many of its member states to finance their regular budgets is a major threat to the second decolonisation of Africa and its aim to finish the incomplete process of liberating the continent. (Zounmenou 34).
(2). The Obsession with Saving the Inherited Neo-Colonial State
It is clear that like the states that constitute it as an intergovernmental organization, the AU is still trapped in state-centric approaches to peace, focusing more on rebuilding the state, that was never authentic in the first place, than on transforming society as a whole. It has been about establishing the

semblance of a functioning nation-state in the form of governmental institutions for providing services and security rather than re-orienting citizenry or boosting indigenous civil society structures that form part of social capital for peace and development. Such rebuilding should ideally be linked to institution building, leadership development, citizenship enhancement, economic rejuvenation.

Conflicts and Peace Building: A Philosophical Framework of Action

Dialogues have proved to be a useful and adequate form of communication in the theory and practice of intercultural philosophy. Consequently any attempt at building peace in Africa must have recourse to dialogue. Dialogue should be the first step which involves the use of human objective thinking and reasoning in solving the problem of mankind. It was in this way that Jean Jacque Rousseau upon realizing the sentimental and egoistic unfolding of human action in the state of nature, that he advances his social contract theory. This theory was agreed upon and can only be workable and acceptable only when dialogue is reached. Rousseau believed that both antagonists and protagonists need to sit and decide to relinquish their freedom in order to be free. It is by so doing that a peaceful society could be attained. Such opinion of Rousseau is not entirely different from what African philosophers will uphold. However, as soon as dialogue is employed, a new framework which has existed in few African states need to be unanimously considered, that constitutes what we call "decolonial peace". By decolonial (Grosfoguel 10) peace we imply the pursuit of peace in a manner that also deals with the colonial continuities in the nature of the inherited state, with its underlying paradigm of war and violence, its colonizer model of the world and its colonial political economy. These continue to haunt post-colonial African societies. The concept is derived from the rich literature in decoloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 28), a family of theories that places on the discussion table the critical importance of decommissioning the underpinnings of the colonial order of things, including neo-colonialism, and pursuing decoloniality as an imperative for the achievement of full liberation in the global South (33). The failure of AU to fundamentally transform the inherited neo-colonial African society (including the state) limits the achievement of decolonial peace. Africans' experiences with centuries of structural violence and its manifestation in intra-state and inter-state conflict demonstrate the need for a focus on a more fundamental peace than is internationally the norm. It requires a shift towards a peace paradigm that promotes the continued decolonisation of the African state. Decolonisation is a long complex process that began as indigenous resistance to colonial conquest, and later developed into the rebellions against colonial rule, the achievement of independence and now the search for alternatives to Western ways of achieving noble purposes of peace, development and justice.

Evaluation, Conclusion and Recommendation

This research has endeavored to unravel and reiterate the basic drives of conflicts, some of which are extant till this day, such as the illegal importation of weapons and possession of those weapons by terrorist groups. A reality like this need not be taken for granted, hence the need for the decolonization of the African and their colonizers relationship needs to be evaluated and hence abolished if possible. This is so because till this day, a greater percentage of the colonizers intention towards the African continent is still that of exploitation. Another major issue that needs attention and evaluation is the frameworks being developed at the level of the AU, including relevant protocols attendant to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform. This have over time, proven not to be uniformly translated into domestic policies or receiving the same level of attention or commitment from all governments on the continent. Policy actors would do well to take note of analyses that point to the frustrations, marginalization and sense of exclusion and lack of opportunity that drive communities to the edge, since poverty or such lack, constitutes some of the basic causes of armed conflicts in Africa.

It is only in the past few years that Africa has addressed the reality that its economic dependency is integrally tied to its inability to address its conflict and peacebuilding challenges in a sustainable way. Truly, there appears to be more chaos and instability when human needs are not been adequately provided. The launch of the African Continental Free Trade Union (ACFTU) in 2019 was seen as a way of helping Africa out of this quagmire. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, was an eye opener towards embracing and facing global peace, but, at the same time, has exposed how fragile many states in Africa have being. Armed conflicts remain time and financial consuming. However, it becomes necessary that Africans begin to generate and manage funds needed for implementing peacebuilding strategies objectively. The very idea of the modern nation-state on African soil (which is colonial in its DNA) needs to be resolved or dismantled; else, lasting peace will scarcely be attained as there appears multiple allegations that some group of foreign private consortiums tend to benefit from the wars and conflicts in some African states.

