

## How The Mind Relates With The World In Husserl

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**Abstract:** Whenever the question of reality is raised, two prominent strands of knowledge stand out: empiricism and idealism. Whereas empiricism holds that reality is entirely visible and measurable, idealism holds the very opposite; that reality is invisible and immeasurable. But if it is empirical in its entirety, what then happens to certain factual abstract realities? And if it is entirely ideal, what then happens to the factual physical entities which we can see and measure? However, in an attempt to reconcile these opposing strands of knowledge, some people hold dual substantial and essential nature of reality: that reality is the combination of the nature of the two opposing strands. Thus, the question is: apart from the ontical approach, how could the ontological approach play out in the understanding of reality? Simply put: if the knowledge of reality holistically bases on scientific approach, how could the ideal be known and be interacted with or what is the role of the mind in epistemic enquiry? At this, the problem becomes both metaphysical and epistemological.

**Key Words:** Mind, Phenomenology, Relate, Transcendence, World

### Introduction

Edmund Husserl is indeed one of the mind-blowing academicians in the history of the European intellectual development. He made commendable effort to save the human intellect from what Bacon calls *idols* which hinder the real knowledge or understanding of the essence or true nature of the object of epistemic enquiry. However, before digging deep into his ideology, it is paramount to give his background briefly. This physicist, astronomer and mathematician whom some call the “father of phenomenology” was born in 1859 in the Moravian Province, Prossnitz. He studied in Friedrich Wilhelm University, Berlin and the University of Vienna. He was prominently influenced by Descartes, Carl Stumpf and Franz Brentano’s personal ideas on ethics, psychology and logic and through his lectures on Hume’s and Mill’s philosophies. He obviously and significantly influenced Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty (Stumpf and Fieser, 2003: 445-7).

### Husserl's Academic Motivation

Edmund Husserl diverted his interest from mathematics and logic to phenomenology so as to address a loophole. The loophole was that he became convinced that the Western culture has lost its foremost direction and aim. This informed and reflected in the title of his major work: *The Crisis of European sciences* published in 1936. Just like Heidegger who opined that the western traditional metaphysics/ontology has lost focus and consequently buried the core question and meaning of being, Husserl believed that Western Philosophy has diverted from its *onus* and *purpose*. This focus-diversion is what he designated with the term, “crisis” which is the “seeming collapse of rationalism.”

The key factor in this diversion of modern thought from the original aim was the enterprise of *natural science*. He thought that this derail in the original mission of philosophy could be traced back to the philosophical attitudes in Greece when philosophers and scientists departed from nature and concentrated on speculations that do not enhance human world-situational-facts. In the olden days, Husserl opined, people had very practical approach to existential issues, seeing to their basic life-needs like clothing, sheltering, feeding, among other existential issues. “They developed mythologies and early religions that supported the

practical concerns of individuals and larger groups... there was no culture of ideas in the sense of concepts that reached beyond the immediate boundaries of local experience and practical interests” and by this, approach to life-situations became “a universal critique of all life and its goals” which “bespeaks nothing but universal science, science of the world as a whole, of the universal unity of all beings.” He was not attacking science per se for in fact, his “ultimate objective is to save human reason by developing philosophically into a rigorous science”, but criticizing “the assumptions and methods of the natural sciences.”