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THE PHILOSOPHER AND HIS POSITION WITHIN THE SOCIAL EPOCH: TOWARDS THE ONTOLOGY OF A FADING APPEARANCE

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Abstract
Human development is a process that did not begin today. It dates back to the very beginning of human existence. Whatsoever form of narrative we take on this plane (creative or evolutionary) has a point of departure for humanity. From thence arises what we have as the status quo. This development is in no way limited to the physical domain. It also covers the cognitive and the affective aspects. This makes it wholesome. However, the affective domain earmarks our interest because of the social dimension it bears. The human being, social by nature, quizzes itself in the face of its quest for self discovery. It sometimes finds itself a minor in the face of human relationship. This comes with a lot of complexities as the ontology of the self sometimes appears to fade, leaving a void. Thus, this paper, using an integral approach, proposes a ground for understanding the place of the philosopher in this ever-evolving epoch where the real seems to lose its worth for a fading representation.

Keywords: Appearance, Creation, Culture, Evolution, Ontology, Social Epoch

1.0 Introduction

One word that best describes our world today is crisis. It comes in various forms. The worst of it is the crisis of identity - which captures the seeming loss of the self to other things but itself. In this case, one becomes the shadow of him/herself. One stands before him/herself as some form of appearance seeking validation from the outside. Without such forthcoming, the sense of the self gradually depletes. It can best be compared, in this case, to a mirage whose ontology is tied to an appearance that diminishes the closer one gets to the point it is expected to be. This is the nature of the social epoch we find ourselves in. How can the philosopher be relevant in this age and time that technological advancements keep making the human being a shadow of itself?

In the trends of human development, the human being was at a time seen as being closer to nature and united with its peers. The closer it was to others, the easier it found itself. This is clearly seen in the social dimension of the African sense of the human person. The human being was not defined in isolation but in communion with others. The more knit it was with others, the greater its chances of seeing itself as a subject. This made intersubjectively explicable without resort to non-human third parties, the creations of humans. Our present epoch is one that appreciates more those palpably far away, thereby failing to recognize the people palpably closer. While it is true that technology has successfully linked us up with those who are far, it has also made those close to us mere appearances. The ontology of this social epoch has the tendency of both alienating the human person from his/herself and others. What must the philosopher do as the gadfly, stinging humanity to the realization of consciousness?

To do justice to the issues raised, this paper will do a terminological clarification. This is meant to draw specific attention to the context in which the philosophical terms employed are exercised. With this cleared, it shall attempt to look at the trends in human development to understand how culture began and the impact it holds on us. This will usher in the social status quo and how its depletion should be a thing of concern for every philosopher. With this, we shall propose the course we must chart if philosophers must remain relevant in and to this multifaceted the world.

2.0 Terminological clarifications

Philosophy is generally taken as the brainchild of the ancient Greek world. Etymologically, it derives from the Greek *philos* meaning "love", and *sophia* meaning "wisdom". The blend of these words gives *philosophia*, "love of wisdom", where wisdom here could be used in context to mean knowledge. It could also be translated with the specific goal of enriching the intellectual prowess of the human person. This makes it an intellectual exercise. Being so, it must be noted that it can be defined in diverse ways. Distinctions in its definition arise when an attempt is made based on its subject matter, the method employed or its purpose. On the grounds of the first, it concerns itself with the most common and conceptual features of the world and the general frame with which most distinctive fundamental principles governing human thought, action and reality. To this end, philosophy is what happens when humans become self conscious and by this awareness, seek an understanding of themselves and their environment. Based on method, it could be seen as the rational search for knowledge. It is a systematic inquiry into the foundations of human knowledge of itself and what the world holds. Based on purpose, philosophy is defined in the terms of its functions. Here, it clarifies the goals of human endeavor and specifies the reasons for human existence. In all these, the philosopher is one who employs himself in the universe to think critically about the world, read closely the situation around him/her, write lucidly what his/her experience is all about, and analyze logically without prejudice his/her place in relation to the world. S/he does all these with the aim of understanding himself and his environment so as to live a purposeful life. As such, Timothy Williamson avers that "philosophy isn't something totally alien to us, it's there already in our lives, in trivial ways and important ones" (3).

This "us" noted above prefigures the social dimension of human existence. Social as a term has its root in the Latin *socius*, meaning "friend". The term *socialis*, coined from it in both Latin and the old French means "allied", depicting the sense of togetherness devoid of any form of isolation. It is characterized by communal living and sharing of essential resources common to a people or group of persons. Therefore, to speak of a social epoch is to describe a moment in the history of human relations. It is a time that says how humans behave given the extent of their technological advancements.

Two Greek words characterize the term ontology. When grouped as a word, it is *ontologia*, where *onto* means "being", "entity", "existence"; while *logia*, from *logos*, pertains to "study" or "science" or "discourse". This makes it the science of being or entity or simply, existence. It is the study of reality as it is. When one says there is something, s/he makes an ontological claim used in context. To speak of ontology of appearance, thus, is to affirm that an appearance depicts an entity, a possible reality. However, it does not clearly define it. In phenomenological terms, an appearance is what shows itself, a *phainomenon*. Therefore, our focus is on the place of the philosopher in this specific social epoch where everything seems to have been taken up by the extended self, the other, whose existence could as well just be a mere appearance. In Kant's usage of it, we speak of this appearance as the object of representation which coincidentally is the immediate object of our perception (A20/B34). This also makes it the object of awareness. That which represents stands in for something else. An in an Aristotelian sense, we could say that it does not stand for itself as a substance but as an accident, constantly viewed in reference to what it stands in for, without which it would not be thought of in the first place (*Metaphysics* Z.1.1028a18-28). This makes the appearance in this context a shadow of the real.

3.0 Trends in Human Development

The earth has existed for more than three billion years. Human life existed a little after the beginning of the earth. Going by the biblical account of creation, man came last of all created things. With his birth came the evolution of culture. The use of culture is not in the current multidisciplinary descriptions we give it. The simplest view of it as the totality of the way of human life suffices. What

marks the beginning of culture was man's use of instruments. It developed with the making and using of instruments, a situation that is uncommon among animals. Special emphasis should be laid on the "making and using" of instruments. While animals on their own could use certain instruments, the art of making it to serve particular purposes is what distinguishes humans. Common instruments at his disposal for his usage were stones, sticks, and every other natural material he came across. Though biologically the early man is similar to us, what he has been from the beginning has undergone a lot of changes. Becoming what we are today took a very long time of evolution.

In this narrative, there are two ways we could speak of culture. The first sees it as something peculiar to man alone. In the second, it is perceived in terms of the relationship between humans and other creatures. In both senses, it is important to note that culture began as something material. Now we have a theoretical concept of it. Natural culture began from crude material that the early man modified and used them as his instruments for survival. In these consisted his way of life. Such constructions of instruments became peculiar and distinctive. Theoretical culture came up much later where one could speak of the term without reference to these aspects. While crude materials served as indispensable means of survival for the early men, theoretical culture came up with things that were not necessarily life-sustaining, more specifically, for human survival. It is in line with this that it is important to make a distinction between things that were necessary and others that were not considered necessary in the strict sense of the word. Human beings then could not have done without the things that were considered necessary: for food, shelter, and meeting their direct quests for survival. The term "survival" is very important on this note. Those that were not really necessary were desired. It is this desire that gave room for development. The distinction made here could also be compared to needs and wants. The former emphasizes the things one cannot do without while the latter dwells on the converse, even when they are also important.

One thing that is important to note in this discourse is the role of the environment in human development. The environment within which a creature finds itself influences its development. Evolutionary discourses best clarify this. Such influences affect the creature not just at the psychomotor level where the creature learns basic skills but also at the cognitive level – the cognitive faculties. Every animal has its own possible cognitive level, not necessarily as imposed on it by humans, but on the natural level. Once the proper disposition is there, the environment proper to it can bring about an exploration of such possibilities. While there could be such cognitive moderations, the animal lacks the capacity to pass it on to its generations as it is the case with humans who teach the same acquired skills to their children. This preempts the origin of schools as formal institutions for learning and teaching.

Humans are inclined to teaching and learning and the acquisition of skills. This must be sustained if successive generations will have to carry on with it or at least keep it as it is. The art of learning most times begin from the family where a child learns by imitation of what he sees. With time, it is sent to a school, which is a more organized pedagogical structure. While looking at this from a profound dimension, Ivan Colagè buttresses: "Culture develops, unrolls and progresses in history, bears a universal anthropological value, and is the locus where active self-transcendence takes place. It constitutes the background and the milieu for human worldly activities…" (148). A cultural environment is always pedagogical in nature, be it formal or informal (in other words, traditional). It is at this level that the child is formally introduced into the life of society. Though human beings might not have consciously modified their environment to modify themselves, however, one thing that is certain is that a modified environment exerts some influence (no matter how relative it might seem) on the creature. For instance, what humans or animals feed on predominantly within a given environment has effects on their general human or animal development at all levels.