For him, natural science has not pictured really what the world is exactly like and the best way to know it, rather it largely relied on “the fatal prejudice that nature is basically physical.” It has over the years not presented the reality of human life-situation in the world and the best way to explain it and the world because its adherence to empirical approach hinders the analysis of the “phenomenal view and human subjectivity” (Zahavi, 2001:2). Husserl terms this approach *the natural attitude* and in it, the world as world withdraws. He posited that scientific discourse makes the world silent and as a consequence, fails to apprehend the world subjectively but objectively. In other words, science is “capable of apprehending the world only as something having the character of an object.” Science grabs only the appearance of the world forgetting that there are more to appearances. He so contended that natural science has hidden the truth form the world by holding that “physical nature envelops everything there is” and also, “that knowledge and truth are “objective” in the sense that they are based upon reality beyond our individual selves.” With natural sciences, the scientific methods enveloped the true knowledge of the spirit and the spirit consequently was conceived as “an object fact founded upon physical stuff.” For him, “the physical science could never provide a truly fundamental analysis of reality, because they uncritically accept a 'natural attitude' towards the world, of naive realism which is an assumption, not a phenomenal given” (Smith, 2003:14). He further contended that natural sciences, as a consequence hold that “there can be no pure self-contained search for an explanation of the spiritual, no purely inner-oriented psychology or theory of spirit beginning with the *ego* in psychical-self-experienced and extending to the other psyche. The way that must be travelled is the external one, the path of physics and chemistry.” Ultimately, the success and glory of sciences result in the gradual scientific-rejection of the spirit. Suffice this to say that “naturalistic objectivism studies spirit according to the methodology of the natural sciences.”

This scientific approach to reality as seen in the natural sciences, for him, posed a threat to true knowledge of reality and that is a problem. In other words, “the phenomenological problem of the world finds its origins in the fact that each scientific attempt to conceptualize the world rests upon an attitude that is capable only of apprehending the world as some sort of natural complex” (Welton, 2003:223). At this, Husserl then set out to “saving human reason.” Suffice this to say that to heavily criticize this position of natural science is the most significant factor of his academic pursuit for as long as this position is believed, man cannot improve his understanding of his true human purpose. With the natural science, philosophy is held in captive and the world becomes itself only a semblance for the natural science treats it like a natural environment or a socio-historical reality or the totality of all such worlds. But “natural environments, psychological domain, and social or cultural milieus are to be treated as “regional ontologies” because they are situated within the world (Welton, 224).

Emphasizing on the problem, it is known that the problem of knowledge in particular reference to the object of knowledge has been the central theme in academics. This is because the epistemic object, according to theories, is not just entirely *empirical*, but also *ideal*. If the epistemic object is physical, empirical observation, verification cum falsification can go a long way in identifying and defining it. But if it is ideal, the best epistemic approach becomes the issue. This is where the natural science missed it and thus, to identify the ideal, Husserl thought, now becomes the sole duty of philosophy via the application of the Transcendental Phenomenology. Even in our bid to grasp reality in its entirety, how true is

our knowledge of whatever (whether empirical or ideal) we claim we know? If we can affirm our own existence, how can we truly affirm the existence of *the other*? Or are we the only existents? But with our common sense, we can perceive *other existents*. How can we identify them and how convincing and reliable is our knowledge of them? How can we define and relate with the world? How can we identify the other visible and invisible, the *other minds* existing in the world with ours? At this, the problem becomes both metaphysical and epistemological. These critical enquiries are important following the fact that the goal of philosophy, Husserl thought, should fundamentally be “to provide the best possible answers to human concerns, to deal rigorously with our quest for the highest values, and... to develop the unique broad-range capacities of human reason” (Stumpf and James, 448).

At this end, the need to emerge with a sort of “Transcendental Phenomenology” which should serve as a way of grasping the essential nature of the spirit and thereby overcoming naturalistic objectivism becomes necessitated. Husserl thus went into developing “a genuinely fundamental philosophical analysis through concentration on the immediate phenomenal content of human external and inner experience and perception” identified as *transcendental phenomenology* (Edo, 1970:13). For Husserl, this course uses *phenomenological approach* to analyze and decide the fundamental “preconditions of human experience and perception, by abstracting from all the content of human consciousness, knowledge and cognition that is not immediately and intuitively given to consciousness... while every theory or inference about an experience may be doubted, the experience itself is beyond doubt” (Smith, 17). By this method, there emerges a complete presuppositionless and indisputable basis for philosophical analysis, especially as it concerns the individual subjectivity (Edo, 13). The feasibility of this follows that “phenomenological constitution is the task of rigorously building up from this basic phenomenological residuum to the world as commonly experienced and known in everyday life, termed the life-world” (Husserl, 1982:355).