Written language was invented more than 3500BC. Human evolution might not have come by and with reading. Writing came as a dynamic invention that stands out as a key to other human inventions and technology by which there exists a constant growth in human development (Colagè 148-149). Through writing came a documentation of human activities and cultural development. The stages of this development are made evident to us today through this art. Discourses on strict biological evolution seem limited when modern developments are considered in the light of learning, for example; cultural evolution has shown that human evolution has long transcended biological considerations within which many had restricted it to be. This suggests that the art of writing came with an entirely new dimension to things in the world. The ability to associate images/figures with other situations has long been in existence. Oral language rose with this association. With written language, there is a progression from an image to a sign cum oral association to a written representation.

Modern science rose out of human ambition. This is largely so because the human being wants to grow and self-transcend. It could realize this because of the human ability to educate itself and self-educate itself to do it. Through educating itself, the human being discovers and learns things in his/her environment. Without anyone teaching the human being, he/she makes things for him/her own well-being, to better itself and the environment. Self-education comes to bear when the same knowledge acquired is mastered through acts of repetitions to perfect the art and subsequently teaching others to reenact the same thing. These two dimensions classify the teaching and learning abilities of human cultural development. Culture (education), therefore, modifies the human being by modifying his/her environment (Colagè 150).

4.0 The Social status

The advancement we have recorded in the various spheres of human life did not come as isolated achievements. People saw particular problems and made effort to solve them. The results of their solutions to the problems seen were made open for public consumption. There was a sense of communal growth. Human interaction and the quest to stay together must have been the reasons we have progressed so far as a human community. In this social era, moreover, one sees a surge in the desire to stay connected to and with people from all over the world at an instant. The idea of telephones, for instance, must have come up because people wanted to keep taps of and with the happenings in their environments from far away. This gives us a glimpse of how human interaction fostered this aspect of technological advancement. The same reason could be advanced for the creation of the social media. By it, we bridged the gaps in human communication caused by the barrier of human separation, distance; thereby making the world a global village.

Expectedly, one would think that these reasons would keep us closely knit in our social relations. One will desire that as more people connect with each other, mutual suspicion would reduce. Parents would easily have access to their children and monitor their growth, for instance. However, what we see is a gradual decay in our social status. Technology made human social connections easier in a sense. It also took away what we had concretely before now, making it an appearance. There seems to be a mimic of the real. Children now sit with their parents at table with phones in hand, shortchanging their parents for people they might never come in direct contact with. We are more connected globally yet disconnected locally. What used to be concrete now gives way to the abstract. What a world of contradictions!

Being social beings, our self-realization has a link to our realization of others in our environment. This is the ground for self-validation, particularly among Africans. Martin Nkemnkia explains this: "the meaning of an individual's life is found in and through his relationship with the Other or Others" (111). People make recognition of what the individual has to offer. This gave the individual a sense of

belonging, a sense of the self. Now that the ontology of appearance gradually replaces this, could what we have as self-realization be real anymore? If self worth is necessarily connected to our social relations, can one say that what we now tag "fake life" on social media be sufficient to build an authentic relationship? What appeared as the initial aim for this aspect of our technological growth was for the promotion and sustenance of human interactions. While it is true that it has indeed grown, its foundation is shaky because it is built on mere appearance, a seeming imitation of actual human existence.

Now people are more isolated than ever. Individualism grows where self-exclusion is given a chance. From our comfort zones, we build our sense of the self, somewhat caught off from our peers. In this scenario, the subjectivity of human perception erodes intersubjectivity. The chances that we now believe in our minds alone with little or no reference to those of others highlight a danger in our interpersonal relationships. What we have as intersubjective relationship is now cloudy, shady and gradually fading away. No doubt that the man of this present age knows so much. Howbeit, he has become a slave to his knowledge. It seems that the more he knows the less effective he is because of the lack of interpersonal relationship that brews.

Photography was initially meant to capture a reality outside of the self, a reality captured within the environment. Now we have selfie that makes us turn to ourselves, keeping away the other as though she/he does not belong to us, to our group anymore. It gives us a sense of being self-made without any need of the other. This is the closed system that reduces reality to my worldview, excluding anything related to the other as a necessary part of me. However, I cannot define myself when I have no contact with others. The moment I gain contact with others, I can no longer speak completely of myself without making reference to them. They form an indispensable part of me. This means that the impressions they live on me count and vice versa. In this case, dialogue is a necessity.