### **Exposition of Husserl's Thought and Proof of Howness of the Mind-World Relationship**

Having now identified the point of derail from the objective and mission in the traditional way of philosophizing, Husserl thus deems it fit to address it by coming up with another better option. This option and the bid to formulate it saw to the emergence of *Transcendental Phenomenology*. With phenomenology, philosophy would now picture the reality of human life and the world and suggest how they could be comprehensively understood. The term “phenomenology” is etymologically Greek: *phainomena* (appearance) and *logos* (study/knowledge/science) which implies the *study of appearance*. “Appearance” here denotes anything at all that comes across our senses and perceptions- it could be ideal (not really and concretely existing) or empirically material (actually concretely existing). Little wonder then why Husserl, just like Brentano, holds that it does not really matter if the object of knowledge truly exists or not (Husserl, 559).

Phenomenology is therefore a sort of study that starts with empirical process but goes beyond empiricism. It systematically and procedurally leads the knowing-mind/self to a *pure* state where it will grab the real essence of the epistemic object disregarding any influence of any sort about that very object. The epistemic enquirer must transcend all bias and physical influences in order to give way for the *unbiased or transcendental self or ego* to emerge, to grasp holistically the real essence/knowledge of the very epistemic object; it “attempts an analysis of mind from the first person perspective in an attempt to understand the basic constitution of the world from the individual human subjective position” (Edo, 43). Put simply, it “sets aside questions about the so-called objective nature of things; it recommended instead that we explore phenomena more subjectively, from within our human experience” (Stumpf and James, 445). By this the knowledge got through phenomenology becomes a product of subjective exercise and the sources of the knowledge (the epistemic objects) become existential facts that are in constant relation with the real life-situation of man in the world. This informs the assertion that existentialism as a philosophical movement cannot deny influences of phenomenology because it adopts

phenomenology's subjective approach, and further develops practical issues of human experience, such as making choices and personal commitments as is clearly and definitively expressed in the existential ideologies propagated by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others. Knowledge becomes a product of man's practical activity from the life-in-the-world, life-situation of man. But importantly, this study of appearance is systematic for it does not deal with critical and rigorous thinking-process or revelation, but the undivided focus and critical study of the appearance (the epistemic object) in question. But attempting to develop the theory, Husserl acknowledges the effort of his predecessors whose ideas are of immense help to his. To this end, he commends Descartes saying that "phenomenology must honour Descartes as its genuine patriarch" for beginning his intellectual foundationalism with the *ego*- the thinking-self. However, he was critical of Descartes to stop at thinking as the defining point of existence hence it is appropriate to add experience (thinking-of-something), hence his position- *ego cogito cogitatum* (I think something).

For him, Descartes' epistemology is incomplete for thinking is thinking of "something". This "something" becomes the *intentionality* because being conscious is being conscious of something- say chair, orange, dog (as the intention (purpose) of the consciousness). Thinking must have a driving-force (aim) for which it acts. But in the other hand, Heidegger would not yet agree with Husserl either, for the thinking-self (man) ought to be recognized first, before thinking or the object of thinking. For Heidegger, Husserl is carried away by the trend created by Descartes and he forgot to perfect his own theory either hence he recognizes consciousness just like Descartes, and additionally recognizes the object of thinking (enquiry) and identifies it as the intentionality, credit to him indeed, but unfortunately failed to recognize the subject in this whole rigorous intellectual process. This problem is what Heidegger calls the *objectification* or *thingification* of man, the subject of the epistemic enquiry and this became the major problem of Western Ontology or traditional Metaphysics which he has come to redress. For Husserl, this intentionality is the rationale for active involvement of the *self* in making our own experience for it is both the structure of consciousness and fundamental category of existence itself because "things are what we intend them to be." The "transcendental self" thus becomes the judge and chief determinant and definer of reality for it is the manufacturer and object of epistemic journey in the search for reality.

However, to clearly state his own epistemic way of phenomenology, Husserl says: "We thus begin, everyone for himself and in himself with the decision to disregard all our present knowledge. We do not give up Descartes' guiding goal of an absolute foundation for knowledge. At the beginning, however, to presuppose even the possibility of that goal would be prejudice" (Stumpf and James, 449). In other words, as Descartes seeks through systematic doubt to achieve an absolutely reliable and certain foundation for knowledge, Husserl formulates the distinctive atmosphere of phenomenology by accepting only one part of Descartes' starting point which is *the thinking self*.

This implies that he starts his intellectual search with the *self*, and advises that the *self* ought to guide all through. By this, epistemic enquiry wears the characteristic of *transcendence* from the empirical endowment to the ideal. But whereas Descartes starts with skepticism, or better still, rejection of all the knowledge he ever claim to have known, Husserl did not, but was even more radical and advised bracketing all beliefs and theories about experiences itself, that is, not allowing them to overpower and direct our reason (Smith, 21). These beliefs, whether scientific or philosophical, lay a suspension of all judgment on the natures and significance of the phenomenal content of experience, or the given content of external and internal experience (Dan, 9). Important is to note that he was not advocating scepticism of scientific or philosophical knowledge, but rather attempting to lay these to one side to analyze the most basic question, of how we build our everyday world from phenomenal consciousness, which all such knowledge presupposes (Smith, 68). He urged that this phenomenological reduction occurs through *epoche* (Dan, 11). But what is *epoche*? *Epoche* is

the “abstraction from all theoretical and inferential content of experience.” It “makes possible the phenomenological reduction to end exclusive focus on only that content left unbracketed by the *epoche* (Dan, 11) and “this phenomenological residuum is generally identified with the immediately given content of intuition; the content of the experience itself, whether of outer perception or inner awareness of consciousness” (Husserl, 982). It is through this epochal bracketing that the unbiased and pure self will emerge and then carry out the epistemic search as supposed.

Therefore, epochal bracketing becomes the most acceptable method for epistemic enquiry for Husserl, if not, the outcome will never be epistemically reliable and bias-free. To stress this therefore, we must put away any pre-knowledge about the object of knowledge in question (*phenomenological epochal bracketing*) and then allow the emergence of the neutrality of the self for epistemic enquiry on the epistemic phenomenon. To get the whole epistemic process right, we must bracket all other objects, people, culture, and any other influence that may come from our previous background. This position clearly showed the influence Husserl got from Bacon who holds that epistemological enquiry must be free from *idols* (phantoms or shadows or bias/obstacles hindering the grasping of real knowledge) which fall under four categories to include: the idols of *market place* (errors from language), the idols of *cave* (hindrances arising from the human temperaments that block the sense of clear judgment) the idols of *tribe* (errors from appearance and our inability to probe more idealistically into issues), and the idols of *theatre* (errors from dogmatism, doctrine and cultural beliefs). For Husserl, we must purge our intellect of any presuppositions, the whole stream of experienced life in approaching the object of knowledge so that it will show us what the real nature of any phenomenon is. That is to say that phenomenology deals with the immediacy, that is, that which the self observes from what a phenomenon demonstrates. This is important following the fact of dynamism in the nature of realities which for Heidegger, is the *possibility*, the *unfixedness* and becomingness of *Dasein* or realities. This dynamic nature of realities shows our *limitedness* in the knowledge of any reality.

To overcome these errors arising from the dynamic nature of realities and get the real and reliable knowledge (essence) of the phenomenon, we must allow a thing to show its real self. By this, phenomenology becomes a discipline of non-pretence or assumption rather, knowledge must be got through the careful observation of the object of epistemology as it is given the freedom to show and demonstrate its real self. This must be because the *self* that will grasp the real knowledge is in the state of transcendence and by this, “the self becomes the first axiom in a logical sequence” and thus “simply as the matrix of experience.” Thus, the real knowledge and nature of a phenomenon must be approached to, with the pure or transcendental self of the knower. The objects under epistemic investigation should be sternly focused upon by the enquirer so as to get to its essence with pure mind void of prejudice. We must look with concentration unto the given “things and facts themselves, as these are given in actual experience and intuition” so to judge only by the evidence demonstrated by these objects and that is why he calls phenomenology the study or science of essence (pure substance), the *eidetic science*. By implication, epistemic primacy is given to sense experience instead of logic in order to “describe *the given* in experience as it is presented in its pure form and found as the immediate data of consciousness.”