5.0 The Relevance of Philosophy to our World today

Many still wonder at what relevance philosophy still holds. For them, it is an abstract enterprise cut off from reality. With this mindset, they look it as a foreclosed discipline that reminisce the intellectual prowess of dead men and women whose contributions we have long outlived. They fail to see what their endeavors have made of what we have today. Most times, thoughts like this come to play when we think of philosophy solely in the technical sense. By doing this, we neglect the natural inclination we have as humans to knowledge. Howbeit, anyone who has followed this paper to this point is a philosopher already. Edward Craig thinks in this light. He believes that nearly "all of us are [philosophers, *emphasis mine*], because we have some kind of values by which we live our lives (or like to think we do, or feel uncomfortable when we don't)" (1). This conception arises from the fact that we think and seek answers to the things happening around us. Being a philosopher is tantamount to being human by virtue of our ability to reason. This suggests that philosophy encompasses all we do to make meaning out of life. It is an art we cannot do without as humans. John Paul II corroborates this in his encyclical *Fides et Ratio* when he claims that by nature, we are philosophers (4).

Philosophy is our compass for understanding the world around us. It is our guide to true knowledge of the causes of things. By this, it takes us deeper than what we have on the surface. It goes beyond what we have as appearance to the substance of all there is. We cannot get to this if we do not distinguish these two levels of ontology. At the level of the former, we are limited to what is available to us from our sense perception of the world. With the latter, we go deeper to a point that brings about an appreciation of what is there before us. The recurrence of this form of quest for the real throughout human history lays bare what initially seem hidden to us. In line with this, John Searle contends how philosophy is never out of touch with human history. It is constantly in touch with it in the sense that what was treated before now will always have a link to what is invoke. For him, "Philosophy never completely overcomes its history, and many mistakes of the past are still with us" (10). This means

that our philosophizing today has the duty to treat these mistakes. It must outlive them by taking out their excesses.

From the foregone, a careful study of philosophy shows that its goal is for knowledge. This is one common feature it shares with other disciplines. With knowledge comes empowerment. Without it, people wander in ignorance which persists when they do not question their assumptions and beliefs. When this link is missing, deception becomes something prevalent. The onus is on us to challenge these assumptions and previous beliefs so as to arrive at their base. When this occurs, nothing is taken for granted. Bertrand Russell gives credence to the kind of knowledge philosophy seeks. According to him, the "knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs (127). Once unchallenged, these convictions, prejudices and beliefs, especially when they are wrong, give room to sheepism.

Being an intellectual activity, philosophy helps us to apply ourselves to every situation. It increases our problem-solving ability. By this, it enables us to fit into societal demands in all aspects. What we garner from philosophy is not limited. It can be applied to almost every venture. The veracity of this statement is evident in the fact that it shades light on many other disciplines. This is why a broader classification of the branches of philosophy touches on its applied aspects. There is a philosophy of virtually every discipline. In a quest as this, it raises basic questions and provides thought-provoking answers to the reality addressed in each field.

Being reflective in nature, philosophy offers a plethora of opportunities for people to self-engage for their good and that of those around them. This is possible through the series of critical thinking and reason involve in it. Andrew Beards calls this self-engagement "stepping back" from the hustles and bustles of life. This art keeps the philosopher away from himself and others to pursue more important things that people would have neglected in life. In his thoughts, he advances: "The world of academic philosophy and the history of philosophy can be understood as the work of a community of human persons who pursue the great questions common to us all in a more sustained and concentrated manner (2). This withdrawal is the base for many of the inventions we have in our world. Scientific development did not just fall from the blues. They are the fruits of this intellectual withdrawal in search of meaning to the things that, at a point in time, appeared cloudy and unsolvable.

In a more general way, every field of study, as we have it today, takes a leaf from philosophy. History shows that philosophers have provided answers to the various questions different disciplines now deal with in details. It gives room for the appreciation of the diverse careers we have. Before now, philosophers were at the helm of affairs in the world given their deep insight on the things happening around them. Has this aspect of philosophy vanished?, one may ask. Though it is more speculative today, philosophy can still guide the various processes of research to bring about more desired and fruitful results. Through this, it can promote life-changing careers that could enhance the human standard of living.

There is also no gainsaying that philosophy has a great influence in our world. It confronts us with the truths that enlighten our paths to success in life. When we individually engage ourselves in our thoughts, we greatly influence ourselves. This self-influence is not limited to our space. The fact that we hold a place in the world means that this influence extends to it. When human beings change, by changing their perception of the world, everything around them changes. It is profitable to humanity when this influence is on the positive plane. This is why it is important for us to sometimes stop and ask: what place does the philosopher hold in this age? This social epoch is one that has need of great

thinkers to give taste to human life. If our society must be sound in all its aspects, we must, therefore, philosophize. We must x-ray our place in the world so we weigh in quickly on the issues we have not done well on or neglected for long. This self-assessment is necessary.

6.0 Charting the course
We have seen that the job of philosophy is to always fill in the gap created by human and natural crisis with something that creates a balance. The world continues after us, it does not end with us. It lives on. What we have done is all that will live on for the generations after us. What this selfie nature of the world does to us is to limit the world to us as though it ends with us. This limited scope is what leads to the crisis that does not allow for inclusiveness. It only allows for a projection of an all-exclusive mentality. It puts others outside of a dialogue-enabling environment, situation or context. That means that dialogue is only possible when we have others even though it begins with our integral being (the human being is a composite of spirit, soul and body). Such collaborative attitudes with others, we noted earlier, must have prompted many technological breakthroughs. Everyone saw the world from specific angles that highlighted the problems in need of solutions were of benefit to all.

Human ingenuity has greatly improved. What we have today was not thought of millions of years before now, the possibilities before us today were at some point seen as impossible. This shows that technology has played a great role in enhancing our perception of the world. It has removed the brick walls of separation among humans, creating room for wireless relationships, cutting across concrete boundaries. Technology viewed in this sense that has led us thus far in development has also left an effect on us. One that loses the essence of what the philosopher must guard against through the right use of the social media. When these wireless relationships transcend the level of mere appearance, true friendship grows. This is the kind that is founded on the real. It does not fade away or disappear with the passage of time. Nothing compares to it in terms of its quality.

Philosophers must learn to scrutinize whatsoever they see on the social media platforms. Reason ought to prevail over emotions and sentiments. Objectivity is the hallmark of the truth. By the right use of reason, one must not be limited to just his/her viewpoint alone. Philosophers must learn to see the wider picture. This is possible when the philosophical enterprise entertains the views of others without castigating them. In this way, fallacies give way to the truth. The philosopher must always ask questions on issues to give people the broader view of reality. In every post, a good philosopher must self-scrutinize by asking the basic questions: is it true? If yes, is it necessary? Are their chances that it might be wrongfully offensive? It is no problem when it is rightfully offensive. One cannot satisfy all peoples at all times after all. Questions like these and more make philosophers relevant in their social interactions in this social epoch.

We must be part of the story making in this epoch. To philosophize today, we must insert ourselves into the concrete living condition of the world. This is a means by which we get in touch with ourselves. Self-alienation is a social vice we must put aside. It makes us create a perspective that sees only ourselves as what must be given attention to. The world around us needs attention too. There is no need looking at it from a third party position, especially one that has been created by humans. Looking at it from this point makes it appear superficial to us. It keeps us away from the dialogue that concretizes the situation of the world. When we do not participate in the living reality around us, we lose grasp of what the future holds. The past is but a history that can only be fruitful if we insert ourselves into what the present gives us.

7.0 Conclusion
This paper started up with the quest to know who a philosopher is. Having made clarifications on the use of terms, it highlighted a philosopher as one who seeks knowledge. Through questions and

answers reflectively thought out, he/she arrives at the truth. An academic venture of this nature is not solitary; it has a social dimension. This aids our clarification of the social epoch we live in. The saying goes: "no man is an island". No one has been created by/for himself alone. We have a connection with others. The trends of human development have shown that human culture began in the simplest way. Culture has undergone changes from a material to a speculative status without failing to describe the totality of human behavior. This human behavior has been greatly influenced by the art of writing which makes learning and teaching easier and accessible. By learning and teaching itself, the human being rises above its limitations. The human being stands out among other creatures by his ability to self-educate and educate others.

We have seen that the consistent growth in science and technology began from human desire. Underneath this curiosity lay the base of philosophical thinking which begins by asking questions on what is there? How we know what is there raises epistemological questions to clarify our ontological claims. Is what is before us real or a mere appearance? The ontological status of our world today must be clarified if philosophy must be relevant to us. Its relevance must not be cut off from the reality of the world. As philosophers, the world is our field. We must intellectually cultivate and tend it with utmost care. Nothing must be taken for granted.

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