At this, having now purged the mind of any pre-knowledge especially as it concerns the phenomenon under epistemic enquiry, the pure, unprejudiced and transcendental ego or self now in the *transcendental realm* emerges and then grasps the essence of the object, i.e. those phenomena which contain an object intentionality within themselves and which alone possess real existence as well as intentional coexistence (Brentano, 92). This portrays the facticity that the essence of any phenomenon is grasped through the essence of the enquiring subject. In Husserl therefore, we see the principle or justice of approaching the spiritual with spiritual and non-spiritual with the non-spiritual so as to allow like terms and unlike terms to go together respectively. By this, to get the real essence of a phenomenon,

the essence (transcendental self) of the epistemic enquirer will be allowed by purging the mind of any presuppositions and pre-knowledge, otherwise, the bias self will grasp biased knowledge of the phenomenon.

In the transcendental real, objects become objects of consciousness which are only perceived in inner consciousness and in “the case of physical phenomenon, only external perception is possible” and by implication, perceptions become “inner perceptions” which possess distinguished characteristics viz: Immediacy, Infallibility and Self-evidence (Priest, 91). By this, Husserl, just like Hume in his serious heavy criticism against metaphysics, rejects the Kantian concept of Noumenal Reality, Lockean Substratum, Platonic Idealism, and Berkeley's Divine Mind which we cannot entirely know. At this, the enquiring-individual would now say: “I have discovered true myself. I have discovered that I alone am the pure ego, with pure existence...Though this ego alone does the *being of the world*, and, for that matter, any being whatsoever, make sense to me and have possible validity” (Stumpf and James, 452). For Husserl therefore, unless the mind is purged and the real self emerges, there will never be real, true and reliable knowledge as a product of epistemology. In Husserl's epistemological phenomenological foundation, the immediacy, and undivided attention in observing the real self-demonstration of the given epistemic object is all that matters, for it is all the consciousness should work on. In his *Paris Lectures*, he made it clear:

For me, the world is nothing other than what I am aware of and what appears valid in such *cogitationes* (my acts of thought). The whole meaning and reality of the world rests exclusively on such cogitations. My entire worldly life takes its course with these. I cannot live, experience, think, value and act in any world which is not in some sense in me, and derives its meaning and truth from me (Stumpf and James, 452).

Man, having with a pure mind descended on an object, defines what the reality, essence of the object truly is, for him. This is how the mind relates with the world. For Husserl, the relationship of the mind must be pure for the mind will do the relationship in its pure state of *tabula rasa* so as to get the real nature or essence of the phenomenon. Reality of a thing must be devoid of pre-knowledge of that very thing hence Husserl detests pretence and bias in the course of getting to the real nature or essence of anything at all. For Husserl, “pure subjectivity” describes best the accurate facts of human experience. The investigating-person must transcend above all tendencies of any sort of bias so as to get to the real science, *eidetic science* of the object of knowledge in question and this method, Husserl recommends to all sciences in their pursuit to the real knowledge of anything at all. This position shows a clear influence of the Kantian Copernican Revolution on Husserl for as Kant posits that it is the mind that descends on objects and grasps its real nature, so does Husserl argue that the transcendental self would descend on the object in order to grasp its essence.

Deductible from Husserl's thought is the fact that consciousness (the knowing-mind) is inseparable from the phenomenon (object of knowledge) and this conveys his idea of intentionality. That is the recognition that human consciousness is defined as consciousness of something – say, seeing, hearing, and remembering; all these refer to objects of experience (Edo, 46). For him;

this concept provides an intimate connection between mental action and the objects of both the external world and the internal content of the mind, and demonstrates that mental content and phenomenal experience, whether external or internal, are fundamentally and inseparably linked. Thus, a fundamental analysis of human mental action and phenomenal experience requires an analysis of those mental intentional acts that link the two (Smith, 68).

Of course, in the transcendental phenomenology, pure consciousness is not segmented, rather it is a continuous phenomenon for the separate objections of perception make up the

continuousness or stream of consciousness, and in his words, “very often, many mental phenomena are present in consciousness simultaneously” (Husserl, 1970:56; Priest, 96). This aligns with Bergson's view that “in the continuity of sensible qualities we mark off the boundaries of bodies” (Stumpf and James, 450). Phenomenon is contained in the subjective act of experiencing an object since each person views the world solely through the perspective of individual subjectivity and to abstract from that subjectivity is to erase the fundamental source of human knowledge. In the Husserlian phenomenological epistemology, unlike a camera picturing and presenting the image of an object, to truly know implies the lubrication of the knowing-mind together with the object of enquiry. We must thus recall that Aristotle has posited that to truly know, is for both the knower and the known to inseparably know themselves for what we know automatically becomes part of us. In knowing, we grasp the real nature of the object for the whole process now includes “the real object, our actual perception of the object as we mean it, and the act of intentionality.” For Husserl, “consciousness makes possible and necessary the fact that such an 'existing' and 'thus determined' Object is intended in it, occurs in it as such sense” (Stumpf and James, 451).

### **Evaluation and Criticisms**

Husserl finally has to be commended for critical and brave attempts made for the growth of knowledge. He truly advanced knowledge especially as it concerns how to come out of epistemic cum intellectual journey with a bias-free result. Husserl strongly holds that to get to the *real nature* or *essence* of a phenomenon, the *transcendental self*, the *pure ego* of the epistemic enquirer must emerge through the assurance of the purgation of the mind of any possible presuppositions in order to surmount the dynamism of reality. The implication of this position on the spirituality of religion is clear. Undeniably, Husserl had so much influence on the spirituality of many religions as he reiterates and inherently inculcates in his ideology that transcendental realities, must be approached with the transcendental self. The lesson that can be drawn from this position is that for one to commune with the spiritual, one must be in the spiritual, and the pure spirit, in and with pure spirit.

Another clear fact in Husserl is his detest for pretence. He is of the view that the epistemic object in question must show and demonstrate its real self. It must not be conditioned or forced to a state that may hinder the display of its true nature. Husserl's idea is equally a democratic one as the epistemic phenomenon to be observed must be given freedom to demonstrate its real nature or essence. Just like the object of epistemic enquiry, the subject of the epistemic enquiry must never carry out this phenomenological epistemology under duress or pretence or with any atom of bias so that the essence of the object would be attained. There must be assurance of freedom and full allowance of both the subject and object of epistemic enquiry so that the goal (to attain the essence of the object) by the subject be got. By extension, we can argue that Husserl has a lot of influences both from ancient and on contemporary Pragmatists, Functionalists and Behaviouralists who insist that reality must be a *working* reality and one of the aspects to demonstrate this is through the behaviours of the epistemic or object of enquiry.

Similarly, if Husserl's ideology could be applied in the Nigerian political trajectory, it will certainly go a long way to solving Nigerian political instability and seeming attitude of refusing to grow in the global political trends. Nigerian politics today is filled with the attitudes of godfatherism, candidate imposition, tribalism and bias of “this is our own” syndrome, electoral maneuvering without any qualms of conscience and consideration to physical and intellectual capabilities of the person involved, leaders denying the led their closeness except in election time, among other ugly situations. If political office aspirants could be allowed to come out and show their real selves intellectually, by experience and expertise, health wise, and other aspects, the *bad eggs* in our political elite class will, by themselves, be dropped, and when this happens, the emergence of good governance, positive political growth would be easier to attain, politics of emotions would stop and politics based on capabilities and good moral inclinations would triumph.

Further, we must recall that it was generally commended that the concept of *intentionality* and as espoused by Brentano and Husserl went a long way in influencing, popularizing and easing the understanding of the concept of *intentional act* and *intentional objects* as espoused and re-conceived by the philosophers of the 19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> centuries. However, phenomenology can undeniably go a long way in modifying certain religious aspects of human life, but it cannot entirely, explain the quiddity of religion which is purely metaphysical as it revolves around the “Supreme Being” whom the religious believes exists and influences his life in one way or the other.

From his theory also, we know that the *pure self* that will emerge after the mind must have been purged of any presupposition is strictly personal, and following that tradition, what we throw out from the door, we may later bring back through the window. In other words, the error or bias we are running from might at last be brought in through the fact that the *self* that will do the knowing may finally give us bias-filled outcome hence it is personal to an individual. After all, no one follows the *transcendental self* in this epistemic process to know if truly it is giving us the reality of the phenomenon under epistemic enquiry. A critical mind ought to be afraid of solipsism or tendency of personal bias or relativity and its consequences if only the *transcendental ego*, the *thinking-self* determines what reality is for him because “no mental phenomenon is perceived by more than one individual” for it takes place in “the realm of inner perception” (Priest, 92). This follows the fact that Husserl says that the objective world with all its objects which exist, existed or will exist *for me* are *all drawn from me* and all the existential meaning and value that they have *for me* are all drawn *from my transcendental self* (Husserl, 1966:93).

More so, following this trend, a life of survival-of-the-fittest might be the end-product of this journey for it is only left for the *transcendental self* to determine what is for it and how it should be defined and identified. Husserl recommends an epistemic process with purged-mind or a mind in a *tabula rasa* state, not that of Lockean idea but vis-à-vis any pre-knowledge on the object of epistemic enquiry. He seems to forget that his epochal bracketing in search of reality is an impossibility itself for it is a functional aspect, property and nature of the mind which it can never be cured of, to keep memories for posterity. Who is the witness to the whole activity of mind-purgation? To which extent will a phenomenon demonstrate its nature and we will be convinced that it has now shown to us its real nature or essence? Put in another way, can the dynamism of phenomena be over powered and suppressed that it will have an end or show to us its very last dynamic activity or aspect of his existence? Again, we must be critical of being led to the domain of abstractness- like the Kantian nothingness where idealism will mar our existence hence it does not really matter if the epistemic object exists or not.

### **Conclusion**

Husserl was attracted by redressing an intellectual misfire from the onset goal of western philosophy, and he began with bracketing of any pre-knowledge and was more of phenomenological, and finally landed in the dependence on the *pure* or *transcendental ego*. He began with attacking natural science for naturalizing every reality; he equally holds the view that every pre-knowledge must be pocketed, bracketed in order that a new reliable and trust-worthy way of knowing will emerge. For Husserl, phenomenological methods ought to be applied to every discipline as its method. His intention was to make phenomenology a general method for every discipline, for it is straight forward and founded on a bias-free academic exercise. With it Husserl thinks, reality in its pure state would be grasped. Moreover, we can see clearly how the mind interacts with the world as the bundle of objects of experience. When the *mind, pure ego* emerges having created an avenue for its emergence through the mind-purgation, it will now discern (interact) with the epistemic object in question (the epistemic object and the world by extension) in order to grasp its real essence.



Objects of the world and the world as an entity are really known through this phenomenological approach. Thus, a thorough and holistic epistemological and metaphysical enquiry must accept that from the known, the unknown is inferred and imagined, and by this, the acknowledgment of the *participating-individual* must first be, and from there, the *transcendental self* or *thinking-self* will emerge and take us higher and purer in the systematic search for reality. By recommendation, failure to follow this prescription and equally apply the tenets in the Heideggerian Ontology where man (*Dasein*), (the being asking questions about his existence will first be perceived as the stepping-stone to the true understanding of reality) will certainly land man to pure, critical and rigorous thinking parlance, domain of nothingness where inhumanity is the order. With this done, intellectual enquiry will be more systematic, holistic and convincing, and the universe will be easily explored and resolutions will be brought to existential-challenging-situations. Adherence to this ideological postulation will emerge anew a way and method of epistemology that is more grounded, convincing and humane in dealing with man's existential challenges.

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